COUNSEL: Upjohn, K.C., H. Terrell, K.C., and Dunham, for the plaintiffs

Warmington, K.C., Rowland Rowlands, and Trevor Lewis, for the defendant company

 

SOLICITORS: Smith, Rundell & Dods, for Morgan, Bruce & Nicholas, Pontypridd; Wrentmore & Son, for Frank James & Sons, Cardiff.

 

JUDGE: Warrington J.

 

DATES: 1907 Dec. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

 

 

Water Supply – Local Government – Urban Authority – Waterworks Company – Special Act – Provisions for Protection of Urban Authority – Action by Urban Authority to enforce – Joinder of Attorney-General – Necessity for – Amendment – Terms – Pontypridd Waterworks Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. cviii.), s. 4.

 

By the Pontypridd Waterworks Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. cviii.), s. 4, the defendant company were authorized to make and maintain a reservoir and certain filter beds, service tanks, conduits or lines of pipes and other works in the county of Glamorgan therein mentioned. Sect. 10 provided that if the works authorized were not completed within the time thereby limited the powers of the defendant company should cease, “Provided that for the protection of the Pontypridd and Ystradyfodwg Local Boards …. the following provisions shall have effect (namely)”; and then followed provisions imposing certain obligations upon the defendant company with reference to the quantity and quality of the water to be supplied to the districts of the two local boards.

 

On September 13, 1906, the plaintiff council, who were the successors in interest of the Ystradyfodwg Local Board, commenced an action in their own name against the defendant company to enforce by mandatory injunction the provisions of s. 10. The defendant company by their defence alleged (inter alia) that they would object that the plaintiff council’s statement of claim disclosed no cause of action. On November 6, 1907, after notice of trial had been given, the plaintiff council obtained an order giving them liberty to amend their writ and [*389] statement of claim by adding the Attorney-General as a co-plaintiff on their relation. The order provided that “all questions as to the terms upon which such amendments ought to be allowed be left to the judge at the trial of this action, when the defendants are to be at liberty to raise such preliminary objections as they may think fit.” The Attorney-General was accordingly added as a co-plaintiff:–

 

Held, that s. 10 of the defendant company’s Act did not confer upon the plaintiff council any statutory power to sue in their own name, and that the only person who could sue was the Attorney-General.

 

Devonport Corporation v. Tozer, [1903] 1 Ch. 759, followed.

 

Held, also, that the liberty given to amend by the order of November 6 must be upon the terms that the plaintiff council should pay to the defendant company their costs of the action up to and including that order, and that the Attorney-General should only be entitled to such relief as he could have claimed if the action had been commenced at the date on which he was added as a party.

 

Ayscough v. Bullar, (1889) 41 Ch. D. 341, applied.

 

WITNESS ACTION.

 

By the Pontypridd Waterworks Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. cviii.), s. 4, the defendant company were authorized to make and maintain in the lines and situations and upon the lands shewn on the deposited plans, and according to the levels shewn on the deposited sections, the reservoir, filter beds, service tanks, conduits or lines of pipes, and other works in the county of Glamorgan therein mentioned.

 

Sect. 10 of the Act was as follows:–

 

“If the works authorized by this Act be not completed within five years from the passing of this Act then on the expiration of that period the powers by this Act granted to the company for executing the same or in relation thereto shall cease except as to so much thereof as is then completed but nothing in this section shall restrict the company from extending their works mains and pipes from time to time whenever it shall be necessary for the purpose of increasing or distributing the supply of water within their limits of supply.

 

“Provided that for the protection of the Pontypridd and Ystradyfodwg Local Boards (hereinafter called the local boards) the following provisions shall have effect (namely):–

 

“(A) The company shall construct and complete within fifteen months from the passing of this Act the filter beds and service tank (No. 2) hereinbefore described and also shall construct and [*390] complete the other filter beds authorized by this Act within four years from the passing of this Act;

 

“(B) The service tanks to all filter beds authorized by this Act shall be constructed to contain not less than 100,000 gallons of filtered water each and such service tanks shall be at all times open to inspection by the local boards or their officers;

 

“(C) The existing Rhiw tank shall be constantly supplied with filtered water so that there shall always be at least one foot of water in the said tank above the inlet to the pipe supplying the town of Pontypridd therefrom. A proper self-closing valve shall be provided on the inlet to the said tank to prevent waste of the water from the Maerdy service tank by overflowing from the Rhiw tank;

 

“(D) The company shall within eighteen months from the passing of this Act lay down and complete a separate and independent line of mains not less than five inches in diameter and connect the same with their existing Maerdy service tank so as to be in a position to supply every portion of the districts of Williamstown Edmondstown and Penygraig within the company’s limits and shall keep the said mains charged with water at all times under constant pressure;

 

“(E) The company shall keep their mains throughout the districts of the local boards charged with water at all times under constant pressure and shall provide such means as will best enable them to do so;

 

“(F) The company shall carry out the works authorized by this Act so as to give in the first instance a storage capacity of not less than 160,000,000 gallons of water and shall further increase their storage capacity if found necessary so as to bring it up to 200,000,000 gallons of water;

 

“(G) After completion of the filter beds and service tank (No. 2) hereinbefore referred to all water not supplied direct from springs within the districts of the local boards shall be properly filtered before the same shall be allowed to enter the mains.

 

The plaintiff council were the successors in interest of the Ystradyfodwg Local Board named in the said Act, and all the [*391] rights of the last-mentioned board had become and were vested in the plaintiff council under and by virtue of the Local Government Act, 1894, and the district of the said local board was now the district of the plaintiff council.

 

On September 13, 1906, the plaintiff council issued their writ in the present action, claiming – (1.) a declaration that the defendant company were bound by the Pontypridd Waterworks Act, 1892, to keep their mains throughout the plaintiff council’s district charged with water at all times under constant pressure, and that the defendant company might be ordered forthwith to provide such means as would enable them to do so; and (2.) an injunction restraining the defendant company, their servants, agents, and workmen from allowing any water not supplied direct from springs within the district of the plaintiff council or of the Pontypridd Urban District Council from entering their mains without being properly filtered.

 

The plaintiff council by their statement of claim alleged that the defendant company had committed the following breaches of their Act – namely, (1.) they had not kept the mains mentioned in s. 10, clause (D), charged with water at all times under constant pressure, but had on many occasions during long periods continuously failed to keep the said mains so charged; (2.) they had not kept their mains throughout the district of the plaintiff council charged with water at all times under constant pressure, and they had not provided such means as would best enable them to do so, but had on many occasions during long periods failed to keep their last-mentioned mains so charged; (3.) they had caused water not supplied direct from springs within the districts referred to in clause (G) to enter the mains referred to in the last-mentioned clause without being previously or at all filtered, so that the same had reached the consumers in an unfiltered or insufficiently filtered condition. The plaintiff council further alleged that the effect of these breaches on the part of the defendant company had been that many inhabitants of the plaintiff council’s district entitled to a sufficient supply of pure water by the defendant company had at intervals been deprived during long periods of any supply (and that other such inhabitants had received water in an unfiltered [*392] or insufficiently filtered condition). The plaintiff council also alleged that they had repeatedly complained to the defendant company of such breaches, and requested them to remedy the same and to perform the said provisions of the Act, but that the defendant company had failed so to do.

 

The defendant company by their defence alleged (inter alia) that they would object that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action.

 

On November 6, 1907, after notice of trial had been given, the plaintiff council obtained an order giving them liberty to amend their writ and statement of claim by adding the Attorney-General as a co-plaintiff in the action on their relation. The order provided that “all questions as to the terms upon which such amendments ought to be allowed be left to the judge at the trial of this action, when the defendants are to be at liberty to raise such preliminary objections as they may think fit.” In pursuance of this order the writ and statement of claim were on November 9, 1907, amended by adding the Attorney-General as a co-plaintiff on the relation of the plaintiff council.

 

The action now came on for trial.

 

Upjohn, K.C., H. Terrell, K.C., and Dunham, for the plaintiffs, stated the facts.

 

Warmington, K.C., Rowland Rowlands, and Trevor Lewis, for the defendant company. We take the preliminary objection that the action as originally constituted was not maintainable. The plaintiff council had no locus standi to bring the present action. At the date when it was commenced no power to sue in their own name was vested in the plaintiff council either by the defendant company’s special Act, the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 17), or the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55). To enable a local authority to sue in their own name one of two things is essential, either the action must be brought in respect of property vested in them in their corporate capacity, or must be brought by them in pursuance of some express statutory authority empowering them to sue in their own name. Neither of those essentials is to be found in the present case. The proper plaintiff was therefore the Attorney-General: [*393] Attorney-General v. Ashborne Recreation Ground Co. (1); Devonport Corporation v. Tozer. (2) The Public Health Act, 1875, one of the main objects of which was to enable proceedings to be taken for the abatement of nuisances, by s. 107 provides that “any local authority may, if in their opinion summary proceedings would afford an inadequate remedy, cause any proceedings to be taken against any person in any superior Court of Law or Equity to enforce the abatement or prohibition of any nuisance under this Act, or for the recovery of any penalties from or for the punishment of any persons offending against the provisions of this Act relating to nuisances. …”

 

[WARRINGTON J. The words of that section would be satisfied by the local authority acting as relators.]

 

Yes. Under that section the local authority are entitled to cause proceedings to be taken, but not to take them themselves in their own name. The provision in s. 10 of the special Act as to the protection of the local boards does not amount to a contract between them and the defendant company: Davis & Sons v. Taff Vale Ry. Co. (3) To enable the plaintiff council to initiate proceedings in their own name special powers must be found in the Act authorizing them to do so, but there are no such powers here.

 

Then, as to the terms on which the amendment joining the Attorney-General ought to be allowed, those are stated by the Court of Appeal in Ayscough v. Bullar (4), namely, that the plaintiff council must pay the defendant company’s costs up to and including the order giving them liberty to amend by adding the Attorney-General as a co-plaintiff, and the Attorney-General must take up the position as commencing the action on the date on which he was made a party.

 

Upjohn, K.C., H. Terrell, K.C., and Dunham, for the plaintiffs. The plaintiff council had a perfectly good cause of action at the date of the issue of the writ, and the Attorney-General was not a necessary party, but was merely added ex abundanti cautel‰. The insertion in s. 10 of the special Act of the words “Provided that for the protection of” the local

 

(1) [1903] 1 Ch. 101.

 

(2) [1903] 1 Ch. 759.

 

(3) [1895] A. C. 542.

 

(4) 41 Ch. D. 341, 346. [*394]

 

boards, &c., was intended by Parliament to confer upon them the power to enforce the rights given to them by that section. The case therefore falls within the exception pointed out by the judges in Devonport Corporation v. Tozer. (1) The section constituted the plaintiff council a public authority ad hoc to enforce the execution of the works therein mentioned for the benefit of a limited section of the public, not of the public at large. The clauses of that section, which are mandatory in their nature, all have reference to public health. The local boards were, and the plaintiff council now are, a health authority. Under the Public Health Act, 1875, all local authorities are health authorities (s. 13) and potential water authorities (s. 51). Under these circumstances s. 10 of the special Act makes mandatory nearly all the works mentioned in the enabling section of the Act. The effect of this is to give to the plaintiff council, as the health authority, power to enforce and to compel the performance of the provisions of s. 10, and further to give them a right of action independent of the Attorney-General.

 

[WARRINGTON J. Do you say that s. 10 is not for the protection of the public, and therefore that the Attorney-General cannot sue?]

 

It is not necessary for us to contend that, because the Attorney-General as representing the Crown can always maintain an information to compel corporations to perform their statutory obligations, whether such obligations are affirmative or negative: Attorney-General v. London and North Western Ry. Co. (2) The Attorney-General does not bring an action by virtue of his being a party to a parliamentary bargain. Sect. 107 of the Public Health Act, 1875, upon which the defendant company rely, leaves the question open as to the persons in whose name the proceedings there mentioned are to be instituted. Sect. 10 of the special Act, it is submitted, gives the plaintiff council an implied right of action. The point raised in the present case was not discussed by Buckley J. in Attorney-General v. Ashborne Recreation Ground Co. (3) Devonport Corporation v. Tozer (1) does not apply to the present case. The plaintiff council here are not, as the

 

(1) [1903] 1 Ch. 759.

 

(2) [1900] 1 Q. B. 78.

 

(3) [1903] 1 Ch. 101. [*395]

 

plaintiffs in that case were, putting in suit a public wrong, but are putting in suit a parliamentary bargain to which the plaintiff council were a party.

 

[WARRINGTON J. Do you say that the plaintiff council could recover damages for the breach by the defendant company of their statutory obligations?]

 

No, it was not contemplated by Parliament that they should do so. What Parliament did contemplate was that the plaintiff council might apply to the Court and obtain a mandatory order to enforce the performance of those obligations. It would always have been competent to the plaintiff council to have gone to the Attorney-General and said, “Here is a water authority in our district who are not performing their duties, with the result that injury to public health is thereby occasioned in a portion of our district.” It is submitted that the plaintiff council are here pursuing the special statutory remedies given them by s. 10 of the Act. The effect of provisions similar to those contained in that section are discussed in Countess of Rothes v. Kirkcaldy and Dysart Waterworks Commissioners (1) and Davis & Sons v. Taff Vale Ry. Co. (2) What effect can be given to the words “Provided that for the protection of” the local boards “the following provisions shall have effect,” &c., unless the plaintiff council are thereby empowered to sue in their own name?

 

[WARRINGTON J. Why are not the local section of the public, whose interests are involved in this enactment, protected by the fact that the enactment is made and can be enforced by the Attorney-General?]

 

That would not be giving any effect to the words. In construing a document the Court is bound to give, if possible, effect to every word of it. It is submitted that Parliament intended by the section to impose certain obligations on the defendant company for the benefit of the persons living in the districts of the local boards, and to constitute those local boards the authorities for enforcing compliance with those obligations without incurring the delay and expense of going to the Attorney-General. It is immaterial that they are obligations for the breach of which damages cannot be recovered. Parliament intended that these

 

(1) (1882) 7 App. Cas. 694, 707.

 

(2) [1895] A. C. 542, 549, 552. [*396]

 

obligations should be specifically performed, and that the local boards alone should be the authorities to enforce their performance by action. The provisions of the section are obviously for the benefit of a section of the public. The plaintiff council, as a health authority, suffer special damage by reason of the non-performance of those provisions.

 

If the Court is against the plaintiff council on this first point, it is submitted that the case is one which falls within Order XVI., r. 2, and is not one in which the Court will impose any terms as to the costs of the amendment. This is an entirely different case from Ayscough v. Bullar (1), where a person having a different cause of action was added as a co-plaintiff. Here the cause of action is the same, and, whether the action is brought by the plaintiff council or by the Attorney-General, the persons who will ultimately benefit by it are the persons for whose benefit s. 10 was enacted.

 

[WARRINGTON J. Assuming that you are wrong on the first point, what would have happened if you had gone to trial without amendment?]

 

The Court would, it is submitted, have allowed the case to stand over, in order that an opportunity might be afforded the plaintiff Council of joining the Attorney-General as a co-plaintiff, as was done by the Court of Appeal in Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council. (2) The present case, it is submitted, falls within the reasoning of Kekewich J. in Showell v. Winkup (3), and not within Ayscough v. Bullar. (1) The plaintiff council ought not, therefore, to be put upon any terms as to the costs. If, however, the Court is of opinion that the plaintiff council ought to pay the defendant company’s costs, those costs, it is submitted, ought to be limited to the costs of the application to join the Attorney-General.

 

Warmington, K.C., was not called upon to reply.

 

WARRINGTON J. This was an action brought by the Rhondda Urban District Council in their own name, and suing on their own behalf, against the Pontypridd Waterworks Company. The

 

(1) 41 Ch. D. 341.

 

(2) [1903] 2 Ch. 556, 561.

 

(3) (1889) 60 L. T. 389, 391. [*397]

 

statement of claim alleges that by the Pontypridd Waterworks Act of 1892 certain provisions relating to the supply of water to two districts, one of which is now the district of the plaintiff council, have not been complied with, and the plaintiff council sought a mandatory injunction to compel the company to comply with those statutory provisions. To that claim the defendant company put in a defence, in which they stated that they would object that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action. They, therefore, at the earliest possible moment gave notice to the plaintiff council that, even if the allegations in the statement of claim were proved, it disclosed no cause of action; that is to say, that there was a legal objection to the action. In order, apparently, to meet that objection the plaintiff council on October 23, 1907 – more than a year after the commencement of the action, and when the action was ready for trial, and when in fact notice of trial had been given – applied for leave to amend by adding the Attorney-General as a co-plaintiff. On November 6, 1907, liberty to amend was given, but the order giving that liberty contained this provision: “It is ordered that all questions as to the terms upon which such amendments ought to be allowed be left to the judge at the trial of this action, when the defendants are to be at liberty to raise such preliminary objections as they may think fit.” The defendant company have now, at the close of the opening of the plaintiffs’ case, and before evidence has been called, taken the objection that the action as originally constituted was unfounded, and that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action on the part of the plaintiff council against them. That is the contention with which I am required to deal. I have, therefore, in the first instance to consider the action in its original form, which was that of an action liable to be dismissed on the ground that the allegations in the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action.

 

Now the facts are these. The plaintiff council are the urban authority under the Public Health Acts, and exercising the powers conferred, and discharging the duties imposed upon local authorities, by the Public Health Act, 1875. The defendant company are a water company supplying certain districts with water, including, amongst those districts, the district of the plaintiff council. The [*398] plaintiff council are the successors under the Local Government Act, 1894, of a local body which were called the Ystradyfodwg Local Board. Sect. 10 of the defendant company’s Act of 1892 provided that if the works authorized were not completed within the time thereby limited the powers of the company should cease, “Provided that for the protection of the Pontypridd and Ystradyfodwg Local Boards (hereinafter called the local boards) the following provisions shall have effect (namely)”; and then there followed certain provisions, which I need not read in detail, imposing obligations upon the defendant company with reference to the quantity and quality of water to be supplied to the districts of those local boards. The present action, as I have stated, is brought by the plaintiff council to enforce those provisions. The objection taken by the defendant company is that those provisions are for the benefit of the public – that is, for the section of the public which inhabits those districts – and that the proper person, and the only person, to sue is the Attorney-General.

 

The only authority to which I think I need refer is Devonport Corporation v. Tozer. (1) There the plaintiffs were the corporation of Devonport – that is to say, they were the persons who occupied the same position in reference to a borough as the plaintiff council here occupy in reference to their district. They had made certain by-laws with regard to new streets which they alleged the defendants were infringing, and they brought an action for an injunction to restrain them from continuing so to infringe them. Objection was taken, as here, that the action was not maintainable in the absence of the Attorney-General, and effect was given to that objection by the Court of Appeal. I do not propose to read the judgments of every member of the Court of Appeal; they all agreed, but the fullest statement of the law applicable to the case is made by Romer L.J., and I propose to read it. He says (2): “It is to be borne in mind that the plaintiffs here have no proprietary rights which are being interfered with by what is being done by the defendants. The plaintiffs, no doubt, have powers conferred upon them to make by-laws, but that alone gives them no special rights over other bodies, or other members of the public, as to initiating

 

(1) [1903] 1 Ch. 759.

 

(2) [1903] 1 Ch. 764. [*399]

 

proceedings to enforce those by-laws. Such powers as the plaintiffs, the public body, have to enforce by by-laws, must be conferred upon them by special powers given to them by statute, and, in fact, you do find special powers here given; and,” – and this is the important part – “except in so far as special powers are given, they have no inherent right to take proceedings. And I think it is rather to be deprecated that public bodies such as the plaintiffs in this case should be at liberty, without the leave of the Attorney-General, to commence expensive proceedings, such as these, at their own will. The fact that you do find a special power given to a public body, such as the plaintiffs, to initiate proceedings at law, or in equity, in certain special cases, is an additional proof that the Legislature never contemplated that, apart from special legislative permission, they should have a right to take any proceedings they might think fit for the purpose of enforcing the by-laws, apart from the special power conferred upon them by statute.” Now the present case is not one of enforcing by-laws, but it is one exactly analogous to that, because, after all, by-laws made under statute are rules which have a statutory effect. This is an action brought to enforce the provisions of a statute. To a certain extent, no doubt, the plaintiff council, as the urban district authority and as the sanitary authority of their district, are interested in the performance by the defendant company of their statutory duties, just as any member of the public is interested; but have they, either by statute or otherwise, any such interest as they can enforce by action? In my opinion they have not. To go back, without reading it, to what Romer L.J. has laid down, they had no proprietary right; that is quite clear. Then is there any special permission conferred upon them by statute? That is the real question which I have to determine. The contention of the plaintiff council is that because the Act of Parliament which imposes the obligation begins by stating that the particular provisions are inserted for the protection of the local boards, that that gives them the right to commence an action in their own name, and that that is in fact the special legislative permission referred to by Romer L.J. in his judgment as sufficient to take the case out of the ordinary rule. In my opinion that is [*400] not so. I think those words only mean this: that, those local boards representing as they did a certain section of the public, these provisions were inserted for the protection of that section of the public, and the protection which that section of the public got was the fact that the provisions were inserted in the Act of Parliament. It was merely an introduction in a narrative form, one might almost say, stating how it came about that those particular provisions were inserted. They were inserted in order that the limited branch of the public might have the special protection which was conferred by the insertion of those provisions. It seems to me, therefore, that the statement of claim as originally framed disclosed no cause of action, and that the defendant company, therefore, were on November 6, 1907, entitled to say that the action so constituted ought to be dismissed on that ground.

 

Then, application being made to amend, leave was given to amend, and the further question I have now to determine is on what terms that leave ought to be given. I have got an action with which I have now to deal as if I were dealing with an application for leave to amend, an action which, on the date when the application for leave to amend comes before the Court, is liable to be dismissed with costs, on the ground that the plaintiff council, who have brought the action, have no right to sue. Now what ought I to do? I think I ought to follow the directions given me by the Court of Appeal in Ayscough v. Bullar. (1) In that case an action had been brought by A. to enforce a particular covenant. A. was doubtful whether she would not have failed for a particular reason affecting herself or the property to which she was entitled, and accordingly before the action was tried, in order to make the matter safe, she applied for leave to join another person against whom no such defence could be raised for the purpose of enforcing the same covenant. That application came on to be heard before the trial, and therefore the judges of the Court of Appeal did not have to consider, and did not in fact consider, whether A., the original plaintiff, would or would not fail in the action, and accordingly they made this order as to the terms upon which leave to make the amendment

 

(1) 41 Ch. D. 341. [*401]

 

should be given. They said this, in the words of Cotton L.J. (1): “We think that allowing the amendment to be made must be upon the terms that if on the trial it appears that the first plaintiff, Miss Ayscough, is not entitled to maintain the action, and that Captain Ayscough is so entitled, she must pay the costs of the action up to the time of the joinder of Captain Ayscough; and further, that he will only be entitled to such relief as he could have claimed if the action had commenced at the time of his joinder as plaintiff.” Those were the terms which the Court of Appeal thought were just in the case before them. Now it appears to me that I have before me, for all practical purposes, exactly the case which they had before them, with this difference, that I have now determined that the action in its original form was not maintainable, and therefore what was conditional in the order of the Court of Appeal in that case need not be conditional in the case I have before me. It is said that it is a mere question who shall obtain the relief in the present case, that the same relief would be obtained if the Attorney-General succeeded as would be obtained if the plaintiff counsel had brought the action; and so it was in Ayscough v. Bullar. (2) The covenant which was to be enforced was the same whether it was A. or B. who commenced the action, and the enforcing of the covenant by B. would give A. exactly the same benefit as A. would have obtained if she enforced it by her own action. It seems to me, therefore, that I have exactly the case which was before the Court in Ayscough v. Bullar. (2) I have to consider not only the question as it affects the plaintiff council, but also what is just to the defendant company, as was pointed out in the case before the Court of Appeal to which I have referred. I think I can only do justice to the defendant company against whom the action – which was an unfounded action; that is to say, one which could not succeed – has been brought by ordering that the plaintiff council pay the costs of the action up to and including November 6, 1907, in any event. I do not mean that there should be a separate taxation now, but that the costs of the action up to and including November 6, which will cover the application to amend, will be the defendant company’s costs in any event; and, further, that the

 

(1) 41 Ch. D. 346.

 

(2) 41 Ch. D. 341. [*402]

 

Attorney-General is only to be entitled to such relief as he could have claimed if the action had been commenced on November 9, 1907, the date upon which he was added as a co-plaintiff by amendment.

 

The hearing was then proceeded with, and ultimately the action was compromised.