Carter
versus Boehm
Original Printed Version (PDF)
Original Citation: (1766) 3 Burr 1905
English Reports Citation: 97 E.R. 1162
Discussed
and approved, Bates v. Hewitt, 1867, L. R. 2 Q. B. 608. Principle applied,
Harrower v. Hutchinson, 1870, L. R. 5 Q. B. 590. Observation adopted, Gandy v.
Adelaide Assurance Company, 1871, L. R. 6 Q. B. 756. Dictum discussed,
Davenport v. Charsley, 1886, 54 L. T. 344. Referred to, Rowley v. London and
North-Western Railway Company, 1873, L. R. 8 Ex. 231. Dictum adopted, Bristol,
&c., Aerated Bread Company v. Maggs, 1890, 44 Ch. D. 622. Referred to,
Seaton v. Heath [1899], 1 Q. B.
790; [1900], A. C. 135. Adopted, Gedge v. Royal Assurance Corporation [1900], 2
Q. B. 222. 1766. [S. C. 1 Bl. 593.] Concealment will avoid a policy
of assurance. and approved, Bates v. Hewitt, 1867, L. R. 2 Q. B. 608. Principle
applied, 72/-m-/473'.ffamweer v. Hutchinson, 1870, L. R. 5 Q. B. 590.
Observation adopted, Gandy v. Adelaide Assurance Company, 1871, L. R. 6 Q. B.
756. Dictum discussed, Damenport v. Charsley, 1886, 54 L. T. 344. Referred to,
Rowley v. London and North-Western Railway Company, 1873, L. R. 8 Ex. 231.
Dictum adopted, Bristol, &c., Aerated Bread Company v. Maggs, 1890, 44 Ch.
D. 622. Referred to, Seaton v. Heath [1899], 1 Q. B. 790; [19001 A. C. 135.
Adopted, Gedge v. Royal Assurance Corporation [1900], 2 Q. B. 222.] This was an
assurance-cause, upon a policy underwritten by Mr. Charles Boehm, of interest,
or no interest: without benefit of salvage. The insurance was made by the
plaintiff, for the benefit of his brother, Governor George Carter. [1906] It
was tried before Lord Mansfield at Guildhall: and a verdict was found for the
plaintiff by a special jury of merchants. On Saturday the 19th of April last,
Mr. Recorder (Eyre,) on behalf of the defen-
8 BURR. 1907. CARTER
V. BOBHM 1163
dant,
moved for a new trial.
His objection was, "that circumstances were not sufficiently
disclosed." A rule was made to shew cause : and copies of letters and
depositions were ordered to be left with Lord Mansfield. N.B. Four other
clauses depended upon this. The counsel for the plaintiff, viz. Mr. Morton, Mr.
Dunning and Mr. Wallace, shewed cause on Thursday the first of this month. But
first, Lord Mansfield reported the evidence-That it was an action on a policy
of insurance for one year : viz. from 16th of October 1759 to 16th October
1760, for the benefit ol the Governor of Fort Maryborough, George Carter,
against the loss of Fort Marlborough in the island of Sumatra in the East
Indies, by its being taken by a foreign enemy. The event happened: the fort was
taken, by Count D'Estaigne, within the year. The first witness was Cawthorne,
the policy-broker, who produced the memorandum given by the governor's brother
(the plaintiff) to him: and the use made of these instructions was to shew that
the insurance was made "for the benefit of Governor Carter, and to insure
him against the taking of the fort by a foreign enemy." Both sides hat
been long in Chancery : and the Chancery-evidence on both sides was read at the
trial. It was objected, on behalf of the defendant, to be a fraud, by
concealment of circumstances which ought to have been disclosed; and
particularly, the weakness of the fort, and the probability of its being
attacked by the French: which con\'a1cealment was offered to be proved by two
letters. The first was a letter from the governor to his brother Roger Carter,
his trustee, the plaintiff in this cause: the second was from the governor to
the East India-Company. [1907] The evidence in reply to this objection
consisted of three depositions in Chancery, setting forth that the governor had
20,0001. in effects: and only insured 10,0001. and that he was guilty of no
fault in defending the fort. The first of these depositions was Captain
Tryon's: which proved that this was not a fort proper or designed to resist
European enemies : but only calculated for defence against the natives of the
island of Sumatra; and also that the governor's office is not military, but
only mercantile; and that Fort Marlborough is only a subordinate factory to
Fort St. George. There was no evidence to the contrary. And a verdict was found
for the plaintiff, by a special jury. After his Lordship had made his report,-
The counsel for the plaintiff proceeded to shew cause against a new trial. They
argued that there was no such concealment of circumstances (as the weakness of
the fort, or the probability of the attack,) as would amount to a fraud
sufficient to vitiate this contract: all which circumstances were universally
known to every merchant upon the exchange of London. And all these
circumstances, they said, were fully considered by a special jury of merchants,
who are the proper judges of them. And Mr. Dunning laid it down as a
rule-" that the insured is only obliged to discover facts; not the ideas
or speculations which he may entertain, upon such facts." They said, this
insurance, was in reality, no more than a wager; " whether the French
would think it their interest to attack this fort; and if they should, whether
they would be able to get a ship oi war up the river, or not." Sir
Flelcher Norton and Mr. Recorder (Eyre) argued, contra, for the defendant {the
underwriter). They insisted, that the insurer has a right to know as much as
the insured himself knows. They alledged too, that the broker is the sole agent
of the insured. [1908] These are general, universal principles, in all
insurances. Then they proceeded to argue in support of the present objection.
The broker had, they said, on being cross-examined, owned that he did not
believe that the insurer would have meddled with the insurance, if he had seen
these two letters. All the circumstances ought to be disclosed. This wager is
not only " whether the fort shall be attacked:" but " whether it
shall be attacked and taken." 1164 CARTER V. BOEHM 3 BURR. 1909. Whatever really increases the risque
ought to be disclosed. Then they entered into the particulars which had been
here kept concealed. And they insisted strongly, that the plaintiff ought to have
discovered the weakness and absolute indefencibility of the fort. In this ease,
as against the insurer, he was obliged to make such discovery, though he acted
for the governor. Indeed, a governor ought not, in point of policy, to be
permitted to insure at all: but if he is permitted to insure, or will insure,
he ought to disclose all facts. It can not be supposed that the insurer would
have insured so low as 41. per cent, if he had known of these letters. It is
begging the question to say, " that a fort is not intended for defence
against an enemy." The supposition is absurd and ridiculous. It must be
presumed that it was intended for that purpose : and the presumption was "
that the fort, the powder, the guns, &c. were in a good and proper
condition." If they were not, (and it is agreed that in fact they were
not, and that the governor knew it,) it ought to have been disclosed. But if he
had disclosed this, he could not have got the insurance. Therefore this was a
fraudulent concealment: and the under-writer is not liable. It does not follow,
that because he did not insure his whole property ; therefore it is good for
what he has judged proper to insure. He might have his reasons for insuring
only a part, and not the whole. Cur. advisare vult. [1909] Lord Mansfield now
delivered the resolution of the Court. This is a motion for a new trial. In
support of it, the counsel for the defendant contend, " that some
circumstances in the knowledge of Governor Carter, not having been mentioned at
the time the policy was underwrote, amount to a concealment, which ought, in
law, to avoid the policy." The counsel for the plaintiff insist, "
that the not mentioning these particulars, does not amount to a concealment,
which ought, in law, to avoid the policy : either as a fraud ; or, as varying
the contract." 1st. It may be proper to say something, in general, of
concealments which avoid a policy. 2dly. To state particularly the case now
under consideration. 3dly. To examine whether the verdict, which finds this policy
good although the particulars objected were not mentioned, is well founded.
First. Insurance is a contract upon speculation. The special facts, upon which
the contingent chance is to be computed, lie most commonly in the knowledge of
the insured only : the under-writer trusta to his representation, and proceeds
upon confidence that he does not keep back any circum\'a1stance in his
knowledge, to mislead the under-writer into a belief that the circumstance does
not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risque, as if it did not exist.
The keeping back such circumstance is a fraud, and therefore the policy is
void. Although the suppression should happen through mistake, without any
fraudulent intention; yet still the under-writer is deceived, and the policy is
void ; because the risque run is really different from the risque understood
and intended to be run, at the time of the agreement. The policy would equally
be void, against the under-writer, if he concealed; as, if he insured a ship on
her voyage, which he privately knew to be arrived: and an action would lie to
recover the premium. [1910] The governing principle is applicable to all
contracts and dealings. Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he
privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that
fact, and his believing the contrary. But either party may be innocently
silent, as to grounds open to both, to exercise their judgment upon. Aliud est
celare; aliud, tacere; neque enim id est celare quicquid reticeas; sed cum quod
tuscias, id ignorare emoluments tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire.
This definition of concealment, restrained to the efficient motives and precise
subject of any contract, will generally hold to make it void, in favour of the
party misled by his ignorance of the thing concealed. There are many matters,
as to which the insured may be innocently silent &
3HBRR.1911. CARTER
V. BOEHM 1165
need not
mention what the under-writer knows-Scientia utrinque par pares coutra-hentes
facit. An under-writer can not insist that the policy ia void, because the
insured did not tell him what he actually knew; what way soever he came to the
knowledge. The insured need not mention what the under-writer ought to know;
what he takes upon himself the knowledge of; or what he waves being informed
of. The under-writer needs not be told what lessens the risque agreed and
understood to be run by the express terms of the policy. He needs not to be
told general topics of speculation : as for instance-The under-writer is bound
to know every cause which may occasion natural perils; as, the difficulty of
the voyage-the kind of seasons -the probability of lightning, hurricanes,
earthquakes, &c. He is bound to know every cause which may occasion
political perils; from the ruptures of States from war, and the various
operations of it. He is bound to know the probability of safety, from the
continuance or return of peace; from the imbecility of the enemy, through the
weakness of their counsels, or their want of strength, &c. If an
under-writer insures private shipa of war, by sea and on shore, from ports to
ports, and places to places, any where-he needs not be told the secret
enterprizes [1911] they are destined upon; because he knows some expedition
must be in view ; and, from the nature of his contract, without being told, he
waves the information. If he insures for three years, he needs not be told any
circumstance to shew it may be over in two : or if he insures a voyage, with
liberty of deviation, he needs not be told what tends to shew there will be no
deviation. Men argue differently, from natural phenomena, and political
appearances: they have different capacities, different degrees of knowledge,
and different intelligence. But the means of information and judging are open
to both : each professes to act from his own skill and sagacity; and therefore
neither needs to communicate to the other. The reason of the rule which obliges
parties to disclose, is to prevent fraud, and to encourage good faith. It is
adapted to such facts as vary the nature of the contract; which one privately
knows, and the other is ignorant of, and has no reason to suspect. The question
therefore must always be " whether there was, under all the
cir\'a1cumstances at the time the policy was under-written, a fair
representation ; or a concealment; fraudulent, if designed ; or, though not
designed, varying materially the object of the policy, and changing the risque
understood to be run." This brings me, in the second place, to state the
case now under consideration. The policy is against the loss for Fort
Marlborough, from being destroyed by, taken by, or surrendered unto, any
European enemy, between the 1st of October 1759, and 1st of October 1760. It
was under-written on the 9th of May 1760. The under-writer knew at the time,
that the policy was to indemnify, to that amount, Roger Carter the Governor of
Fort Marlborough, in case the event insured againat should happen. The
governor's instructions for the insurance, bearing date at Fort Marlborough the
22d of September 1759, were laid before the underwriter. Two actions upon this
policy were tried before me in the year 1762. The defendants then knew of a
letter written to the East India Company, which the Company offered to put into
my hands; but would not deliver to the parties, because it contained some
matters which they did not think proper to be made public. [1912] An objection
occurred to me at the trial, " whether a policy against the loss of Fort
Marlborough, for the benefit of the governor, was good;" upon the
principle which does not allow a sailor to insure his wages. But considering
that this place, though called a fort, was really but a factory or settlement
for trade : and that he, though called a governor, was really but a merchant
-considering too, that the law allows the captain of a ship to insure goods
which he has on board, or his share in the ship, if he be a part-owner; and the
captain of a privateer, ii he be a part-owner, to insure his share-considering
too, that the objection did not lie, upon any ground of justice, in the mouth
of the under-writer, who knew him to be the governor, at the time he took the
premium-and as, with regard to principles of public convenience, the case so
seldom happens, (I never saw one before,) any danger from the example is little
to be apprehended-I did not think myself warranted, upon that point, to nonsuit
the plaintiff; especially too, as the objection did not come from the Bar.
1166 CARTER
V. BOBHM 3 BURR. 1913.
Though
this point was mentioned, it was not insisted upon, at the last trial: nor has
it been seriously argued, upon this motion, as sufficient, alone, to vacate the
policy : and if it had, we are all of opinion " that we are not warranted
to say it is void, upon this account. Upon the plaintiff's obtaining these two
verdicts, the underwriters went into a Court of Equity; where they have had an
opportunity to sift every thing to the bottom, to get every discovery from the
governor and his brother, and to examine any witnesses who were upon the spot.
At last, after the fullest investigation of every kind, the present action came
on to be tried at the sittings after last term. The plaintiff proved without
contradiction, that the place called Bencoolen or Fort Marlborough is a factory
or settlement, but no military fort or fortress. That it was not established
for a place of arms or defence against the attacks of an European enemy; but
merely for the purpose of trade, and of defence against the natives. That the
fort was only intended and built with an intent to keep off the country blacks.
That the only security against European ships of war, consisted in the
difficulty of the entrance and navigation of the river, for want of proper
pilots. That the general state and condition of the said fort, and of the
strength thereof, was, in general [1913] well known, by most persons conversant
or acquainted with Indian affairs, or the state of the Company's factories or
settlements; and could not be kept secret or concealed from persons who should
endeavour by proper inquiry, to inform themselves. That there were no
apprehensions or intelligence of any attack by the French, until they attacked
Nattal in Feb. 1760. That on the 8th of February 1760, there was no suspicion
of any design by the French. That the governor then bought, from the witness,
goods to the value of 40001. and had goods to the value of above 20,0001. and
then dealt for 50,0001. and upwards. That on the 1st of April 1760, the fort
was attacked by a French man of war of 64 guns and a frigate of twenty guns
under the Count D'Estaigne, brought in by Dutch pilots; unavoidably taken ; and
afterwards delivered to the Dutch ; and the prisoners sent to Batavia. On the
part of the defendant-after all the opportunities of inquiry, no evidence was
offered, that the French ever had any design upon Fort Marlborough, before the
end of March 1760; or that there was the least intelligence or alarm "that
they might make the attempt," till the taking of Nattal in the year 1760.
They did not offer to disprove the evidence, that the governor had acted, as in
full security, long after the month of September 1759 ; and had turned his
money into goods, so late as the 8th of February 1760. There was no attempt to
shew that he had not lost by the capture very considerably beyond the value of
the insurance. But the defendant relied upon a letter, written to the East
India Company, bearing date the 16th of September 1759, which was sent to
England by the "Pitt," Captain Wilson, who arrived in May 1760,
together with the instructions for insuring ; and also a letter bearing date
the 22d of September 1759, sent to the plaintiff by the same conveyance, and at
the same time, (which letters his Lordship repeated).* They relied too upon the
cross-examination of the broker who negotiated the policy, " that, in his
opinion, [1914] these letters ought to have been shewn, or the contents
disclosed; and if they had, the policy would not have been under-written."
The defendant's counsel contended at the trial, as they have done upon this
motion, "that the policy was void."- 1st. Because the state and
condition of the fort, mentioned in the governor's letter to the East India
Company, was not disclosed. 2dly. Because he did not disclose, that the French,
not being in a condition to * The former of them notifies to the East India
Company, that the French had the preceding year, a design on foot, to attempt
taking that settlement by surprize ; and that it was very probable that they
might revive that design. It confesses and represents the weakness of the fort:
its being badly supplied with stores, arras and ammunition : and the
impracticability of maintaining it (in its then state) against an European
enemy. The latter letter (to his brother) owns that he is " now more
afraid than formerly, that the French should attack and take the settlement;
for, as they can not muster a force to relieve their friends at the coast, they
may, rather than remain idle, pay us a visit. It seems, that they had such an
intention, last year." And therefore he desires his brother to get an
insurance made upon his stock there.
3 BURR. 1911. CARTER V. BOEHM 1167
relieve
their friends upon the coast, were more likely to make an attack upon this
settlement, rather than remain idle. 3dly. That he had not disclosed his having
received a letter of the 4th of February 1759, from which it seemed that the
French had a design to take this settlement, by surprize, the year before. They
also contended, that the opinion of the broker was almost decisive. The whole
was laid before the jury ; who found for the plaintiff. Thirdly-It remains to
consider these objections, and to examine " whether this verdict is well
founded." To this purpose, it is necessary to consider the nature of the
contract, at the time it was entered into. The policy was signed in May 1760.
The contingency was "whether Fort Marlborough was or would be taken, by an
European enemy, between October 1759, and October 1760." The computation
of the risque depended upon the chance, " whether any European power would
attack the place by sea," If they did, it was incapable of resistance. The
under-writer at London, in May 1760, could judge much better of the probability
of the contingency, than Governor Carter could at Fort Marlborough, in
September 1759. He knew the success of the operations of the war in Europe. He
knew what naval force the English and French had sent to the East Indies. He
knew, from a comparison of that force, whether the sea was open to any such
attempt by the French. He knew, or might know every thing which was known at
Fort Marlborough in September 1759, of the general state of affairs iti the
[1915] East Indies, or the particular condition of Fort Marlborough, by the
ship which brought the orders for the insurance. He knew that ship must have brought
many letters to the East India Company; and, particularly, from the governor.
He knew what probability there was of the Dutch committing or having committed
hostilities. Under these circumstances, and with this knowledge, he insures
against the general contingency of the place being attacked by an European
power. If there had been any design on foot, or any enterprize begun in
September, 1759, to the knowledge of the governor, it would have varied the
risk understood by the underwriter; because not being told of a particular
design or attack then subsisting, he estimated the risk upon the foot of an
incertain operation, which might or might not be attempted. But the governor
had no notice of any design subsisting in September, 1759. There was no such design
in fact: the attempt was made without premeditation, from the sudden
opportunity of a favourable occasion, by the connivance and assistance of the
Dutch, which tempted Count D'Estaigne to break his parol. These being the
circumstances under which the contract was entered into, we shall be better
able to judge of the objections upon the foot of concealment. The first
concealment is, that he did not disclose the condition of the place. The
underwriter knew the insurance was for the governor. He knew the governor must
be acquainted with the state of the place. He knew the governor could not
disclose it, consistent with his duty. He knew the governor, by insuring,
apprehended at least the possibility of an attack. With this knowledge, without
asking a question, he underwrote. By so doing, he took the knowledge of the
state of the place upon himself. It was a matter as to which he might be
informed various ways: it was not a matter within the private knowledge of the
governor only. But, not to rely upon that--The utmost which can be contended
is, that the under\'a1writer trusted to the fort being in the condition in
which it ought to be : in like manner as it is taken for granted, that a ship
insured is sea-worthy. What ia that condition 1 All the witnesses agree "
that [1916] it was only to resist the natives, and not an European force."
The policy insures against a total loss ; taking for granted " that if the
place was attacked it would be lost." The contingency therefore which the
under-writer has insured against is, " whether the place would be attacked
by an European force; and not whether it would be able to resist such an
attack, if the ships could get up the river." It was particularly left to
the jury, to consider, " whether this was the contingency in the
contemplation of the parties :" they have found that it was.
1168 CARTER
V. BOEHM 3 BURR. 1917.
And
we are all of opinion, " that, in this respect, their conclusion is
agreeable to the evidence." In this view, the state and condition of the
place was material only in case of a land-attack by the natives. The second
concealment is-his not having disclosed, that, from the French not being able
to relieve their friends upon the coast, they might make them a visit. Thia is
no part of the fact of the case: it is a mere speculation of the governor's
from the general state of the war. The conjecture was dictated to him from his
fears. It is a bold attempt, for the conquered to attack the conqueror in his
own dominions. The practicability of it in this case, depended upon the English
naval force in those seas; which the underwriter could better judge of at
London in May, 1760, than the governor could at Fort Marlborough in September,
1759. The third concealment is-that he did not disclose the letter, from Mr.
Winch, of the 4th of February, 1759, mentioning the design of the French, the
year before. What that letter was; how he mentioned the design, or upon what
authority he mentioned it; or by whom the design was supposed to be imagined,
does not appear. The defendant has had every opportunity of discovery; and
nothing has come out upon it, as to this letter, which he thinks makes for his
purpose. The plaintiff offered to read the account Winch wrote to the East
India Company : which was objected to ; and therefore not read. [1917] The
nature of that intelligence therefore is very doubtful. But taking it in the
strongest light, it is a report of a design to surprise, the year before ; but
then dropt. This is a topic of mere general speculation; which made no part of
the fact of the case upon which the insurance was to be made. It was said-If a
man insured a ship, knowing that two privateers were lying in her way, without
mentioning that circumstance, it would be a fraud-I agree it. But if he knew
that two privateers had been there the year before, it would be no fraud, not
to mention that circumstance: because, it does not follow that they will cruise
this year at the same time, in the same place; or that they are in a condition
to do it. If the circumstance of " this design laid aside " had been
mentioned, it would have tended rather to lessen the risque, than increase it:
for, the design of a surprise which has transpired, arid been laid aside, is
less likely to be taken up again; especially by a vanquished enemy. The jury
considered the nature of the governor's silence, as to these particulars : they
thought it innocent: and that the omission to mention them did not vary the
contract. And we are all of opinion, " that, in this respect, they judged
extremely right." There is a silence, not objected to at the trial nor
upon this motion; which might with as much reason have been objected to, as the
two last omissions; rather more. It appears by the governor's * letter to the
plaintiff, " that he was principally apprehensive of a t Dutch war."
He certainly had, what he thought, good grounds for his apprehension. Count
D'Estaigne being piloted by the Dutch, delivering the fort to the Dutch, and
sending the prisoners to Batavia, is a confirmation of those grounds. And probably,
the loss of the place was owing to the Dutch. The French could not have got up
the river without Dutch pilots: and it is plain, the whole was concerted with
them. And yet, at the time of underwriting the policy, there was no intimation
about the Dutch. The reaaoti why the counsel have not objected to his not
disclosing the grounds of this apprehension, is, because it must have arisen
from political speculation, and [1918] general intelligence; therefore, they
agree, it is not necessary to communicate such things to an underwriter.
Lastly-Great stress was laid upon the opinion of the broker. But we all think,
the jury ought not to pay the least regard to it. It is mere opinion ; which is
not evidence. It is opinion after an event. It is opinion without the least
foundation from any previous precedent or usage. It is an opinion which, if
rightly formed, could only be drawn from the same premises from which the Court
* Dated 22d Sept. 1759. t His words are-" And in case of a Dutch war, I
would have it (the insurance) done at any rate."
3BURR. 1919. REX V. FROME SELWOOD 1169
and jury
were to determine the cause : and therefore it is improper and irrelevant in
the mouth of a witness. There is no imputation upon the governor, as to any
intention of fraud. By the same conveyance, which brought his orders to insure,
he wrote to the company every thing which he knew or suspected : he desired
nothing to be kept a secret, which he wrote either to them or his brother. His
subsequent conduct, down to the 8th of February 1760, shewed that he thought
the danger very improbable. The reason of the rule against concealment is, to
prevent fraud and encourage good faith. If the defendant's objections were to
prevail, in the present case, the rule would be turned into an instrument of
fraud. The underwriter, here, kuowing the governor to be acquainted with the
state of the place; knowing that he apprehended danger, and must have some
ground for his apprehension; being told nothing of either; signed this policy,
without asking a question. If the objection " that he was not told"
is sufficient to vacate it, he took the premium, knowing the policy to be void;
in order to gain, if the alternative turned out one way; and to make no
satisfaction, if it turned out the other: he drew the governor into a false
confidence, " that, if the worst should happen, he had provided against
total ruin;" knowing, at the same time, "that the indemnity to which
the governor trusted was void." There was not a word said to him, of the
affairs of India, or the state of the war there, or the condition of Fort
Marlborough. If he thought that omission an objection at the time, he ought not
to have signed the policy [1919] with a secret reserve in his own mind to make
it void ; if he dispensed with the information, and did not think this silence
an objection then; he cannot take it up now, after the event. What has often
been said of the Statute of Frauds may, with more propriety, be applied to
every rule of law, drawn from principles of natural equity, to prevent
fraud-" That it should never be so turned, construed, or used, as to
protect, or be a means of fraud." After the fullest deliberation, we are
all clear that the verdict is well founded: and there ought not to be a new
trial: consequently, that the rule for that purpose ought to be discharged.
Rule discharged.
The
end of Easter term, 1766, 6 G, 3.