[COURT OF APPEAL]

REGINA v. GREATER LONDON COUNCIL

Ex parte BLACKBURN AND ANOTHER

Licensing - Films - Censorship - County council delegating powers of censorship to unincorporated board with power to review - Whether delegation ultra vires - Council rule incorporating statutory test for obscene publications - Whether proper test - Obscene Publications Act 1959 (7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66), s. 1 (1)¹ Cinematograph Act 1909 (9 Edw. 7, c. 30), s. 2 (1)² - Cinematograph Act 1952 (15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 68), s. 3 (1)³

Crown Practice - Prohibition - Film licensing authority - Application to prohibit local council exercising their powers - Whether sufficient locus standi as ratepayer and parent

The Greater London Council, the licensing authority under the Cinematograph Acts 1909 and 1952 for licensing premises for the public exhibition of films, exercised their powers under rules, rule 116 of which provided that: "No film shall be exhibited at the premises ... (2) the effect of which is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to see it," that being in terms the test of obscenity laid down in section 1 (1) of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 in relation to "articles." The council had for many years delegated their power to censor films to the British Board of Film Censors, an unincorporated body of persons, which, though connected with the trade, had been recognised by judicial decision since 1925 and by Parliament in section 3 (1) of the Cinematograph Act 1952 as a proper body for performing that function, subject to the council retaining the final power to review any decision by the board.

In 1973 the board refused a certificate for the public exhibition of a particular film, but, on appeal by the exhibitors, the council, applying the test in their rule 116 (2), licensed its public exhibition. Later, following a complaint to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner by the applicants, residents and ratepayers in the council's area, the exhibitors of that film were prosecuted and convicted by a jury in June 1975 for the common law offence of showing in public a grossly indecent film.

The applicants applied to the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division for an order of prohibition directed to the council to prevent them from (a) exercising their censorship powers in accordance with a test which was bad in law, namely, the statutory test of obscenity, instead of the common law test of gross indecency applicable to the public exhibition of films; and (b) acting in excess of their powers in delegating those powers to the board, a body having no legal existence, or authorising it to act as their agent, without retaining the

1 Obscene Publications Act 1959, s. 1: "(1) For the purposes of this Act an article shall be deemed to be obscene if its effect or (where the article comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any one of its items is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it."

2 Cinematograph Act 1909 (as amended by Cinematograph Act 1952), s. 2 (1): see post, p. 553G-H.

3 Cinematograph Act 1952, s. 3 (1): see post, p. 561D-E.

right to revoke the board' s decisions to grant certificates and acting in such manner that their right of review was normally inoperative.

The Divisional Court refused the applications, holding, inter alia, that the delegation of the council's authority to the board was lawful, that rule 116 (2) was reasonable, and that it supplemented the common law criteria for public exhibition.

On appeal by the applicants: -

Held, allowing the appeal, (1) that the council were acting unlawfully in exercising their licensing powers by reference to a rule which applied the statutory test of obscenity applicable to publications and which was so limited as to permit the public exhibition of grossly indecent films, contrary to the general common law applicable to the licensing of films; that the court could therefore exercise its discretion to issue an order of prohibition to stop the council from misusing their powers; but that the order should not issue until the council had had time to repeal or waive rule 116 (2) and to comply with the requirements of the common law or to abandon the censorship of films save in relation to children, leaving it to Parliament to reform the law.

Per Bridge L.J. Though the court's conclusions on the law are inescapable as the law stands, I cannot feel any enthusiasm for the result. The statutory test of obscenity has been much criticised, and with good reason. The law in its present state is so full of anomalies and operates so uncertainly and unevenly that some rationalisation is urgently needed (post, p. 567E-G).

(2) That the applicants, as citizens, ratepayers and parents within the council's jurisdiction, had sufficient locus standi to apply for a prerogative order to prohibit a public authority from acting unlawfully.

But (3) that the council were not acting in excess of their powers by delegating to the British Board of Film Censors the task of censoring films for public exhibition so long as they retained their power to review the board's decisions; for though the board was not a legal entity it had been recognised both by the courts and by Parliament as a proper body to carry out in practice the task of censoring and certifying films for public exhibition, subject to review by the licensing authority in whom the statutory discretion was vested.

Dicta in Reg. v. Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. [1973] A.C. 435, 458, 493, H.L.(E.) and Rex v. London County Council, Ex parte Entertainments Protection Association Ltd [1931] 2 K.B. 215, C.A. applied.

Ellis v. Dubowski [1921] 3 K.B. 621, D.C.; Mills v. London County Council [1925] 1 K.B. 213, D.C. and Reg. v. Stanley [1965] 2 Q.B. 327, C.C. A. approved.

Decision of the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division reversed in part.

The following cases are referred to in the judgments:

Attorney-General ex rel. McWhirter v. Independent Broadcasting Authority [1973] Q. B. 629; [1973] 2 W.L.R. 344; [1973] 1 All E.R. 689, C.A.

Bradbury v. Enfield London Borough Council [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1311; [1967] 3 All E.R. 434, C.A.

Dyson v. Attorney-General [1911] 1 K.B. 410, C.A.

Ellis v. Dubowski [1921] 3 K.B. 621, D.C.

London County Council v. Bermondsey Bioscope Co. Ltd. [1911] 1 K.B. 445, D.C.

Mills v. London County Council [1925] 1 K.B. 213, D.C.

Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation [1955] Ch. 210; [1954] 3 W.L.R. 990; [1954] 3 All E.R. 698, C.A.

Reg. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 893; [1968] 1 All E.R. 763, C.A.

Reg. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn (No. 3) [1973] Q.B. 241; [1973] 2 W.L.R. 43; [1973] 1 All E.R. 323, C.A.

Reg. v. Hereford Corporation. Ex parte Harrower [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1424; [1970] 3 All E.R. 460, D.C.

Reg. v. Hicklin (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.

Reg. v. Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. [1973] A.C. 435; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 143; [1972] 2 All E.R. 898, H.L.(E.).

Reg. v. Paddington Valuation Officer, Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 380; [1965] 3 W.L.R. 426; [1965] 2 All E.R. 836, C.A.

Reg. v. Saunders (1875) 1 Q.B.D. 15.

Reg. v. Staniforth [1976] 2 W.L.R. 849, C.A.

Reg. v. Stanley [1965] 2 Q.B. 327; [1965] 2 W.L.R. 917; [1965] 1 All E.R. 1035, C.C.A.

Reg. v. Thames Magistrates' Court, Ex parte Greenbaum (1957) 55 L.G.R. 129, C.A.

Rex. v. Burnley Justices (1916) 32 T.L.R. 695, D.C.

Rex v. London County Council, Ex parte Entertainments Protection Association Ltd. [1931] 2 K.B. 215, C.A.

Thorson v. Attorney-General of Canada (1975) 1 S.C.R. 138.

The following additional cases were cited in argument:

Director of Public Prosecutions v. Whyte [1972] A.C. 849; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 410; [1972] 3 All E.R. 12, H.L.(E.).

Stott, Ex parte [1916] 1 K.B. 7, D.C.

APPEAL from the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division.

The applicants, Albert Raymond Blackburn, and his wife. Tessa Marion Blackburn, residing in Homefield Road, Chiswick, London W.4, within the area of the Greater London Council, applied for and obtained leave from the Divisional Court to apply for an order of prohibition to issue against the council to prevent them (a) from exercising their censorship powers over the public exhibition of cinematograph films in accordance with a test of obscenity which was bad in law, namely, whether the effect of a film submitted for censorship was, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to corrupt and deprave persons likely to see it, instead of applying the common law which governed the exhibition of films: (b) from acting ultra vires or invalidly in law in delegating or purporting to delegate their censorship powers to the British Board of Film Censors, because the board had no legal existence and/or denied its legal existence, and from authorising de board to act as their agent for the censorship of films: (c) from delegating their powers of film censorship to the board or authorising the board to act as their agent for such censorship without retaining a right to revoke the decisions of the board when granting certificates for the exhibition of films: and (d) from delegating their powers of film censorship or authorising the board to act as their agent without ever exercising or considering whether they should exercise their power to revoke the decisions of the board to pass films for exhibition in public.

The court (Lord Widgery C.J., Kilner Brown and Watkins JJ.) on February 5, 1976, refused the order and dismissed the motion with costs to the respondent council.

The applicants appealed on the grounds that the Divisional Court

had been wrong in law in holding that the council were entitled to apply the statutory test of obscenity laid down by the Act of 1959 instead of the common law test of gross indecency; that it was wrong in law in deciding that the council could delegate their powers of censorship to the British Board of Film Censors, a body which did not exist in law and claimed not to exist in law; and that as the Court of Appeal was not bound by Mills v. London County Council [1925] 1 K.B. 213, as the Divisional Court had been, it should issue the order of prohibition which would ensure the establishment of an effective right of review by the council and enable them to ban a film passed by the board for public exhibition.

The hearing of the appeal was expedited.

The applicants in person.

John Davies Q.C., Gordon Langley and Peter Barber for the Greater London Council.

April 14. The following judgments were read.

LORD DENNING M.R. Mr. Raymond Blackburn comes before us once again. This time he draws to our attention the pornographic films which are being shown openly in cinemas in London, and elsewhere. They are grossly indecent. They are an offence against the common law of England. Yet the Greater London Council, the licensing authority, are doing nothing to stop them. On the contrary, he says, they are virtually permitting them. The rules of the Greater London Council are framed in such limited terms that films gct through which are grossly indecent. He gives a striking instance. Last year they gave their consent to a film called "More about the Language of Love." Afterwards the exhibitors were prosecuted on the ground that it was an outrage to public decency. The jury convicted the exhibitors. They had no doubt about it, retiring only for 20 minutes. The judge said to them: "Thank you in the name of the public." The case raises important questions on the censorship of films.

1. The powers of the Greater London Council

There are only two statutes which give the council control over cinemas. The first is the Cinematograph Act 1909. It was passed in the early days and was concerned with the safety in cinemas, not with censorship. The title states that it is "An Act to make better provision for securing safety." It gave the county councils the power to grant licences - no doubt with a view to safety - but this power was expressed in such wide terms that it was afterwards interpreted so as to give a power of censorship. It says in section 2 (1):

"A county council may grant licences to such persons as they think fit to use the premises ... on such terms and conditions and under such restrictions as, ... the council may by the respective licences determine."

Although the Act was concerned with safety, nevertheless the courts two years later held that a county council could impose conditions which related to other matters, so long as they were not unreasonable. So in 1911 the courts held that a condition saying that the premises should not be opened on Sundays was valid: see London County Council v.

Bermondsey Bioscope Co. Ltd. [1911] 1 K.B. 445. Soon afterwards the county councils began to insert a condition that no film shown should be of a licentious or indecent character. Such a condition was accepted as valid, but it did not permit any censorship beforehand. Next, the county council tried to insert a power of censorship by delegating it to three justices. This was held to be invalid: see Rex v. Burnley Justices (1916) 32 T.L.R. 695. Once again they tried. They sought to hand over all power of censorship to the British Board of Film Censors: but this was held invalid because the county councils were not allowed to delegate their powers: see Ellis v. Dubowski [1921] 3 K.B. 621. But in 1924 there was a breakthrough. The courts gave a decision which allowed censorship by the British Board of Film Censors provided that that body did not have the final say, but was subject to review by the county council itself: see Mills v. London County Council [1925] 1 KB 213 That decision has held the field since that time and must, I think, be accepted as good law. It was recognised as such by Parliament itself in 1952 when it made it compulsory for conditions to be imposed for the protection of children: see section 3 of the Cinematograph Act 1952. Under that section the county council are under a duty to impose conditions so as to ensure that, if a film is designated as unsuitable for children, then children are not to be admitted to see it. Such designation is to be done "by the licensing authority or such other body as may be specified in the licence." In speaking of "such other body" Parliament no doubt had in mind the British Board of Film Censors. To that extent, therefore, the board has Parliamentary approval.

2. The British Board of Film Censors

The British Board of Film Censors is not a legal entity. It has no existence known to the law. It is but a name given to the activities of a few persons, but it goes back for 60 years. There is a president, at present Lord Harlech, who is responsible for broad policy. There is a secretary, Mr. James Ferman, who makes executive decisions. There are four film examiners, who work full-time. These work in pairs, viewing films on three days each week. They put films into four categories, according to their suitability for various age groups: U, A, AA and X. U for everyone. X for those over 18. They sometimes require cuts before giving a certificate. The examiners are recruited from outside the film industry. They are paid salaries. The money is provided by the manufacturers of films through the Incorporated Association of Kinematograph Manufacturers.

The extent of their work is shown by what they did last year - 1975. They saw 417 feature films. They passed 400 and refused 17. But of those 17, they passed five after cuts had been made. They passed 73 documentary films.

Although the board is not a body known to the law, it is, I think, a "body" within section 3 (1) of the Act of 1952. I do not think the county councils can delegate the whole of their responsibilities to the board: see section 5 of the Act of 1909 (repealed in 1972) and Ellis v. Dubowski [1921] 3 K.B. 621, 625: but they can treat the board as an advisory body whose views they can accept or reject; provided that the final decision - aye or nay - rests with the county council. If the exhibitor - or any member of the public - brings the film up before the county council, they ought themselves to review the decision of the British Board of Film Censors and exercise their own judgment on it. That is, I think, the right way to interpret Mills v. London County Council [1925] 1 K.B. 213. When the

board issues a certificate permitting the exhibition of a film - and the county council takes no objection to it - that is equivalent to a permission by the county council itself. When the board refuses a certificate, the exhibitor can appeal to the county council. The county council can then give their consent to the exhibition, and from their decision there is no appeal.

The upshot of it all is this. The county council are in law the body which have the power to censor films for exhibition in cinemas: but in practice it is the British Board of Film Censors which carries out the censorship, subject to review by the county council.

3. The tests to be applied

The next question is: what tests are the county council to apply when they exercise censorship powers? Are they to apply the tests laid down in the Obscene Publications Act 1959? Or the tests laid down by the common law?

(i) The Obscene Publications Act 1959

In 1959 Parliament passed the Obscene Publications Act 1959. I remember il well. I attended the debates, and took part. Its object was to strengthen the law against pornography. It contained a test of obscenity which was to be applied to publications. An article was to be deemed obscene if its effect, taken as a whole, was "such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons" likely to read it. Unfortunately that legislation misfired. I explained the reasons in Reg. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn (No. 3) [1973] Q.B. 241. One reason was because of the inadequacy of the definition of obscenity. It did not stop gross indecency. An article might be so indecent as to shock the readers: but yet it might not tend to deprave and corrupt them. Another reason was because of the defence of public good. The courts used to allow so-called experts to come forward and say that pornography is good for those who take pleasure in it. Fortunately this court, only a week or two ago, held that the evidence on those lines was inadmissible: see Reg. v. Staniforth [1976] 2 W.L.R. 849. But still the fact remains that the test itself is inadequate.

(ii) The common law test

It has been established for centuries that it is an offence at common law to show in public an indecent exhibition. There was a case 100 years ago m which two showmen kept on Epsom Downs a booth in which a grossly indecent exhibition took place. The Court for Crown Cases Reserved held that "those facts are abundant to prove a common law offence": see Reg. v. Saunders (1875) 1 Q.B.D. 15, 19.

This common law offence was clearly recognised by the House of Lords in Reg. v. Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. [1973] A.C. 435. Lord Reid said, at p. 458, in this context that indecency "includes anything which an ordinary decent man or woman would find to be shocking, disgusting and revolting": and Lord Simon of Glaisdale said, at p. 493, that "the authorities establish a common law offence of conduct which outrages public decency."

This common law offence has proved to be a far better stop upon pornography than the Act of 1959. For this simple reason: pornography shocks and disgusts decent people, but it does not tend to deprave or

corrupt them. They revolt from it and turn away from it. If asked, they will be quite ready to say that it is grossly indecent, but far less ready to say that it tends to deprave or corrupt.

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The customs authorities and Post Office apply the simple test: "Is this indecent?" They have no difficulty in condemning millions of magazines on that account, without their decisions being questioned. But when jurors are asked to apply the test: "Does this tend to deprave or corrupt?," they have been known to allow the most indecent articles to get into circulation.

I notice that the Law Commission in its Report Criminal Law: Report on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform (Law Com. No. 76), March 17, 1976, recommends that the common law offence (when the test is gross indecency) should be abolished (see paragraph 3.138, p. 120); and that instead the statutory offence (where the test is to tend to deprave or corrupt) should be made to apply to films (see paragraph 3.150 (a), p. 123). I hope that Parliament will look closely into this recommendation before it is adopted and made law. Some may think that the common law offence is capable of being far more effective in stopping pornography - and is much easier for juries to understand and apply - than the statutory offence.

(iii) Cinematograph films

Parliament expressly said that the provisions of the Act of 1959 were not to apply to cinematograph films shown in public. It did so by the proviso to section 1 (3) (h). Why did Parliament do this? I propose to look at Hansard to find out. I know that we are not supposed to do this. But the Law Commission looked at Hansard: see their Report, paragraph 3.46. p. 88. So did Lord Diplock in Knuller's case [1973] A.C. 435, 480. So I have looked at Hansard to refresh my memory. In the Lords Viscount Kilmuir L.C. referred to the four forms of publication which were excepted from the Bill. First, the live performance of stage plays; secondly, the cinema; thirdly, television; and fourthly, broadcasting. He said that the promoters of the Bill - it was a private member's Bill - desired to leave those four out of the Bill and to allow the common law to apply to them. The government were content that this should be so. The Lord Chancellor said that they "have in practice not been prosecuted in the past and ... are most unlikely, so far as can be contemplated, to be prosecuted in the future": see Hansard (House of Lords), June 22, 1959, vol. 217. col. 74. In the Commons the Solicitor-General added that those four forms "are subject, in fact, to censorship either by public authority or internal control by the Lord Chamberlain, the Board of Film Censors, or whatever it may be": see Hansard (House of Commons), July 23, 1959, vol. 609, col. 1446.

So we have the reason why cinematograph films were omitted. It was because they could be left to the common law and the existing means of censorship.

No doubt those reasons seemed sufficient in 1959. But they are no longer valid today. During the last two or three years pornographic films have been imported from Sweden, I believe, in large numbers - and no doubt at much expense. They have been exhibited in cinemas in London to the shame of its decent citizens. The existing censorship has proved totally ineffective to stop it. This was brought vividlly into the open by Reg. v. Jacey (London) Ltd. decided at the Central Criminal Court on June 5, 1975, and reported as news in "The Times," June 6, 1975. A

film called "More about the Language of Love" was refused a certificate by the British Board of Film Censors: but the exhibitors appealed to the Greater London Council. The council granted consent to it being shown. It was shown at a public cinema. The redoubtable Mr. Blackburn brought it to the notice of Sir Robert Mark, the Commissioner of Police. A prosecution was brought on the ground that it offended against common law. The owners and manager of the cinema were charged with showing a film which was grossly indecent. The jury found them guilty. The judge fined the two companies £500 apiece and the manager £50.

Why did the Creater London Council grant their consent to the showing of that film - which was found by the jury to be grossly indecent - and which was, therefore, unlawful? The answer is because they have been applying the wrong test. They have applied the test of "tendency to deprave or corrupt" under the Act of 1959, instead of the test of "indecency" under the common law.

The tests laid down by the Greater London Council

The Greater London Council at present accept their responsibilities as censor of films to be shown in London. They have laid down rules [Greater London: Rules of Management for Places of Entertainment] which are incorporated as conditions of every licence issued by the council. These are the material rules:

"108. No film shall be exhibited at the premises unless - (a) it is a 'flash' or current newsreel; (b) it has been passed by the British Board of Film Censors as a U, A, AA, or X film; or (c) the council has expressly consented to the exhibition of the film.

"111. If the council does not agree with the category in which any film passed by the British Board of Film Censors is placed it shall if it thinks fit alter such category and ... the film thereafter shall be treated as having been placed in the altered category....

"112. Any special conditions which the council may impose in respect of the exhibition of any film shall, after notice thereof by the council to the licensee, be complied with.

"116" - quite an important one - "No film shall be exhibited at the premises - (1) which is likely - (a) to encourage or to incite to crime; or (b) to lead to disorder; or (c) to stir up hatred against any section of the public in Great Britain on grounds of colour, race or ethnic or national origins; or (2) the effect of which is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to see it.

"If the licensee is notified by the council in writing that it objects to the exhibition of a film on any of the grounds, such film shall not be exhibited."

It is to be noticed that, so far as obscenity is concerned, those rules, in rule 116 (2) adopt the test laid down by section 1 of the Obscene Publications Act 1959, which I may abbreviate as "tendency to deprave and corrupt." And there is overwhelming evidence to show that that is the test which the county council themselves apply when their viewing committee exercises their power of censorship. For instance, the chairman of their film viewing board gave an interview which was published in "Cinema T.V. Today" on March 1, 1975. He was described as "Phil Bassett. now GLC censor" and reported as saying: "We just have to ask ourselves the question of whether the films are likely to deprave or corrupt anyone."

On July 16, 1975, the Arts Committee, in a report to the council, set out A rule 116. containing the "tendency to deprave and corrupt" and said:

"This condition ... has provided the council's film censorship criteria since [1965]." On October 23, 1975, the solicitor to the Greater London Council said in an affidavit:

"Since the enactment of the Obscene Publications Act in 1959, it is, I submit, appropriate for the council to consider whether the effect of a film taken as a whole as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to see it. The test ... is, I submit, the very test which Parliament in 1959 expected and hoped cinematograph licensing authorities would apply."

Much further evidence was also put before us by Mr. Blackburn. It shows conclusively that the council apply the test in the Act of 1959, and not the common law test.

4. The validity of the G.L.C. rules

Those rules made by the G.L.C. prohibit a film which is such as to "tend to deprave and corrupt": but they do not prohibit a film which is grossly indecent. Test it this way: if the British Board of Film Censors pass a film which is grossly indecent, the G.L.C. cannot stop it being shown. There is nothing in their rules which enables them to do so. If the British Board of Film Censors reject a film which is grossly indecent, the licensee can apply to the G.L.C. for their consent to the exhibition of the film: and they will give their consent (as they did in the Jacey case) so long as it does not tend to deprave or corrupt.

By making these rules and so applying them, it follows that a film which is unlawful (as being grossly indecent) may, nevertheless, be shown in London cinemas with the sanction of the Greater London Council, as happened in the Jacey case. In other words, the Greater London Council, have made rules which permit films to be shown, even though their exhibition is contrary to law. This is, to my mind, a misuse of the licensing power which they have assumed. It is wrong for a licensing authority to give their consent to that which is unlawful. That is shown by Rex v. London County Council, Ex parte Entertainments Protection Association Ltd. [1931] 2 K.B. 215. The L.C.C. there made a condition that a cinema should not be opened on Sundays, but announced that they would take no action if £35 was paid to charity for each Sunday opening. Now Sunday opening was a plain breach of the Sunday Observance Act 1780. This court held that the L.C.C. had acted illegally. They had purported to sanction the doing of something which was contrary to law - to dispense with the law - a thing which cannot be done by anyone, not even by the London County Council.

5. Locus standi

It was suggested that Mr. Blackburn has no sufficient interest to bring these proceedings against the G.L.C. It is a point which was taken against him by the Commissioner of Police: see Reg. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118, 137, 149: and against the late Mr. McWhirter of courageous memory by the Independent Broadcasting Authority: see Attorney-General ex rel. McWhirter v. Independent Broadcasting Authority [1973] Q.B. 629, 648-649. On this point, I would ask: Who then can bring proceedings when a public authority is guilty of a misuse of power? Mr. Blackburn is a citizen of London.

His wife is a ratepayer. He has children who may be harmed by the exhibition of pornographic films. If he has no sufficient interest, no other citizen has. I think he comes within the principle which I stated in McWhirter's case [1973l Q.B. 629, 649, which I would recast today so as to read:

"I regard it as a matter of high constitutional principle that if there is good ground for supposing that a government department or a public authority is transgressing the law, or is about to transgress it, in a way which offends or injures thousands of Her Majesty's subjects, then any one of those offended or injured can draw it to the attention of the courts of law and seek to have the law enforced, and the courts in their discretion can grant whatever remedy is appropriate."

The applications by Mr. Blackburn and Mr. McWhirter did much good. They show how desirable such a principle is. One remedy which is always open by leave of the court, is to apply for a prerogative writ, such as certiorari, mandamus or prohibition. These provide a discretionary remedy and the discretion of the court extends to permitting an application to be made by any member of the public: see Reg. v. Thames Magistrates' Court, Ex parte Greenhaum (1957) 55 L.G.R. 129, and especially what was said by Parker L.J.; and Reg. v. Hereford Corporation, Ex parte Harrower [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1424; though it will refuse it to a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him: see Reg. v. Paddington Valuation Officer, Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 380, 401. Another remedy open likewise is by asking for a declaration: see Dyson v. Attorney-General [1911] 1 K.B. 410; Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation [1955] Ch. 210 and Thorson v. Attorney-General of Canada (1975) 1 S.C.R. 138, where Laskin C.J. and his colleagues notably expanded the scope of the remedy. Also by injunction, as in Bradbury v. Enfield London Borough Council [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1311.

The remedy

There is nothing in the statute which compels the G.L.C. to exercise powers of censorship over films to be shown to adults. They are under a duty to censor films which are unsuitable for children (under the Act of 1952), but not those for adults. If the G.L.C. think it right no longer to act as censors for adults, there is nothing to stop them. But they would have to amend their existing rules before they could do so. Alternatively, they could amend their rules so as to make sure that they prohibit the exhibition of any film which is grossly indecent contrary to the common law. Unless they do one or other of these things. I think that this court has power to prohibit them from continuing their present procedure, and should do so. The prerogative writ of prohibition has, in the past, usually been exercised so as to prohibit judicial tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction. But just as the scope of certiorari has been extended to administrative authorities, so also with prohibition. It is available to prohibit administrative authorities from exceeding their powers, or misusing them. In particular, it can prohibit a licensing authority from making rules or granting licences which permit conduct that is contrary to law.

Conclusion

In my opinion, therefore. Mr. Blackburn has made out his case. He has shown that the G.L.C. have been exercising their censorship powers in a manner which is unlawful: because they have been applying a test which

is bad in law. If they continue with their present wrong test and in consequence give their consent to films which are grossly indecent, they may be said to be aiding and abetting a criminal offence. In these circumstances this court can and should issue an order of prohibition to stop them. But I do not think we should issue the order today. We should give the Greater London Council time to mend their ways either by applying the proper test or no longer exercising censorship. They have already suspended their viewing of films. They suspended it on July 22, 1975, after the decision in the Reg. v. Jacey, "The Times," June 6, 1975, case. It may be that, as a result of our decision today, they will discontinue film viewing altogether and give up any responsibility for the censorship of films save in regard to children. If they should do this, it will be imperative for Parliament itself to take action: so as to place the censorship of films on a proper footing.

I would allow the appeal so as to award Mr. Blackburn his costs here and below, and give him leave to apply later if necessary for prohibition.

STEPHENSON L.J. This appeal arises out of the power conferred on county councils, including now the respondent council, by section 2 (1) of the Cinematograph Act 1909 as amended by the Schedule to the Cinematograph Act 1952 to

"grant licences to such persons as they think fit to use the premises specified in the licence for the purpose of cinematograph exhibitions (as defined in the Cinematograph Act 1952) on such terms and conditions and under such restrictions as, subject to regulations of the Secretary of State, the council may by the respective licences determine."

Although the Secretary of State has exercised his power to make regulations for such premises only to secure safety (except in the case of children), councils have used the power to impose conditions more widely, for example to prohibit opening on Sundays (London County Council v. Bermondsey Bioscope Co. Ltd. [1911] 1 K.B. 445) and to prohibit certain kinds of film, as the council now do by rule 108 and more particularly by rule 116, which Lord Denning M.R. has read.

There is no question that this power to censor by the imposition of conditions is within the powers conferred upon councils by the statute. Any reasonable conditions - or rather any conditions which are not plainly unreasonable - will if challenged be upheld by the courts (London County Council v. Bermondsey Bioscope Co. Ltd., at p. 451; Mills v. London County Council [1925] 1 K.B. 213, 220), provided always that they are not ultra vires. It is this proviso which in this case the Divisional Court has ignored but I think must be applied.

In the latter case the Divisional Court agreed with a previous decision of the same court in Ellis v. Dubowski [1921] 3 K.B. 621, that it was beyond the council's statutory powers to impose conditions which in effect transferred or delegated the exercise of the council's statutory powers to the British Board of Film Censors and thereby made the decision of an extraneous body final and unappealable, but that it was within their powers to do so provided that they retained the right to review and revoke the board's decisions by adopting the condition suggested by Sankey J. in Ellis' case at p. 624 that no film not certified by the board was to be shown without the express sanction of the council's licensing committee.

Mr. Blackburn. on behalf of the applicants, does not contend that the council have acted unlawfully in delegating their power of censorship to

the film viewing sub-committee of their Arts and Recreation Committee; but he submits that rule 108 is ultra vires because it purports to delegate the council's censorship power to the board and authorises the board to act as their agent for the censorship of films; and he asks the court to prohibit the council from so acting. I agree with the judgment of Lord Widgery C.J. on this point that the decision in Mills' case [1925] 1 K. B. 213 is a complete answer to it. That decision is not binding upon us, but in my judgment it was right and should be followed.

It is true that in Mills' case a point which Mr. Blackburn makes was not taken, namely, that the board, as its solicitors admitted in their letter of March 12, 1973, "is not a formal legal entity." But in Ellis' case [1921] 3 K.B. 621, 622, it was stated to be

"an unofficial body appointed by firms engaged in letting out films on hire, to act as censors of films and so to protect the interests of the trade."

It is a body, unincorporated it is true and unable to be sued, which since it came into existence in 1912 has not only received judicial notice but has been recognised both by the Home Office in their circulars on the Cinematograph Acts, and by Parliament. For it was eventually conceded, in my opinion rightly, that it was in the mind of the legislature when h provided by section 3 (1) of the Cinematograph Act 1952:

"It shall be the duty of the licensing authority, in granting a licence under the Act of 1909 as respects any premises, - (a) to impose conditions or restrictions prohibiting the admission of children to cinematograph exhibitions involving the showing of works designated, by the licensing authority or such other body as may be specified in the licence, as works unsuitable for children; and (b) to consider what (if any) conditions or restrictions should be imposed as to the admission of children to other cinematograph exhibitions involving the showing of works designated by the authority or such other body as aforesaid as of such other description as may be specified in the licence."

I agree with the statement put before the council on October 18, 1966, that:

"The reference in the section to 'such other body as may be specified in the licence' makes it possible for licensing authorities to refer in the conditions attached to licences to the system of certification of films by the British Board of Film Censors, while preserving the right of licensing authorities to act independently of the board's decisions if they see fit to do so."

It is also true, and acknowledged by the council, that they have never banned a film which has been passed by the board. But rule 116 preserves the council's power to ban a film passed by the board, though only on the grounds specified in the rule, and rule 108 (c) in effect repeats Sankey J.' s condition giving them power to permit or ban a film which the board has not passed. I agree with the Divisional Court that the powers referred to in those two rules prevent the council's use of the board from being an abuse of their power, and this ground of appeal fails.

I cannot, however, follow the Divisional Court in dismissing Mr. Blackburn's other submission that the council have in rule 116 been applying the wrong test and ought to be prohibited from so doing. That rule is clearly intended to enforce the law. In forbidding by rule 116 (1) (c) the exhibition of any film which is likely "to stir up hatred against any section

of the public in Great Britain on grounds of colour, race or ethnic or A national origins "it enforces the Race Relations Acts 1965 and 1968. But in forbidding by rule 116 (2) the exhibition of any film" the effect of which is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to see it "it enforces the law against obscenity which Parliament derived from Reg. v. Hicklin (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371, and applied to reading matter and other "articles" by the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and to stage plays by section 2 of the Theatres Act 1968 but did not apply to cinematograph exhibitions, which were left to the common law that makes indecent exhibitions in public unlawful. The miscellaneous authorities which establish this, including Reg. v. Saunders (1875) 1 Q.B.D. 15 (to which Lord Denning M.R. referred) are collected in paragraphs 3.27 and 3.28 of the Law Commission's Report No. 76 of March 17, 1976 on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform at p. 81 and in the speech of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Reg. v. Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. [1973] A.C. 435, 492-493. The offence seems to be the exposure or exhibition in public of indecent things or acts: per Lord Reid at p.458; and of the offences of which the defendant Saunders was convicted only one was for publishing words and six others were for exhibiting performances, practices and representations, though Lord Simon of Glaisdale mentions that case as dealing with indecent words only.

The Law Commission have in the same report recommended that this well known and much criticised obscenity test should be made applicable to the exhibition of films by amending the Act of 1959; paragraphs 3.86 at p. 103, 3.138 at p. 120 and 3.150 (a) at p. 123; see also p. 186. But unless and until Parliament enacts that recommendation the common law against indecency applies to them, and the test of indecency is a different test.

We are told by Mr. Davies for the council that the test of indecency at common law is the lest which the board always applies; and that may explain why they refused to pass the film "More about the Language of Love" which the council then passed. On Mr. Blackburn's initiative those who had exhibited it with a notice under rule 114 that it had been passed by the council were prosecuted to conviction for an indecent exhibition contrary to common law. He is now engaged in prosecuting the exhibitors of its predecessor "The Language of Love" and asks the court to enforce the right law by prohibiting them from applying the wrong test.

Indecency and obscenity are alike difficult to define, but they arc not the same thing in the natural meaning of the words or in the eyes of the law. The submission that they meant the same thing was rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Reg. v. Stanley [1965] 2 Q.B. 327. The jury had there convicted the appellant of sending postal packets which enclosed "indecent or obscene" cinematograph films (and a booklet) contrary to section 11 of the Post Office Act 1953. The jury found the articles indecent but not obscene, and the Court of Criminal Appeal upheld the convictions, Lord Parker C.J. saying. at pp. 333. 334:

"The words 'indecent or obscene' convey one idea. namely, offending against the recognised standards of propriety, indecent being at the lower end of the scale and obscene at the upper end of the scale ... an indecent article is not necessarily obscene, whereas an obscene article almost certainly must be indecent."

If that is right - and it seems to me common sense - the council are by the express terms of rule 116 (2) forbidding the exhibition of films which are at the upper end of the scale instead of forbidding the exhibition of

films which are anywhere on the scale, whether at its upper or its lower end or in between. In so doing they are using their power of censorship according to the wrong law and by necessary implication consenting to the exhibition of films at the lower end of the scale which are nevertheless indecent at common law and so unlawful.

It is true, but not, in my judgment, relevant, that there is no duty on the council to impose any censorship conditions at all on films for adults. But if the council choose to impose such conditions, they must be lawful conditions. If authority for that were needed, it is to be found in the decision of this court in Rex v. London County Council, Ex parte Entertainments Protection Association Ltd. [1931] 2 K.B. 215. There certiorari issued to quash an order or decision which in effect waived compliance with the Sunday Observance Act 1780 because it informed a licensee that the council would take no action against him for the present if he exhibited films on Sundays. This court there said that it was the duty of the council to obey the law, not to dispense with it.

It may be said that there is a necessity for a council to impose conditions as to days of showing whereas there is no necessity to impose conditions of censorship. But if a council "enter the field" whether by prescribing days or kinds of film for exhibition, they must, in my judgment, impose conditions which enforce the law applicable in that field and do not depart from it. It may be said, furthermore, that what the council have done here is not to waive or break the law but to enforce it only to a limited extent, and that by so acting they are not acting contrary to law as was the L.C.C. in the matter of Sunday opening. By doing too little they are not acting ultra vires. Acting ultra vires is doing too much, not too little. This line of argument ignores, I think, the implication and effect of prescribing too permissive a test. The implication of rule 116 (7) is that a film, however indecent, may be exhibited, and the council will not object to its exhibition, unless it is also obscene as the law defines obscenity; and the effect of rule 116 (2) is that an indecent film, such as the jury found "More about the Language of Love" to be, will be passed by the council and exhibited. A rule with that implication and that effect may not be unreasonable but is ultra vires because that is its implication and its effect. It may be reasonable to apply a test which Parliament has applied to words and public performances of plays, but it involves an excess of jurisdiction in authorising what is illegal. Contrast condition 10 of the Model Licensing Conditions recommended by the Home Office in circulars on the Cinematograph Acts, but not adopted by the council, as an example of a condition which prescribes a test that is not too permissive but too exacting:

"Where the licensing authority have given notice in writing to the licensee of the premises prohibiting the exhibition of a film on the ground that it contains matter which, if exhibited, would offend against good taste or decency or would be likely to encourage or incite to crime or to lead to disorder or to be offensive to public feeling, that film shall not be exhibited in the premises except with the consent in writing of the licensing authority."

(Compare section 3 (1) (a) of the Television Act 1964.)

Not every exhibition offending against good taste or offensive to public feeling is an offence against the common law. Such a condition does too much, not too little; yet it could not be successfully contended that it was ultra vires because it went further than the law required. I cannot therefore

accept, as Lord Widgery C.J. accepted, the council's last-minute contention, put forward in their solicitor's affidavit of October 23, 1975, that their condition of censorship simply supplemented the common law by adding an additional test.

This opinion of the council's duties does not turn the council's power to impose conditions into a duty, or compel them to impose conditions which Parliament has not required them to impose. It declares that if the council do exercise their power to impose conditions which cover activities restricted by the general law, whether by statute or by the common law, they must cover them correctly in a manner which does not permit infringement of the law, whether directly as in Rex v. London County Council, Ex parte Entertainments Protection Association Ltd. [1931] 2 K.B. 215 or indirectly as in this case. The council are in my judgment under no duty to impose censorship conditions except on the exhibition of films to children. If our decision in this case leads the council to repeal or waive rule 116 (2), I would not regard them as failing in any legal duty. What they cannot, I think, do is to continue to leave censorship of films, which their licensees exhibit, to the board alone, because that would be to make the board's ipse dixit final, which was what Ellis' case [1921] 3 K.B. 621 rightly decided they could not do. If the council give up their power of censoring films, then Parliament, which has relied so long on the existing co-operation between councils and the board to censor films, may have to come to the rescue, perhaps by making a certificate of the board a statutory requirement for exhibition of any film to adults, or by applying the Obscene Publications Act 1959 to cinematograph exhibitions to adults, as the Law Commission recommends, or by re-activating parts of the Cinematograph and Indecent Displays Bill of 1973⁴. Indeed it is to be hoped that this case may lead to early legislation to improve and clarify the law, which in this notoriously difficult and controversial field of human activity by common consent works badly.

In the present unsatisfactory state of the law, rule 116 (2) is, in my opinion, one which the council have no power to make; it does not supplement the common law but contradicts it and the council should be prohibited from acting upon it.

If that is right, I see no reason why the applicants should not apply for prohibition. They live in the council's jurisdiction and have locus standi, Mrs. Blackburn as a ratepayer. But I agree that we should not in the exercise of the court's discretion, make an order of prohibition yet. I assume that the council grant licences which are in force for one year: section 2 (2) of the Act of 1909; and they must have time to consider our judgments and whether they will amend rule 116 (2) or abolish it altogether before notifying their licensees.

I agree with the order which Lord Denning M.R. proposes.

BRIDGE L.J. The Cinematograph Act 1909 required cinemas to be licensed by local authorities and empowered the grant of licences "on such terms and conditions and under such restrictions as ... the council may by the respective licences determine." It is odd, as Lord Widgery C.J. said, that this power should have come to be used for a purpose for which it was not originally intended, namely, as a means of censoring the contents of films. It is, perhaps, odder still that the censoring function should in practice have come to be exercised mainly by the British Board of Film Censors. The board is an informal, unofficial and unincorporated

4 Note: See Hansard for March 24, 1976, vol. 369, no. 51, cols. 645 et seq.

organisation originally set up by the film industry to provide a form of voluntary censorship. In Ellis v. Dubowski [1921] 3 K.B. 621, a licence condition that no film be shown unless certified for public exhibition by the board, was held ultra vires on the ground that it amounted to an unauthorised delegation of the licensing authority's statutory discretion, there being in that case no provision for the licensee to have recourse to the authority by way of review of any decision by the board. However, as the judges suggested in Ellis's case, and as the court later held in Mills v. London County Council [1925] 1 K.B. 213, delegation of censorship, to the board was unobjectionable provided the licensing authority reserved to itself the power to override the board's decision on appeal by the licensee. In both those cases the court was concerned with the reasonableness of the censorship conditions from the point of view of the licensee. A condition which subjects the licensee, in the matter of censorship, to the arbitrary decision of a third party is obviously unreasonable, in the sense in which that term is used in relation to the exercise of a statutory discretion. But any such unreasonableness is cured by reserving the last word to the authority in whom the statutory discretion is vested.

The Act of 1909 conferred a power of censorship but clearly imposed no duty of censorship on licensing authorities. Such a duty was imposed for the first time, and then only in relation to children under 16, by the Cinematograph Act 1952, section 3 (1), which required that licence conditions should prohibit the admission of children to films "designated by the licensing authority or such other body as may be specified in the licence, as works unsuitable for children." This looks like a legislative recognition of the established practice of delegation to the board. It authorises an out and out delegation of the power to censor children's films, but leaves the previous position, as established in the cases of Ellis and Mills, unaffected in regard to the censorship of films for adults.

The decision in the Mills case [1925] 1 K.B. 213, that a licensee cannot object to a delegation of censorship to the board provided he has a right of appeal to the licensing authority against the board's decision to withhold approval in any particular case, was in my judgment clearly right. By parity of reasoning I think there is no objection from the public point of view to such a delegation to the board, provided again that the licensing authority reserves to itself the right to override any decision of the board approving a film for exhibition and to nullify the effect of that approval. Mr. Blackburn's complaints directed against delegation to the board are, in my judgment, without substance.

The important question raised by this appeal is whether the Greater London Council act lawfully in respect of the criterion which they apply when any decision of the board is challenged. By rule 116 (2) of their standard rules, subject to which licences are granted, the Greater London Council prescribe that no film shall be exhibited: "the effect of which is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to see it." The rule was adopted by the G.L.C. in 1966. Its language is clearly derived from the statutory test of obscenity in section 1 (1) of the Obscene Publications Act 1959. The G.L.C. must have felt that their wisdom was confirmed when the Theatres Act 1968 abolished theatre censorship by the Lord Chamberlain and applied the same test of obscenity to stage plays. But whereas the Act of 1968 gave to the stage a complete immunity from liability to prosecution for any common law offence of which the essence was that a performance was "obscene, indecent, offensive, disgusting or injurious to morality," the screen remains,

on account of its exclusion from the ambit of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 subject to the full rigours of the common law.

The issue was thrown into high relief when the exhibitors of a film called "More about the Language of Love," which was refused a certificate by the board but passed by the G.L.C. in March 1974, were convicted in June 1975 of the common law offence of showing a film which depicted grossly indecent performances, thereby outraging public decency. Following that conviction and the issue of the present proceedings by Mr. and Mrs. Blackburn, the G.L.C. decided for the time being to suspend their activities in viewing films by way of review of any decision of the board. I well understand their reasons for doing so. But this abdication of function has the effect, so long as it continues, of reproducing the situation which was successfully challenged as unlawful in Ellis v. Dubowski [1921] 3 K.B. 621. It ought to be remedied without delay.

In the Divisional Court Lord Widgery C.J. tested the legality of the G.L.C.'s rule 116 (2) by asking whether it was reasonable. If that is the correct test. I should unhesitatingly agree with him that it is reasonable. It would be absurd to suggest that the test of obscenity adopted by Parliament in the Acts of 1959 and 1968 is unreasonable if applied to films. But, with respect, I do not think the test of reasonableness is here in point. We are not here concerned with whether the rule imposes an unreasonable restriction on the licensee. The question is whether the effect of judging films by the criterion of rule 116 (2) alone is calculated to result in the G.L.C. giving apparent authority for the exhibition of films in contravention of the general law. The Divisional Court was not referred to Rex v. London County Council, Ex parte Entertainments Protection Association Ltd. [1931] 2 K.B. 215. If they had been, I think they would have decided this case differently. In that case the L.C.C. had exercised their licensing function in such a way as to purport to authorise film performances on Sunday, notwithstanding that such performances were then prohibited under the general law by the Sunday Observance Act 1780. The court held that the council had exceeded its jurisdiction. The principle to be derived from the case is that it is an excess of jurisdiction for a licensing authority to exercise its power in such a way that it appears to sanction that which is contrary to the general law. The fact that a criminal offence has been apparently authorised by the licensing authority does not, of course, give any immunity from prosecution. But this does not prevent such a purported exercise of the licensing authority's power being challenged by way of one of the prerogative orders.

The existence of the common law offence of publicly exhibiting indecent acts or things is beyond doubt: Reg. v. Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. [1973] A.C. 435. Lord Reid said, at p. 458, that it "includes anything which an ordinary decent man or woman would find to be shocking, disgusting and revolting." It is clear that by this test a film might well be judged unfit for public exhibition which fell short of any tendency to deprave and corrupt.

Lord Widgery C.J. held that the effect of rule 116 (2) was to "supplement the common law by adding additional tests which a film must satisfy if it is to be shown in the G.L.C. area."Again, with respect. I cannot agree. The criteria of indecency and obscenity relate to the same subject matter. Lord Parker C.J. summed the matter up in Reg. v. Stanley [1965] 2 Q.B. 327, 333-334, when he said:

"The words 'indecent or obscene' convey one idea, namely, offending against the recognised standards of propriety, indecent being at the

lower end of the scale and obscene at the upper end of the scale.... As it seems to this court, an indecent article is not necessarily obscene, whereas an obscene article almost certainly must be indecent."

So long as the G.L.C. direct themselves by reference to the statutory test of obscenity and ignore the common law test of indecency, the probable result must be that they will appear to authorise public exhibition of films which will offend against the common law. It has been said by Mr. Davies for the G.L.C., that whatever test they apply they cannot ensure that the exhibitor of a film they have approved will not be prosecuted and convicted by the verdict of a jury. This proposition is correct, but it affords no argument for the adoption of a test which does not conform to the general law. If the single criterion relevant to any issue of obscenity or indecency by which the C.L.C. direct themselves in exercising censorship is calculated to permit what the common law prohibits, their jurisdiction is not lawfully exercised.

I agree that Mrs. Blackburn has sufficient locus standi, as a ratepayer, to apply for an order of prohibition and that it is in our discretion to make the order. I should be very reluctant to take that ultimate step, which might create many difficulties for the G.L.C., without first giving them a reasonable time to put their house in order. This they can do in one of two ways. They can exclude from their licence conditions any provision relating to the films that may be shown save such as is necessary to implement the authority's obligations under section 3 (1) of the Cinematograph Act 1952. Alternatively they can introduce for the censorship of films for adults a criterion directed to prevent the showing of any film which would be an indecent public exhibition.

Although the conclusions I have reached on the questions of law involved in this appeal seem to me inescapable as the law stands, I cannot say I feel any enthusiasm for the result. The statutory test of obscenity has been much criticised, and with good reason. But I don't know how many people today would accept as an appropriate test of criminality what is "shocking, disgusting and revolting." There are profound differences of opinion as to what are the appropriate standards in relation to such matters which the law ought to be designed to maintain. Some want the law to move one way, some another, but surely no one can be content for it to stand still. The one proposition which I imagine nearly everybody would assent to is that the law in its present state is so full of anomalies and operates so uncertainly and unevenly that some rationalisation is urgently needed. If our decision has the result, as seems probable, that many authorities will abandon altogether the thankless task of censoring films for adults, perhaps that may emphasise the urgency of some reforming legislation.

I agree with my Lords that the appeal should be allowed to the extent indicated by Lord Denning M.R.

Solicitors: A. G. Cardner, Greater London Council.

M. M. H.