A-G v Garner [1907] 2 KB 480.
A-G (ex rel McWhirter) v Independent Broadcasting Authority [1973] 1 All ER 689, [1973] QB 629, [1973] 2 WLR 344, CA, 16 Digest (Reissue) 267, 2536.
A-G v Liverpool Corp, A-G v Aspinall (1835) 1 My & Cr 171, 40 ER 342; subsequent proceedings 7 LJ Ch 51, [1835-42] All ER Rep 525, LC, 28(2) Digest (Reissue) 1967, 805.
Baker v R [1975] 3 All ER 55, [1975] AC 774, [1975] 3 WLR 113, PC, Digest (Cont Vol D) 196, *3998f.
Belcher v Reading Corp [1949] 2 All ER 969, [1950] Ch 380, 26 Digest (Reissue) 804, 5348.
Boyce v Paddington BC [1903] 1 Ch 109; rvsd [1903] 2 Ch 556, CA; rvsd [1906] AC 1, HL, 28(2) Digest (Reissue) 1110, 1069.
Bradbury v Enfield London Borough [1967] 3 All ER 434, [1967] 1 WLR 1311, CA, 19 Digest (Reissue) 520, 3984.
Bromley v Smith (1826) 1 Sim 8, 57 ER 482, 11 Digest (Reissue) 47, 657.
Collins v Lower Hutt City Corp [1961] NZLR 250, 16 Digest (Reissue) 273, 2600.
Covent Garden Community Association Ltd v Greater London Council (2 April 1980, unreported), QBD.
Dyson v A-G [1911] 1 KB 410, CA, 11 Digest (Reissue) 693, 308.
Evan v Avon Corp (1860) 29 Beav 144, 54 ER 581, 28(2) Digest (Reissue) 1069, 813.
Evans v Collins [1964] 1 All ER 808, [1965] 1 QB 580, [1964] 3 WLR 36, DC, 26 Digest (Reissue) 803, 5347.
Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 3 All ER 70, sub nom Gouriet v A-G [1978] AC 435, [1977] 3 WLR 300, HL, 16 Digest (Reissue) 265, 2528.
Heywood v Hull Prison Board of Visitors [1980] 3 All ER 594, [1980] 1 WLR 1386.
Holden v Bolton Corp (1887) 3 TLR 676, 16 Digest (Reissue) 276, 2621.
Hungerford Market Co v City Steamboat Co (1860) 3 E & E 365, 121 ER 479, 47 Digest (Repl) 767, 1036.
IRC v National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 93, [1981] 2 WLR 722, HL.
Lee v Enfield London Borough (1967) 66 LGR 195, 19 Digest (Reissue) 521, 3988.
Luby v Newcastle-under-Lyme Corp [1964] 3 All ER 169, [1965] 1 QB 214, [1964] 3 WLR 500, CA; affg [1964] 1 All ER 84, [1964] 2 QB 64, [1964] 2 WLR 475, 26 Digest (Reissue) 803, 5346.
MacIlreith v Hart (1908) 39 SCR 657.
National Enterprises Ltd v Racal Communications Ltd [1975] 3 All ER 1010, [1975] Ch 397, [1975] 2 WLR 222, CA, 3 Digest (Reissue) 130, 709.
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R v Cotham [1898] 1 QB 802, DC, 16 Digest (Reissue) 404, 4454.
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R v Greater London Council, ex p Blackburn [1976] 3 All ER 184, [1976] 1 WLR 550, CA, Digest (Cont Vol E) 587, 183a.
R v Guardians of Lewisham Union [1897] 1 QB 498, DC, 16 Digest (Reissue) 332, 3468.
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R v Thames Magistrates' Court, ex p Greenbaum (1957) 55 LGR 129, CA.
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Steeples v Derbyshire CC (10 February 1981, unreported), QBD.

Stott, Ex p [1916] 1 KB 7, 45 Digest (Repl) 214, 179.
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A-G v Aspinall (1837) 2 My & Cr 613, [1835-42] All ER Rep 525.
A-G v Derbyshire CC [1916] 2 AC 283, HL.
A-G v Stafford Corp [1878] WN 74.
Bennett v Yateley Parish Council (No 2) (1964) 63 LGR 29, CA.
Brown's Mortgage, Re, Wallasey Corp v A-G [1945] Ch 166.
Davies v Cowperthwaite [1938] 2 All ER 685, DC.
Meade v Haringey London Borough [1979] 2 All ER 1016, [1979] 1 WLR 637, CA.
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Parr v A-G (ex rel Ponsonby) (1842) 8 Cl & F 409, 8 ER 159, HL.
R v Grain, ex p Wandsworth Guardians [1927] 2 KB 205, CA.
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Edward Evans-Combe QC and Lionel Levine for the plaintiffs.
Gavin Lightman QC and Charles George for the defendants.

   '1. The Thirty-first above-named Defendant (hereinafter referred to as "Camden") is an Inner London Borough Council. The First to Thirtieth above-named Defendants inclusive (hereinafter together referred to as "the Controlling Councillors") are Councillors of Camden and have served as such at the material times. The Plaintiffs have at all material times been ratepayers in the London Borough of Camden.
   2. The Controlling Councillors have at the material times: (1) together (or with certain of the other Councillors serving from time to time) constituted a majority of the Councillors of Camden; (2) materially acted in concert and as a majority group of the Councillors of Camden; and (3) exercised effective control over the affairs of Camden by their ability to control and the exercise of control of the conduct of meetings of the Council of Camden and the committees thereof and the departments thereof.
   3. In the exercise of their powers and the performance of their duties as Councillors of Camden and in the exercise of their said control over the affairs of Camden and in particular with respect to matters involving the income and expenditure of Camden and the levying of rates the Controlling Councillors and each of them has owed a fiduciary duty or a duty akin thereto to the ratepayers of Camden including the Plaintiffs and to Camden.
   4. From dates and during diverse material times which the Plaintiffs cannot state until after discovery the Controlling Councillors among themselves expressly or implicitly agreed or determined that the manner in which the affairs of Camden would be managed and conducted under their control would be in accordance with certain policies. Those policies included those of which the gist were: (1) that there would be no increase in the rents payable by the tenants of Camden occupying Housing Act accommodation or no such increases except when the Controlling Councillors believed that by their omissions they would certainly become personally liable; (2) that there would be no cuts in services meaning in fact that there would be no reductions or material reductions in any of the areas of expenditure where expenditure was being incurred by Camden; (3) that there would be no material reduction in the size of Camden's direct labour force.
   5. The Controlling Councillors have caused the affairs of Camden to be conducted in accordance with the said several policies and thereby the expenditures of Camden have been unreasonably improperly and/or unlawfully increased and the income and receipts of Camden have been unreasonably improperly and/or unlawfully reduced or lost.
   6. The Controlling Councillors well knew that the effect of their causing the affairs of Camden to be conducted in accordance with those said policies would be greatly to increase (and progressively so) the imbalance between the expenditure of Camden and its income and receipts. The Controlling Councillors knew and intended (as has been the case) that the ratepayers of Camden would be required to pay by greatly increasing rate levies for the implementation of those said policies.
   7. By their conduct in forcing Camden to implement the said policies the Controlling Councillors paid no regard or alternatively insufficient regard to the interests of and their duties to the ratepayers of Camden including the Plaintiffs. Further or alternatively in so far as the implementation of those policies was with respect to matters where by reason of statute and otherwise there were duties imposed on Camden and the Controlling Councillors to others then the Controlling Councillors failed to pay any or sufficient regard to maintaining a proper reasonably [sic] or lawful balance between compliance with those duties and the duties they owed to the ratepayers of Camden including the Plaintiffs.

   8. The Controlling Councillors have acted and conducted themselves in breach of their said duties owed to the ratepayers of Camden including the Plaintiffs and owed to Camden and are liable jointly and severally to account with respect thereto.
   

   (1) With respect to the years covered by the financial years of Camden to 31st March 1980 and 31st March 1981 the Controlling Councillors procured that Camden did not and would not increase rents payable by tenants occupying Housing Act accommodation at all or sufficiently. Prior to April 1979 the rent income from tenants was not sufficient to meet the costs of repairing maintaining supervising and heating those some 30,000 units of accommodation and the ratepayers by the general rate fund were contributing to the Housing Revenue Account maintained by Camden amounts equal to or in excess of the said rent income. From April 1979 and progressively since the Controlling Councillors have procured that the general rate fund contribution increased by unreasonable improper and/or unlawful amounts so that such application of general rate funds represents amounts double or more than double the amounts of the said rent income. For the year to 31st March 1981 the said rents will only be some £12,500,000 whilst rate fund moneys of some £30,000,000 are being used to meet these housing costs. Accordingly for every £1 of rent collected the Controlling Councillors are producing that the ratepayers pay a subsidy of over £2.
   (2) At all material times the building and works departments of Camden have operated without sufficient or proper control and inefficiently. The Controlling Councillors have known that construction and other work undertaken by Camden by its own directly employed labour force has been at excessive cost to Camden and in general at greater cost than would have been charged by other contractors. Further from about March 1980 the Controlling Councillors have known that work available to be undertaken by Camden's direct labour force of some 1,000 employees would become progressively reduced. The same has been the case. Wrongfully the Controlling Councillors declined to take or deferred taking steps to reduce the size of the directly employed labour force and the same has become further under employed and without sufficient work to do and inefficient.
   (3) Camden in common with other local authorities relies heavily on grants contributed by the Government from the Exchequer in order to meet its expenditure. By September 1980 the Controlling Councillors knew that a minority of local authorities including Camden (some 23 out of over 450) would lose material amounts of Rate Support Grant by reason of their levels of expenditure. The reductions to those local authorities was to take effect from the year 1980/81 but the said 23 local authorities including Camden were invited to satisfy the Department of Environment as to their intent as to spending and obtain a waiver from such loss of Rate Support Grant. A majority or most of the said 23 local authorities did so satisfy the Department of Environment as to intent and avoided such loss of grant.
   (4) The Controlling Councillors determined that they would procure that Camden defy and dispute with the Government in the matter including by legal action and the same without any sufficient advice that such legal action would succeed. In furtherance of that determination or otherwise the Controlling Councillors procured that Camden would make no attempt or no real attempt to obtain waiver from the loss of Rate Support Grant.
   (5) Instead the Controlling Councillors determined that the loss of grant for the year 1980/81 which was estimated at some £6,020,000 (and not then lost to Camden) should be charged to the ratepayers of Camden and resolved and otherwise caused a supplementary rate of 6p (estimated to produce some £6,600,000) for the period 4th December 1980 to 31st March 1981 to be levied and collected in Camden.
   (6) Further by their said conduct the Controlling Councillors have caused110 Camden to lose Rate Support Grant in the amount of some £20,000,000 for the year 1981/82 and the Controlling Councillors will cause that amount to be levied additionally from the ratepayers.
   9. Further the Controlling Councillors have known (or would have known had they been willing to consider the matter) that the manner in which they have been procuring that Camden's affairs be conducted as aforesaid was unreasonable, improper or unlawful. In writing and in meeting the Chief Executive Officer of Camden and the District Auditor have advised and cautioned the Controlling Councillors. Further they have known that the financial accounts of Camden for the years 1978/79 and 1979/80 have not been passed by the District Auditor who has been considering objections of unreasonable and unlawful expenditure by Camden.
   10. By the knowledge of the Controlling Councillors and the knowledge of its other Councillors and Officers, Camden has knowledge that its affairs have been conducted by the Controlling Councillors improperly and in breach of duty as aforesaid and the same is to be imputed to Camden.
   11. Further in breach of fiduciary duty as aforesaid the said supplementary rate of 6p for the period 6th December 1980 to 31st March 1981 has been resolved and levied and Camden is collecting and receiving the same as constructive trustee for the ratepayers of Camden including the Plaintiffs.
   

Against the First to Thirtieth above-named individual Defendants
   (1) A declaration that in the exercise of their powers and performance of their duties as Councillors of the London Borough of Camden the First to Thirtieth Defendants have acted in breach of duty owed by them to the ratepayers of the London Borough of Camden including the Plaintiffs and to that Defendant Borough Council.
   (2) An account of the moneys that were it not for the Defendants' breaches of duty would not have been expended by the London Borough of Camden and further would have been received by the Defendant Borough Council and for which these Defendants are liable to account.
   (3) All further necessary inquiries and accounts.
   (4) Order that these Defendants pay and make good to the Defendant Borough Council all such moneys found on taking accounts and inquiries together with interest.

Against the Thirty first above-named Defendant London Borough of Camden
   (5) A declaration that the London Borough of Camden is with respect to the moneys collected and received by it from the supplementary rate of 6p levied for the period 6th December 1980 to 31st March 1981 constructive trustee for the ratepayers of that Borough Council including the Plaintiffs or for the ratepayers in the amounts in which they have paid the same.
   (6) All necessary accounts and inquiries.
   (7) If necessary, a Receiver.

Against all the Defendants
   (8) Further or other relief.
   (9) Costs.'

   '111.-(1) The general management, regulation and control of houses provided by a local authority under this Part of this Act shall be vested in and exercised by the authority, and the authority may make such reasonable charges for the tenancy or occupation of the houses as they may determine ...
   '113 ... (4): The local authority shall from time to time review rents and make such changes, either of rents generally or of particular rents, and rebates (if any) as circumstances may require ...

   '... the tenants are not the only people whose interests the corporation have to consider, for they have to bear in mind the general body of ratepayers in mind as well. It seems to me that, in solving the economic problems with which councils are confronted today, and which arise mainly from the greatly increased cost of materials and labour, they are placed in a position of not inconsiderable difficulty. It is, of course, clear that they have to consider the welfare of their tenants and to remember that those tenants are people of small-sometimes of very small-means. On the other hand, they have also to be mindful of the interests of the ratepayers as a whole-the majority of whom, in Reading, as I was informed, are people of comparable means with the tenants of the council houses. It is their duty, so far as possible, to maintain a balance between these two sections of the local community, having due regard, of course, to any specific requirements of the Housing Acts.'

   'to do any thing (whether or not involving the expenditure, borrowing or lending of money or the acquisition or disposal of any property or rights) which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions.'

   'An officer appointed under subsection (i) above shall hold office on such reasonable terms and conditions, including conditions as to remuneration, as the authority appointing him think fit.'

   'This system of procedure might possibly be admirably philanthropic if the funds of the council at the time they were thus administered belonged to the existing members of that body. These members would then be generous at their own expense. The evidence does not disclose what sum the rates of the district amounted to, or what portion of that gross sum was paid by the persons who were members of the council since, say, the month of March, 1920; but it may be safely assumed, I should think, that these members did not, at any time, pay the whole of the rates then collected. The council then, at all times since the year 1914, may safely be assumed to have been dealing with funds a portion of which-possibly the larger portion of which-was contributed by ratepayers who were not, and are not members of the council. The indulgence of philanthropic enthusiasm at the expense of persons other than the philanthropists is an entirely different thing from the indulgence of it at the expense of the philanthropists themselves. The former wears quite a different aspect from the latter, and may bear a different legal as well as moral character. A body charged with the administration for definite purposes of funds contributed in whole or in part by persons other than the members of that body, owes, in my view, a duty to those latter persons to conduct that administration in a fairly businesslike manner with reasonable care, skill and caution, and with a due and alert regard to the interests of those contributors who are not members of the body. Towards these latter persons the body stands somewhat in the position of trustees or managers of the property of others.'

   'The Attorney-General has considered your letter of the 18th June seeking consent to relator proceedings. He notes that the existing proceedings were launched by ratepayers in their own name, and that leading Counsel has advised that there is authority for the proposition that individual ratepayers have locus standi to proceed in their own name against councillors for breach of duty resulting in losses to, or the improper application of, the Rate Fund. The relator action must be reserved for use where the complainant has no locus standi, and in the circumstances the Attorney-General is not prepared to give his consent unless the Court rules that the present Plaintiffs cannot pursue their plan. If the Court should so rule, the Attorney-General will consider a further application as a matter of urgency, and I would be able to give you his answer within twenty-four hours of your application.'

   'But this, as a general proposition, only means that the person discriminated against cannot object merely on the ground that he is charged more than the other man. It does not necessarily follow that nobody else can object. No doubt that might be the position if the power was exercisable simply and solely for the benefit of the person or body on whom it was conferred. Take, however, the case of a trustee running an omnibus service with a statutory power to charge fares to passengers, and no equality clause. If such a trustee chose from motives of philanthropy to allow some person or class of persons considered by him to be badly off to travel free or at reduced fares, it may be that the passengers charged the full fare could not object on that account, but we apprehend that the cestius que trustent certainly could. A similar situation might arise as between a company, or the directors of a company, running an omnibus undertaking with a similar right to charge fares, and the shareholders of such company: see the Hungerford Market case ((1860) 3 E & E 365 at 381, 121 ER 479 at 485) where COCKBURN, C.J., said: "If the service be rendered and the accommodation afforded, the obligation of the company is fulfilled. If it omit to exact the toll which is a consideration for the service, the shareholders would seem to be the only persons who can have a right to complain." Local authorities are not, of course, trustees for their ratepayers, but they do, we think, owe an analogous fiduciary duty to their ratepayers in relation to115 the application of funds contributed by the latter. Thus local authorities running an omnibus undertaking at the risk of their ratepayers, in the sense that any deficiencies must be met by an addition to the rates, are not, in our view, entitled, merely on the strength of a general power, to charge different fates to different passengers or classes of passengers, to make a gift to a particular class of persons of right of free travel on their vehicles, simply because the local authority concerned are of opinion that the favoured class of persons ought, on benevolent or philanthropic grounds, to be accorded that benefit. In other words they are not, in our view, entitled to use their discriminatory power as proprietors of the transport undertaking in order to confer out of rates a special benefit on some particular class of inhabitants whom they, as the local authority for the town or district in question, may think deserve such assistance. In the absence of clear statutory authority for such a proceeding (which to our mind a mere general power to charge differential fares certainly is not) we would for our part regard it as illegal on the ground that, to put the matter bluntly, it would amount simply to the making of a gift or present in money's worth to a particular section of the local community at the expense of the general body of ratepayers.'

   'A consequence of this practice is that in its opinions delivered on an appeal the Board may have assumed, without itself deciding, that a proposition of law which was not disputed by the parties in the court from which the appeal is brought is correct. The proposition of law so assumed to be correct may be incorporated, whether expressly or by implication, in the ratio decidendi of the particular appeal; because it does not bear the authority of an opinion reached by the Board itself it does not create a precedent for use in the decision of other cases.'

   'Lastly, and as this is the real point as I see it in the case, counsel for the council raises the point whether these applicants had a sufficient interest to enable them to come to this court and apply for an order of mandamus. It has always been recognised that there is quite a different criterion of interest which would justify an application for certiorari and one which would justify an application for mandamus. It is said that a far more stringent test applies in the case of mandamus and that an applicant must have, as it is put, a specific legal right. The mere fact that the applicants were electrical contractors does not, in my judgment, of itself give them a sufficient right, but if as I understand, they or some of them are ratepayers as well, then as it seems to me there would be a sufficient right to enable them to apply for mandamus.'

   'Before proceeding to consideration of these matters, something more needs to be said about the threshold requirement of "sufficient interest". The courts in exercising the power to grant prerogative writs, or since 1938 prerogative orders, have always reserved the right to be satisfied that the applicant had some genuine locus standi to appear before it. This they expressed in different ways. Sometimes it was said, usually in relation to certiorari, that the applicant must be a person aggrieved, or have a particular grievance (see R v Thames Magistrates' Court, ex parte Greenbaum (1957) 55 LGR 129); usually in relation to mandamus, that he must have a specific legal right (see R v Guardians of Lewisham Union [1897] 1 QB 498, R v Russell [1968] 3 All ER 695, [1969] 1 QB 324); sometimes that he must have a sufficient interest (see R v Cotham [1898] 1 QB 802 (mandamus), Ex parte Stott [1916] 1 KB 7 (certiorari)). By 1977 when RSC Ord 53 was introduced the courts, guided by Lord Parker CJ, in cases where mandamus was sought, were moving away from the Lewisham Union test of specific legal right to one of sufficient interest. In R v Russell Lord Parker CJ had tentatively adhered to the test of legal specific right, but in R v Customs and Excise Comrs, ex parte Cooke and Stevenson [1970] 1 All ER 1068, [1970] WLR 450 he had moved to sufficient interest. Shortly afterward the new rule (RSC Ord 53, r 3) was drafted with these words.'

   'Locus standi It was suggested that Mr Blackburn has no sufficient interest to bring these proceedings against the GLC. It is a point which was taken against him by the Commissioner of Police [see R v Metropolitan Police Comr, ex p Blackburn [1968] 1 All ER 763 at 770, 777, [1968] 2 QB 118 at 137, 149] and against the late Mr McWhirter of courageous memory by the Independent Broadcasting Authority [see A-G (ex rel McWhirter) v Independent Broadcasting Authority [1973] 1 All ER 689 at 698-699, [1973] QB 629 at 648-649]. On this point, I would ask: who then can bring proceedings when a public authority is guilty of a misuse of power? Mr Blackburn is a citizen of London. His wife is a ratepayer. He has children who may be harmed by the exhibition of pornographic films. If he has no sufficient interest, no other citizen has. I think he comes within the principle which I stated in McWhirter's case [1973] 1 All ER 689 at 696, [1973] QB 629 at 646, which I would recast today so as to read: "I regard it as a matter of high constitutional principle that, if there is good ground for supposing that a government department or a public authority is transgressing the law, or is about to transgress it, in a way which offends or injures thousands of Her Majesty's subjects, then any one of those offended or injured can draw it to the attention of the courts of law and seek to have the law enforced, and the courts in their discretion can grant whatever remedy is appropriate." The applications by Mr Blackburn and Mr McWhirter did much good. They show how desirable such a principle is. One remedy which is always open, by leave of the court, is to apply for a prerogative writ such as certiorari, mandamus or prohibition. These provide a discretionary remedy and the discretion of the court extends to permitting an application to be made by any member of the public: see R v Thames Magistrates' Court, ex parte Greenbaum (1957) 55 LGR 129 and especially what was said by Parker LJ: and R v Hereford Corpn, ex parte Harrower [1970] 3 All ER 460, [1970] 1 WLR 1424; though it will refuse it to a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him: see R v Paddington Valuation Officer, ex parte Peachey Property Corpn Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 836 at 841, [1966] 1 QB 380 at 401. Another remedy open likewise is by asking for a declaration: see Dyson v Attorney-General [1911] 13 1 KB 410, Prescott v Birmingham Corpn [1954] 3 All ER 698, [1955] Ch 210 and Thorson v Attorney-General of Canada (1974) 43 DLR (3d) 1, where Laskin CJ and his colleagues notably expanded the scope of a remedy. Also by injunction as in Bradbury v Enfield London Borough Council [1967] 3 All ER 434, [1967] 1 WLR 1311.'

   'If it were necessary to decide the point I would decide that the courts today are no more fettered by differences in procedure than they have been during the last century fettered by differences in forms of action, and I would hold that the plaintiff, being a person with sufficient interest for the purposes of RSC Ord 53, r 3(5), and having thereby a locus standi to apply for an injunction under that order, has a similar locus standi to apply for the same relief in these proceedings. And I would hold that any difference in substance between the two forms of proceeding can, if necessary, be given effect to when the discretion of the court arises as to the relief to be given. I note in particular in this context the fact that partly but not only because there has been one substantial issue of fact in these proceedings a lis inter partes could be said to be at least as appropriate as, if not more appropriate than, an application for judicial review, although I recognise, of course, that if the matter had been canvassed on such an application an order could have been made for cross-examination on the affidavits which would have been sworn.'

   'The fact that leave is required in judicial review proceedings and was required before prerogative orders prior to the new rule is a significant factor to be taken into account in the approach to locus standi, since the requirement of leave provides a necessary filter to prevent frivolous actions by persons who have no sufficient interest in the result of the proceeding.'

   '... [RSC] Ord 53, r 5(1) requires a would-be applicant for judicial review to obtain preliminary leave ex parte from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division or in vacation from a judge in chambers. There are very good reasons (among them an economy of public time and the avoidance of injustice to persons whom it is desired to make respondents) for that requirement of preliminary leave. If an action commenced by writ or originating summons is used instead of the machinery of Ord 53, that requirement of leave is circumvented.'

Azza M Abdallah Barrister.