PRIOR HISTORY:[***1]
Appeal, No. 41, Jan. T., 1932, by Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, from decree of
O.C. Delaware Co., March T., 1931, No. 120, setting aside appraisement for transfer
inheritance tax purposes, in estate of John T. Dorrance, deceased. Reversed.
Appeal from tax appraisement. Before HANNUM, P.J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Exceptions to appraisement by the executors dismissed. Appeal by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Error assigned, inter alia, was decree, dismissing exceptions, quoting it.
DISPOSITION: The decree of the court below is reversed and the
appraisement, subject to modifications indicated by the Commonwealth’s stipulation
as to the value of the estate, is reinstated; the costs to be paid by
appellees.
COUNSEL: Wm. A. Schnader, Attorney General, with him Francis
T. Anderson, Wm. A. Gray and Herman J. Goldberg, Deputy Attorney General, for
appellant. -- The sole question in this case is whether, after 1911, Dr.
Dorrance again became domiciled in Pennsylvania, and whether at the time of his
death, he was domiciled here. These questions must be decided under the law of
Pennsylvania.
Domicile is the place at which a man has fixed his real family home and
[***2] principal establishment for an indefinite time and not for a
merely temporary purpose: Fry’s Election, 71 Pa. 302; Carey’s App., 75 Pa. 201;
Hindman’s App., 85 Pa. 466; Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617; Lowry’s Est., 6 Pa.
Superior Ct. 143; Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64; Winsor’s Est., 264 Pa. 552;
Blessing’s Est., 267 Pa. 380; Barclay’s Est., 259 Pa. 401.
The term “domicil” is derived from the Latin word meaning home, and
the fundamental significance of home may be said to have fixed the fundamental
meaning of domicile.
To acquire a domicile of choice, there must concur: (1) Physical presence in
the place where the domicile is alleged to have been acquired; (2) Intent to
make that place the home of the party. A domicile acquired by the concurrence
of these two factors continues until a new one is acquired: Mitchell v. United
States, 21 Wallace 350.
Declarations are decisive in determining domicile only if the declarant has two
or more real family homes occupied at different seasons of the year: Winsor's
Est., 264 Pa. 552; Graham v. Dempsey, 169 Pa. 460.
A domicile of choice once acquired cannot be lost by declarations alone:
Dalrymple’s Est., 215 Pa. 367; May v. May, 94 Pa. [***3] Superior
Ct. 293.
An existing domicile is presumed to continue until a new one is shown to have
been adopted, facto et animo, and, where a change is alleged, the burden of
proving it rests upon whoever makes the allegation: Carey’s App., 75 Pa. 201;
Ennis v. Smith, 14 Howard 400; Mitchell v. U.S., 21 Wallace 350.
The burden of proving a change of domicile rests upon him who asserts it; but
the burden shifts when it has been shown that the real family home has been
moved: Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617; Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64; Williamson
v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619.
Robert von Moschzisker, with him John B. Hannum, Jr., of Hannum, Hunter, Hannum
& Hodge, Schofield Andrews and Ellis Ames Ballard, of Ballard, Spahr,
Andrews & Ingersoll, for appellee. -- An established domicile is presumed
to continue until its abandonment is proved.
The burden of proving the abandonment of an established domicile and the
acquisition of a new one is upon the person asserting the change: Price v.
Price, 156 Pa. 617, 626; Barclay’s Est., 259 Pa. 401.
A new domicile can be acquired only by physical presence at a new residence
plus intent to make that new residence the principal home; but an established
[***4] domicile can be retained without physical presence or
residence, until it be proved that a new domicile has been acquired: Price v.
Price, 156 Pa. 617; Barclay’s Est., 259 Pa. 401; Lowry’s Est., 6 Pa. Superior
Ct. 143; Matter of Martin, 173 N.Y. App. Div. 1; Hindman’s App., 85 Pa. 466;
Dalrymple’s Est., 215 Pa. 367.
A person is free to choose his domicile effectively provided the requisites of
domicile exist in relation to the place of his choice. His choice of a new
domicile will not be effective unless and until he establishes, through
physical presence in the new locality, a residence with intent to make it his
principal home. His choice to keep an established domicile will be effective,
without physical presence or residence in that locality, up to the time, if
ever, that he is proved to have abandoned it: Barclay’s Est., 259 Pa. 401; Lowry's
Est., 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143.
An intention to stay at a given place indefinitely may fix that place, as one's
domicile, but this depends upon other attending circumstances, which are absent
in this case.
JUDGES: Before FRAZER, C.J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER,
MAXEY, DREW and LINN, JJ.
OPINIONBY: FRAZER
OPINION:[*155][**304] OPINION
[***5] BY MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FRAZER:
This case comes before us on appeal by the Commonwealth from a decree of the
Orphans' Court of Delaware County setting aside an appraisement of the estate
of John T. Dorrance for transfer inheritance tax purposes. The decree of the
court below was based upon a finding, after hearing, that decedent was
domiciled in Cinnaminson Township, Burlington County, New Jersey, and not in
Pennsylvania.
[*156] The appeal was taken under provisions of the Act of June 20,
1919, P.L. 521, and a preliminary question arises as to the scope of review in
cases of this character. Appellees, who are executors of Dorrance’s Estate,
contend that although, under the Act of April 18, 1919, P.L. 72, the testimony
becomes part of the record, upon an appeal on certiorari “we cannot weigh
conflicting evidence further than to determine whether the decree appealed from
is supported by any evidence and whether the court or judge had jurisdiction or
authority to do the act complained of.” Citing Walker’s App., 294 Pa. 385,
389. While, in appeals on certiorari, this court will not usually overrule
findings of fact which have evidence to support them, nevertheless we will
review [***6] conclusions of law based upon undisputed facts:
Hand’s Case, 266 Pa. 277. The determination of decedent’s domicile in this
appeal is a conclusion of law, based upon facts, most of which are undisputed.
Furthermore, this case falls within the rule stated in Hindman’s App., 85 Pa.
466, 470, that where a finding of fact is simply a deduction from other facts
reported by the tribunal under review, and the ultimate fact in question is
purely the result of reasoning, we are competent to judge of its correctness
and will draw our own conclusions from the facts as reported.
Dr. John T. Dorrance was born November 11, 1873, in Bristol, Bucks County,
Pennsylvania, where he spent the early years of his life with his parents. In
1895 he graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, after which
he attended the University of Gottingen in Germany, where he took his doctor's
degree in chemistry. In 1897 he entered the employ of the Joseph Campbell
Preserve Company in Camden, New Jersey, in which company his uncle, Arthur
Dorrance, had a substantial interest. He remained with that firm and its
corporate successor, the Campbell Soup Company, until his death.
[*157] At the start [***7] of his business career he
established his residence at a boarding house in Camden, living there until
1905, when he moved to the Robeson Apartments in the same city. In 1906 he
married Miss Ethel Mallinckrodt of Baltimore, Maryland, who survives him as his
widow. Dorrance and his wife made their home at the Robeson Apartments until
1908, at which time they moved to Philadelphia and remained in that city until
1911. In 1909 Dorrance purchased a country place known as Pomona Farms in
Cinnaminson Township, Burlington County, New Jersey. He later conveyed the
title to this property to the Campbell Preserve Company and thereafter leased
the premises from that company. Upon completion of alterations to the leased
property, Dorrance and his family entered into possession on May 7, 1911, and
the Commonwealth [**305] concedes that from this date until
November 14, 1925, decedent’s domicile was in New Jersey.
During the years which passed from the time of his first association with the
Campbell Company, Dorrance rose rapidly in the management and control of the
business. The company itself grew into one of the largest canning and
preserving enterprises in this country. At the time [***8] of
Dorrance’s death in September, 1930, it employed between four and five thousand
persons, and annually consumed in the business enormous quantities of
vegetables and other farm products. Dorrance became the head of the company and
from 1915 until his death was the owner of all its capital stock. In 1922 the
company was reorganized as the Campbell Soup Company, a New Jersey corporation
with offices in Camden. At the time of his death Dorrance had amassed an
immense fortune, which both parties agree is to be estimated at a figure
exceeding one hundred fifteen million dollars.
In 1925 he purchased a large and attractive estate known as
“Woodcrest” located in Radnor, Delaware County, Pennsylvania, in the
suburbs of Philadelphia. The property was taken in the joint names of Doctor
[*158] and Mrs. Dorrance, and, including subsequent additions of
surrounding acreage and furnishing of the mansion, the cost was approximately a
million dollars. Speaking of the purchase of the Radnor Estate, Mrs. Dorrance,
the widow, testified as follows:
“It was purchased so that our children would be more in contact with
children and where they could go to school more easily with children with
[***9] their prospects in life, and where we could do some
entertaining for my oldest daughter who was then coming of age and who mingled
with the world; and where I . . . would be nearer my associates.” In 1925
the children comprised four daughters aged respectively, 18, 16, 14 and 10, and
one son in his sixth year.
The house at Radnor was first occupied by the Dorrance family on November 14,
1925, at which time their entire personal effects were removed from Cinnaminson
to Radnor. The Commonwealth contends that from this date until his death,
almost five years later, Dorrance was domiciled in Pennsylvania. Despite an
attempt on the part of the executors to demonstrate that the former home in New
Jersey was maintained as the principal home and establishment of decedent, and
that there was a mere occasional occupancy of the Radnor place, it is our
opinion the evidence clearly indicates that from 1925 until the autumn of 1930,
the Radnor Estate was the real and only home of the Dorrances, and except for
occasional visits to Cinnaminson and sojourns in Bar Harbor, Palm Beach and
other resorts, as well as trips to Europe, “Woodcrest” was occupied
continuously by decedent and his family until [***10] his death,
and at present is the family home. The place at Cinnaminson was retained in
substantially the same condition as before the acquisition of
“Woodcrest,” but with the number of servants reduced from ten to two.
It was occupied after 1926 by the mother and sister of Dorrance, who remained
there until their deaths in 1928 and 1929 respectively. During their occupancy,
one or two rooms in the house [*159] were reserved for Dorrance and
his wife and available for their temporary use at any time. The evidence is not
convincing that Dorrance used the Cinnaminson residence for any extended period
after removal of his family to Radnor. Undoubtedly he made occasional visits to
the place, but these can be accounted for on several grounds: his mother and
sister were both living there and eventually developed fatal illnesses; the
Cinnaminson place was in the midst of the experimental farms of the soup
company; above all, in addition to a claimed sentimental attachment to
Cinnaminson, he was anxious to give color to his asserted intention to retain
New Jersey as the place of his domicile.
Much of the vast amount of testimony and exhibits introduced by both appellant
and appellees [***11] is immaterial to the issue, but there are a
number of facts which, in our opinion, establish beyond question that
continuously since 1925 the true home of Dorrance and his family was in
Pennsylvania, and that the New Jersey residence was retained by him merely to
lend weight to the fiction that he was domiciled there. Before 1925 Dorrance
employed ten servants at Cinnaminson. After 1925 there were never more than
four, and after the death of Dorrance’s mother in 1929 only two. At
“Woodcrest” sixteen servants were employed in the house and ten to
twelve others worked on the grounds. There was a corresponding difference in
the running expenses of the two properties. In 1924 the living expenses at
Cinnaminson were slightly over twenty-nine thousand dollars. After 1925 the
expenditures were considerably diminished and in 1929 amounted to approximately
$6,500. On the other hand, the maintenance of the Radnor Estate exceeded
$90,000 in 1929, and the year before amounted to approximately $95,000.
Although the comparative size of two residences is not conclusive of the fact
of domicile, it is evidence of the intention to make one place the principal
home. The expenditure of a very [***12] large sum of money for a
residence [*160] which is not adapted to nor designed for mere
seasonal occupancy is strong indication of an intention to make it the
principal residence and main establishment of the family, particularly where
the new residence is more elaborate and pretentious than any former abode. A
few figures will readily show the marked difference between the Dorrance
estates. The Cinnaminson property consisted of approximately seven acres
located in a country district and surrounded by truck farms. The homestead was
more than [**306] fifty years old and had been remodeled in 1911.
Although situated among fine old trees and surrounded by an extensive lawn, the
house “was an ordinary brick mansard roof house of the time that it was
built; very ugly,” as Mrs. Dorrance testified.
On the other hand “Woodcrest” was considered one of the most
beautiful estates in the suburbs of Philadelphia. It originally comprised 119
acres but subsequent additions to protect the boundaries brought the total
acreage over 137. The house was an imposing stone residence of modern
construction with six rooms and two lavatories on the first floor, and a large
center hall which [***13] extended to the third floor. On the
second floor there were ten rooms and five baths for the use of the family or
their guests, and in addition twelve smaller rooms with two baths in the
servants' quarters. The third floor consisted of five bed rooms, a nursery and
two baths. There were several smaller buildings on the grounds which were used
as living quarters by employees. There was also a garage capable of
accommodating seven cars.
Included among the exhibits introduced by the executors were a number of
photographs of the Cinnaminson property, showing the grounds as well as the
interior of the house. The Commonwealth presented an air view of the Radnor
Estate, but no pictures showing the property in greater detail. At the argument
it was stated that the officers of the Commonwealth had been refused access to
the grounds at “Woodcrest” for the purpose of taking photographs. The
inference naturally arises that [*161] a comparison of photographs
of the two estates would indicate considerable disparity between them.
The testimony as to the time Dorrance spent with his family at Cinnaminson
after 1925 is extremely vague and uncertain. A fair conclusion from the
evidence [***14] is that Dr. Dorrance and his wife made occasional
trips to Pomona Farms remaining one or two nights at a time, and that upon
their return from Bar Harbor or Jamestown at the end of the summers, a longer
period was spent there, but only for the purpose of waiting until the servants
had opened the Radnor house and made it fit for occupancy. When leaving for
Europe or starting on summer vacations their trunks and other baggage were sent
from Radnor and shipped directly back to that place upon returning. Considering
the nature of the occupancy of the Radnor Estate, as well as the length of time
spent there out of each year, all the facts clearly indicate that it was the
principal establishment of Dorrance and his true family home after 1925.
The sumptuous residence in Pennsylvania was consistently chosen by Dorrance
himself, as well as his wife and children, for all the outstanding events of
their social life. Dorrance gave a number of large dinner parties there for
men, principally business associates and friends, at which more than sixty
guests were usually present. He and his wife entertained smaller groups for
dinner quite frequently. His children invited their friends to
“Woodcrest” [***15] for parties. One of his daughters was
married in 1926 at the Radnor Church and the wedding reception was held at
“Woodcrest”; another, who was at the debutante age, was presented to
society at an elaborate affair there in 1929.
Servants who had been in the household during the period in question testified
that, except when he was absent on vacations, Dorrance spent practically every
night at his home in Radnor. He traveled back and forth daily from Radnor to
his office in Camden. His weekends were spent at the Radnor place, several
witnesses [*162] testifying that Dorrance took great interest in
his estate and on Sundays walked around the extensive grounds inspecting the
property and conversing with caretakers. The children were entered in schools
from the Radnor residence and with their mother regularly attended St. Martin's
Church in Radnor Township. Dorrance himself did not transfer his membership to
the Radnor Church but maintained his affiliation with a church in Riverton, New
Jersey. This latter was only one of many things which he did to avoid the
appearance of identifying himself with the community in which he resided with
his family; and that these acts, together [***16] with his
declarations of residence in New Jersey, were intended to bolster his
assertions that he remained domiciled in New Jersey, there can be little doubt.
His real motive and the reasons which prompted this course of conduct are
apparent.
With a remarkable demonstration of the same business acumen and sagacity which
enabled him to accumulate his enormous personal fortune, he carefully drew his
wills (all except the last one previous to 1925), with the intent of retaining
for his children, after his death, his 100% interest in the Campbell Soup
Company. This he would be able to do under the laws of New Jersey by the
accumulation of income for the payment of inheritance and estate taxes, and with
the assurance that his wife could not elect to take personalty against his
will, which would not be possible under the laws of Pennsylvania. In addition,
it was a matter of considerable importance for him to declare himself a
resident of New Jersey in respect to the payment of annual taxes on personal
property, as his stock in the soup company, as well as United States and New
Jersey government securities, were exempt from the tax in that state. By
claiming a residence in New Jersey, [***17] Dorrance was able to
effect a large annual saving in taxation. Taxation matters were discussed by
him in his conversations with leading business men and bankers in
[**307] Philadelphia and emphasized [*163] by his New
Jersey counsel. For that reason, Dorrance informed others he hesitated to take
up residence at Radnor, and when contemplating the purchase of
“Woodcrest” he consulted his attorney, who advised him that retention
of his New Jersey domicile “was largely a matter of intention.” Consequently,
following his removal to the estate at Radnor, he scrupulously endeavored to
declare in formal documents and on many occasions that he was a resident of New
Jersey. Upon the advice of his attorney he executed an agreement with his wife
that their residence should remain at Cinnaminson despite the occupancy of
“Woodcrest” during “a portion of each year.” The agreement
stated that both would refrain from voting elsewhere than in Burlington County,
New Jersey, and contained other clauses of a similar nature. Dorrance refused
to accept a directorship in the Pennsylvania Railroad until assured by the
president of the company that it was not necessary for more than a majority
[***18] of the directors of that corporation to be residents of
Pennsylvania. On many occasions and in various formal documents executed after
1925 he stated his residence to be at Cinnaminson, but counsel for the
Commonwealth has indicated several instances in which Dr. Dorrance did give his
address as Radnor. Mrs. Dorrance was not as consistent as her husband in her
declarations concerning residence. Her accounts with merchants and department
stores indicated only the address at Radnor. All the members of the family were
listed in the social register with address as Woodcrest, Radnor. In 1929, for the
first time, the residence at Cinnaminson was included with that of Radnor.
A circumstance of considerable importance was the fact that after 1925 many of
Dorrance’s friends and acquaintances assumed he had become a resident of
Pennsylvania. Dorrance discussed this with his lawyer, stating he had denied to
them any intention of giving up his domicile in New Jersey. But in letters and
conversations [*164] several of his friends expressed to him their
belief that he had become a legal resident of Pennsylvania. The evidence shows
that such belief was induced by the fact that his [***19] residence
at “Woodcrest” had all the indications of a permanent home, both from
the manner of his residence in that place and the continuous nature of his
abode there.
We come now to an examination of the law applicable in determining the domicile
of decedent. The precise question is as follows: May expressions of a man to
the effect that he desires to retain a domicile of choice in one state, prevail
over the intention to make a new home manifested by an actual removal to the
new residence in another state, and accompanied by a manner of living which can
leave no doubt that the new abode is the principal residence and establishment,
particularly where the wish to retain the old domicile is colored by the motive
of regulating his affairs after death in a manner not permitted by the laws of
the state removed to, and is also bound up with the purpose of avoiding payment
of substantial taxes on personal property? We are of opinion that such is not
the law and that John T. Dorrance was domiciled in Pennsylvania at the time of
his death.
In holding that Dorrance was domiciled in New Jersey, the learned judge of the
court below based his decree on the legal proposition that where a
[***2] man has more than one residence, he may choose for his
domicile whichever one of them he pleases. He further held that an existing
domicile may be retained, although residence is given up entirely and a new
residence taken up at a new place, simply because there was no intention to
acquire a new domicile at the new place of residence. These principles may be
acceptable as good law in particular cases; we are, however, of opinion that
they are not applicable to the facts under consideration here. None of the
Pennsylvania cases cited in the opinion of the lower court or referred to us in
the briefs of counsel is sufficiently [*165] similar on its facts
to be controlling in the present situation. At most they contain helpful
generalizations on the law of domicile. The leading cases can be clearly
distinguished. Fry’s Election Case, 71 Pa. 302, held that the temporary
residence of students in a college town was not sufficient to establish a
domicile for voting purposes. In Carey’s App., 75 Pa. 201, decedent was held
domiciled in the last place in which he had established a residence of more
than temporary character. Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617, decided that absence
from a [***21] domicile of choice because of serious illness would
not result in the acquisition of a new domicile. In Dalrymple’s Est., 215 Pa.
367, it was held there was no change of domicile where the intention was not
supported by an actual change of habitation. Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64,
was a foreign attachment case and is not in point. In Barclay’s Est., 259 Pa.
401, decedent was held domiciled in Pennsylvania because there was no clear
evidence of the establishment of a permanent residence in Ohio. Winsor’s Est.,
264 Pa. 552, is discussed elsewhere in this opinion. Perhaps the Pennsylvania
case most nearly in point is Blessing’s Est., 267 Pa. 380, in which decedent
owned two residences, one in Philadelphia County and the other in Montgomery
County. The house in the city was boarded up and little used. In a per curiam
opinion, we held that decedent’s intention to be domiciled in Philadelphia
could not prevail over the fact of his actual residence with his family in
Montgomery County.
[**308] With a few scattered expressions to the contrary, the law
is generally settled that, as regards the determination of domicile, a person's
expression of desire may not supersede the effect [***22] of his
conduct. “Apart from possible exceptions, a man cannot retain a domicile
in one place when he has moved to another and intends to reside there for the
rest of his life, by any wish, declaration or intent inconsistent with the
dominant facts of where he actually lives and what he actually means to
do”: [*166]National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50, 56;
Dickinson v. Brookline, 181 Mass. 195. See also Thayer v. Boston, 124 Mass.
132. “Every person must have a domicile somewhere and a man cannot elect
to make his home in one place for the general purposes of life, and in another
place for the purposes of taxation”: Feehan v. Tax Commissioner, 237 Mass.
169, 171. “A declaration [as to domicile] that is self-serving and not
followed by acts in accordance with the declaration will not be regarded as
conclusive, but will yield to the intent which the acts and conduct of the
person clearly indicate”: In re Paris’s Est., 176 N.Y.S. 879, 882.
The legal effect of one’s acts in contradistinction to an expressed intention
in regard to domicile is well stated in the case of Pettit’s Exrx. v. City of
Lexington, 193 Ky. 679, 683, as follows: “The location of one’s legal
residence [***23] is, as we have seen, a question of fact and
intention, and the fact as exhibited and the intention as inferred or expressed
must coincide in the conclusion. It should also be noted that neither of these
elements can exercise a controlling effect, though intention may arise from the
established fact; as where one’s conduct conclusively shows his residence to be
in one place, his expressed intention that it shall be in another place may not
override the fact so as to locate it there. The intention in that case will be
inferred from residence alone in the face of contrary expressions of
purpose.”
In that case, which was a proceeding to determine the legal residence of
decedent for assessment of personal property for city taxes, it appears
decedent had a house in which he lived at 801 East Main Street, Lexington,
Kentucky. He subsequently purchased a farm outside the city, known as the Tod
Hunter place. Although he spent considerable time at the country place and in deeds
and formal documents expressed his intention to fix his legal residence there,
from the facts as to his mode of living, the court decided he was domiciled in
Lexington. On page 684 of the opinion the court states: [***24]
[*167] “The spending of a short time each summer in the
country under conditions less comfortable than those under which he lived in
the city, the voting from the Tod Hunter place, a few times, and the refraining
from registering and voting in Lexington were all acts performed by him with
the view of manifesting what he doubtless conceived to be conclusive evidence
of the establishment and maintenance of a residence at the Tod Hunter place.
But those acts in our opinion are not sufficient evidence of the intention to
overcome that to be inferred from the fact of his actual residence at 801 East
Main Street and his doing of those things at that place that one usually and
normally does in establishing and maintaining a home and legal residence.”
Another equally strong decision from the Supreme Court of Kentucky is Baker v.
Baker, Eccles & Co., 162 Ky. 683, affirmed in 242 U.S. 394. At page 709 the
former court said: “If the place of Baker’s residence had to be determined
alone by intention manifested in speeches without any reference to the acts and
conduct . . ., we would have little doubt in adjudging that he never lost his
legal residence in Tennessee and only had an actual [***25]
residence in Paducah for the purpose of conducting the business in which he was
there engaged, all the while having it in mind to return to Tennessee when the
objects of his sojourn in Paducah had been accomplished. But when we turn to
the other side of the case, we find abundant reason for the opinion that . . .
he not only had an actual residence in Paducah, but acquired a legal residence
there, which he retained until his death.” See also City of Lebanon v.
Biggers, 117 Ky. 430; Bartlett v. New Boston, 77 N.H. 476; Tax Collector of
Lowell v. Hanchett, 240 Mass. 557; Babcock v. Slater, 212 Mass. 434.
If we turn to the English decisions, the law is the same. In Douglas v.
Douglas, L.R. 12 Eq. 617, WICKENS, V.C., lucidly remarks: “It seems to me,
as it did to Vice Chancellor JAMES in Haldane v. Eckford, L.R. 8 Eq.
[*168] 631, that the intention required for a change of domicile,
as distinguished from the action embodying it, is intention to settle in a new
country as a permanent home, and that if this intention exists and is
sufficiently carried into effect, certain legal consequences follow from it,
whether such consequences were intended or not, and perhaps even though the
[***26] person in question might have intended the exact
contrary.” See also Moffett v. Moffett, (1920) 1 Ir. Rep. 57, 65. In the
quotation given above, the change of domicile was from one country to another.
A fortiori the decision is applicable to a change of domicile as between
states, since it is elementary law that a national domicile is less easily lost
than a municipal or quasi national one.
In Lord HALSBURY’s “The Laws of England,” volume VI, page 186, under
the general topic of Domicile, it is stated: “If residence and the
intention that it shall be permanent are [**309] both present, a
domicile is acquired even in the face of express declarations of a desire to
retain the old domicile.” Again, at page 187 of the same volume, is the
following: “Expressions of intention, written or oral, may be given in
evidence, but such evidence must be carefully weighed in connection with the
context in which it occurred, and even if the expressions are clear and
consistent they cannot prevail against a course of conduct leading to an
opposite inference.”
The celebrated English author, A. V. Dicey, whose statements concerning the law
of domicile are frequently quoted with approval in this [***27]
country (see Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619), in his book “Conflict
of Laws,” 4th edition, page 133, says: “Direct expressions, however,
of intention may be worth little as evidence. The person who uses them may not
know what constitutes a domicile. He may call a place his home, simply because
he often lives there. He may wish to be, or to appear, domiciled in one
country, while in fact residing permanently and intending so to reside, i.e.,
being domiciled, in another. A direct statement, in short, that D
[*169] considers himself domiciled, or to have his home in France,
though it may sometimes be important, may often carry little weight. This
remark specially applies to the description which a person gives of himself in formal
documents as, e.g., 'D residing in France.'”
At page 106 of the same volume he says: “A person’s wish to retain his
domicile in one country will not enable him to retain it, if, in fact, he
resides with the animus manendi in another.” Citing In re Steer (1855) 3
H. & N. 594. In commenting on this statement in a footnote on the same
page, the learned editor of the fourth edition adds the following: “Can an
Englishman, i.e., one domiciled in England, [***28] live
permanently in Scotland and retain his English domicile, because he does not
wish to subject himself to limitation of his testamentary capacity? No case has
yet decided this in the affirmative; if so held, then domicile must be
reinterpreted as depending on intention primarily, and only in a minor degree
on residence, the intention not being of residence but of falling under a legal
system affecting status.”
The learned judge of the court below, in holding Dorrance was domiciled in New
Jersey at the time of his death, gave too much weight to the declarations of
intent contained in his will and other documents. The Pennsylvania cases do not
support the proposition that a declaration in a will is “well-nigh
conclusive.” That may be true where there is no satisfactory evidence
indicating intention to make a permanent home in any one place, as was the
situation in Appointment of Guardian for Belle N. Nicholls, 86 Pa. Superior Ct.
38, and such rule would also apply where decedent had two residences almost
alike in size and costliness, and spent practically six months of the year in
each, as in Winsor’s Est., 264 Pa. 552. The general rule, however, is that
recitals in deeds and [***29] wills are not given particular weight
in determining domicile in comparison with the evidence supplied by the daily
life of the individual and his acts and conduct. “Nor are the recitals in
his will and some of his deeds [*170] sufficient to fix his
domicile. They are not controlling when contradicted by other facts and
circumstances”: Dalrymple’s Est., 215 Pa. 367, 371, quoting Jacobs on
Domicile. “More weight will be given to a person’s acts than to his
declarations, and when they are inconsistent, the acts will control”: 19
C.J. 438; see also 21 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, page 206. “That acts
speak louder than words is sound law as well as proverbial wisdom”: Graham
v. Dempsey, 169 Pa. 460, 462. “On the question of domicile, less weight
will be given to a party’s declarations than to his acts”: Holt v. Hendee,
248 Ill. 288, 296. “While residence in this case [naturalization proceedings]
depends largely on intention, the intention is to be gathered from the acts of
the petitioner rather than from his declarations”: In re Barron, 26 F.
(2d) 106, 107; see also In re Tallmadge, 181 N.Y.S. 336; Curtis v. Curtis, 185
App. Div. 391, 396; Matter of Mesa y Hernandez, 149 N.Y.S. 536,
[***30] affirmed 172 App. Div. 467; and see specially Rosenberg v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 37 F. (2d) 808.
In holding that a domicile of choice may not be retained by intention alone, we
do not mean to disturb the well settled rule that absence from a place of legal
residence, for purposes of health or other unavoidable necessity, will not
result in a loss of that domicile. See Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617; Pickering
v. Winch, 48 Oregon 500. Nor do we mean that where a man has two actual
residences, either one of which might be his domicile, he is not free to choose
between them. See Winsor’s Est., 264 Pa. 552; Chambers v. Hathaway, 187 Cal.
104; Dunn v. Trefry, 260 Fed. 147.
Counsel for executors rely particularly on Frick’s Est., 190 N.Y.S. 262.
Neither this case nor In re Lyon’s Est., 191 N.Y.S. 260 (which is even stronger
but not cited in the briefs) is an appellate court opinion and for that reason
they are not entitled to much weight here, but particular circumstances in the
present case distinguish it clearly from those just cited. In those
[*171] cases neither the presence of an ulterior motive nor the
task of attempting to reconcile declarations which were inconsistent [***31]
with conduct interfered with the New York court in determining that there was
no intention on the part of the persons involved [**310] to change
their true home, or to make a new residence their principal establishment and
“technically preeminent headquarters.” In the Frick Case, Surrogate
Foley said: “Counsel for the tax commission gives full credit to Mr.
Frick’s honest belief that he was a resident of Pennsylvania. It is conceded
also, that no question of the evasion of the payment of a tax in New York is
involved here.” In the case of Dr. Dorrance, we have observed he from time
to time expressed the belief that he was a resident of New Jersey. On the
contrary his acts show a studied attempt to create evidence tending to indicate
a legal residence in New Jersey. If he really believed he was a New Jersey
resident after 1925, it seems unnecessary for him to have entered into an
agreement with his wife concerning the matter, or to have secured his
appointment as a member of a commission to investigate the question of
compulsory insurance for motor vehicles within the State of New Jersey, or to
have written his most intimate friends and associates that he was not a
Pennsylvanian. [***32]
An attempt was made by counsel for appellees during the argument and in the briefs
to show that Dorrance at no time intended to make his Radnor Estate a permanent
home and that he contemplated returning to Cinnaminson at an indefinite future
time. Assuming such to be the case, there is no doubt that such vague intention
of resuming a former domicile will not prevent the acquisition of a new one.
“If a person changes his domicile without any present intention of
removing therefrom it is none the less his domicile, although he may entertain
a floating intention to return, or to move somewhere else at some future
period. . . . If there be both actual residence and intention of remaining --
the animus manendi -- then a domicile is established”: Worsham v.
[*172] Ligon, 144 G. 707. “If a person has actually removed to
another place, with an intention of remaining there for an indefinite time, and
as a place of fixed present domicile, it is to be deemed his place of domicile,
notwithstanding he may entertain a floating intention to return at some future
period”: Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 569, quoting Story’s
“Conflict of Laws.” “The requisite animus is the present
intention [***33] of permanent or indefinite residence in a given
place or country, or negatively expressed, the absence of any present intention
of not residing there permanently or indefinitely”: Price v. Price, supra,
page 626. See also Attorney General v. Pattinger, (1861) 30 L.J. Ex. 284.
Having now ascertained that intention alone cannot defeat the acquisition of a
new domicile where other facts show a change of domicile has actually occurred,
it remains to consider whether the evidence in this case is sufficient to
warrant a finding that Dorrance was domiciled in Pennsylvania, as contended by
appellant. It is true the burden of showing a change from a former domicile is
upon the party asserting it, but the fact of residence in a particular place is
prima facie evidence of domicile. (As to burden of proof in such case see
Collins v. City of Ashland, 112 Fed. 175.) The Commonwealth having established
by adequate evidence that, at the time of his death, Dorrance had an actual
residence in Pennsylvania, it was incumbent upon the executors to rebut the
presumption arising therefrom by satisfactory proof that he resided in New
Jersey or that the Pennsylvania residence was intended merely for a
[***34] temporary purpose. This, in our opinion, they have failed
to do.
It is argued by appellees that before a new domicile of choice can be acquired
there must be proof of the abandonment of the old. In our opinion this contention
is unsound, for the intention to make one’s home in a new place necessarily
includes the abandonment of the former home. This thought is clearly expressed
in Ford v. Peck, 116 Kan. 74, 76, as follows: “It is elementary
[*173] law that change of domicile, as from Oklahoma to Salina,
Kansas, involves two things, designated by classical authors as the factum and
the animus. There must be transfer of bodily presence to another place,
represented in the statutory definition by adoption of a place of habitation;
and there must be intention to abide at the new location, either permanently or
indefinitely, represented in the statutory definition by intention of returning
when absent. Sometimes the animus is treated as involving two separate
intentions, one to abandon the old location, and one to abide in the new. If
the last intention be formed, it necessarily includes the other. The factum and
the animus must finally coexist. Neither alone is enough; but
[***35] the animus may follow the factum in point of time and,
should that occur, the change of domicile is complete.” (Italics ours.)
One of the most satisfactory definitions of domicile is that stated by Story in
his “Conflict of Laws”: “By the term domicile in its ordinary
acceptation is meant the place where a person lives or has his home. In a
strict legal sense that is properly the domicile of a person where he has his
true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever
he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” To acquire a domicile of
choice two things must concur: “(1) Physical presence in the place where
domicile is alleged to have been acquired; (2) Intent to make that place the
home of the party”: Goodrich “Conflict of Laws,” page 30;
Carey’s App., 75 Pa. 201; Fry’s Election Case, 71 Pa. 302. “If the
intention of permanently residing in a particular place exists, a residence in
pursuance of [**311] that intention, however short, will establish
a domicile”: Price v. Price, supra.
We are not impressed with the argument that Dorrance owed a moral obligation to
the State of New Jersey by virtue of having accumulated his vast fortune there,
[***36] or in the words of appellees, that “both in law and
[*174] in justice New Jersey was entitled to tribute from John T.
Dorrance, while to Pennsylvania he owed no such debt.” The large profits
which came to him through his ownership of the Campbell Soup Company
represented the results of nation-wide sale of his products. His money was
acquired from the country at large and not from any particular state. Moreover,
Dorrance was by birth a Pennsylvanian. Even after his marriage he lived in this
State three years before locating in Cinnaminson. When he came to Radnor to
live in 1925 he was not only resuming his domicile of origin, but was purposely
making his home in a neighborhood more congenial to his family and more
suitable to his position in life than the New Jersey location which he left. It
is appropriately stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent
case of Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, U.S. Sup. Ct. Advance Reports,
1931-2, No. 13, page 720: “Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within
the state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws, are
inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs of government.”
From what [***37] we have said and quoted above, it clearly appears
that by the act of removing his home and family from New Jersey to
Pennsylvania, Dorrance acquired a domicile in the latter state. That he was unaware
that such action would result in a change of domicile is irrelevant to the
issue. His intention to maintain a home, indeed a very lavish home, at Radnor,
is undoubted. We fail to find in the record, after careful search, any
convincing testimony of a bona fide intention upon his part or that of any
member of his family, to occupy “Woodcrest” for any other than an
indefinite period, and in fact to make it the “technically preeminent
headquarters” of himself and family after November, 1925. “The
intention required for the acquisition of a domicile of choice is an intention
to make a home in fact, and not an intention to acquire a domicile:”
Restatement of the [*175] Law of Conflict of Laws, section 21. *
The evidence indicates that beyond all question Dorrance’s family home and
principal establishment was at Radnor. When either he or the members of his
family went away on vacations they started from “Woodcrest” and
returned there afterwards. Practically his entire time, except [***38]
when absent on vacations, was spent there. His friends and acquaintances
considered it his home. Indeed we may readily believe that in his heart Dr.
Dorrance knew “Woodcrest” to be his true and only home, but for
personal reasons he preferred to state in public that it was not his home when
every fact and circumstance pointed to the contrary. As already indicated, his
mere declarations, undoubtedly made solely for personal reasons, did not
prevent the acquisition of a domicile in Pennsylvania. In our opinion the
evidence clearly establishes the legal domicile of Dr. Dorrance to be in
Pennsylvania and accordingly there is due the Commonwealth an inheritance
transfer tax, based upon the agreed value of his estate at the time of his
death.
* See Treatise No. 1 (a) Supporting Restatement No. 1, (1925) the American Law
Institute, at page 67, “It is not enough that a man desires to acquire or
to keep a 'legal residence' or 'legal domicile'; the intention necessary for
the acquisition of a domicile is an intention as to the fact, not as to the
legal consequences of the fact. 'A man’s home is where he makes it, not where
he would like to have it.' . . . The intention requisite for domicile is the
intention to have a home, and that is the only legally relevant intention; the
domicile follows as a legal consequence, without regard to whether the
consequence is desired or not.” [***39]
DISSENTBY: SCHAFFER; KEPHART
DISSENT: DISSENTING OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE SCHAFFER:
It seems to me that the majority opinion does not give that full weight to the
intention of the decedent which should be given. In determining where a man's
domicile [*176] is there are two factors which are absolutely
controlling: One is the actual fact of residence and the other is the man's
intention to make that residence his home. As to this all authorities agree.
But where, as in the case before us, the man has two residences, at each of
which he spends part of his time, and each of which is fully maintained and
equipped to be his home, the factor of residence is equivocal and for that very
reason cannot be determinative of domicile. Consequently, in such a situation,
we look to the other necessary factor, which is intention, as the factor of
preponderant importance: Winsor’s Est., 264 Pa. 552; Fry’s Election Case, 71
Pa. 302; In re Guardian for Nicholls, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 38; Hunnings v.
Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 261; Thayer v. Boston, 124 Mass. 132; American
Law Institute, Restatement, “Conflict of Laws,” section 26 and
comment thereto; 19 C.J. 405-406 (“Domicile,” section 13); Jacobs
[***40] on the Law of Domicile, (edition 1887), sections 421-424;
Minor, Conflict of Laws, section 64, (page 123); 1 Wharton, Conflict of Laws,
(3d edition), 144, (section 69). These authorities likewise stand for the proposition
that where the proofs on either side are balanced, the claim of the earlier
residence to be the domicile should prevail.
Until he purchased the Radnor residence, Dr. Dorrance had been domiciled at
Cinnaminson [**312] in the State of New Jersey for fourteen years.
The question then for decision is, did he abandon his domicile there and
acquire one in Pennsylvania? The Cinnaminson property is the kind of one in
which a man of Dr. Dorrance’s wealth and position could appropriately live.
Until he bought the Radnor place, it met all of his requirements as a home, but
apparently did not meet the social desires of his family. To gratify their
wishes, he purchased the Radnor house, but never closed the one at Cinnaminson.
He lived in the Radnor house more than he did in the New Jersey one, but never
permitted it to be occupied by anyone except his mother and sister for a short
time. [*177] While they were there, he reserved quarters for
himself and his family. [***41] He always kept the Cinnaminson house
heated, in repair, with servants there, fully maintained as a residence. During
the last three years of his life, it was the only one of his residences which
was open throughout the whole of each year. He was living in the Cinnaminson
home when he died.
By every spoken declaration which he made, and by almost his every act, except
the mere purchase of the Radnor house and his occupying it himself more than he
occupied the one at Cinnaminson, he indicated that he had not intended to
change his domicile. The following circumstances, in addition to his spoken
words, indicate that he did not intend to abandon his New Jersey one:
All his interests were in New Jersey, where he had made his great fortune.
While he did not actually own the large area of land in New Jersey which was
tributary to his business, in effect he did, because he owned all the capital
stock of the Campbell Soup Company, which in turn owned the land.
Before purchasing the Pennsylvania property, he consulted his New Jersey
counsel to ascertain whether or not this purchase and the occupancy of the
Pennsylvania property would cause him to lose his domicile in New Jersey. He
[***42] was advised that he would not lose it, if in purchasing the
Radnor place and living there, it was not his intention to abandon his home at
Cinnaminson. This is a powerful piece of evidence on the question of his
intent.
It was important to him that he keep his New Jersey residence in order that the
trusts which he intended to create out of his fortune should be maintained
under New Jersey law in order to carry out his purposes, and also important in
the matter of taxes which his estate would be called upon to pay if he became
domiciled in Pennsylvania. It was also important to him, and as to this he
inquired, because, under the New Jersey law, his [*178] wife could
not take against his will, and if he was domiciled in Pennsylvania, she could.
In his will and in all the codicils, he recited himself as domiciled in the
State of New Jersey. This is true of all wills which he signed. He expressly
directed that his will should be probated in New Jersey.
He continued to receive his personal mail from a New Jersey post-office as he
had done in the past. He stayed frequently at Cinnaminson, and his wife and
children also stayed there, but less frequently. He expressed a dislike
[***43] for the place at Radnor and affection for the place at
Cinnaminson. Shortly before his death, he made definite and detailed plans for
additions and improvements to the place at Cinnaminson. He paid his poll tax
every year in New Jersey. He and his wife voted at Cinnaminson whenever they
did vote and he never voted in Pennsylvania. He maintained his church
affiliations in New Jersey and continued to act as senior warden of the church
at Riverton in that state, which office under the church law he could hold only
if he was domiciled in the parish. He always paid his personal tax in
Cinnaminson Township and never paid personal taxes in Pennsylvania, making an
affidavit on a Pennsylvania property tax return sent to him in 1926 that he was
a resident of New Jersey.
He made numerous declarations to the effect that his home was in New Jersey and
his place at Radnor simply a show place for the social pleasures of his wife
and children, that he was a resident and citizen of New Jersey and intended
always to so remain. He so badged himself in applying for passports and when he
took the oath of office as a director in a bank in New Jersey. He declined
election to the board of directors [***44] of the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company until he was assured that he could under the law be elected
and serve as a resident of New Jersey.
What more could a man do who has two homes and who wishes to retain the older
one as his domicile? [*179] Where a man has a domicile, he does not
lose it unless he abandons it. To me the testimony overwhelmingly indicates
that the Cinnaminson property was just as much an actual residence of Dr.
Dorrance as was the house in Radnor and that his intention to keep Cinnaminson
as his permanent home remained unchanged to his death. Where a man has two
actual residences, he is free to choose between them. This the majority opinion
recognizes, because it says: “Nor do we mean that where a man has two
actual residences, either one of which might be his domicile, he is not free to
choose between them.”
In Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617, 626, we said: “Domicile of origin must be
presumed to continue until another sole domicile has been acquired by actual
residence, coupled with the intention of abandoning the domicile of
origin.” Whether the established domicile was one of origin or choice can
make no difference in principle.
[**313] New Jersey [***45] has insisted that he was
domiciled there and has collected taxes from his estate on the basis of this
claim. Had the situation been reversed and had he lived in Pennsylvania in the
manner he did in New Jersey, it is manifest to me that Pennsylvania could
rightly claim he was domiciled here and not in New Jersey, just as it did in the
case of Henry C. Frick, and as the New York court decided it could in Matter of
Frick, 116 N.Y. Misc. Rep. 488, 190 N.Y. Supp. 262.
I would affirm the decree of the court below.
DISSENTING OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE KEPHART:
In disagreeing with the majority opinion, which I do reluctantly, it is only
because a careful consideration of the entire record convinces me that the
Commonwealth has not met the burden of proof imposed by the circumstances of
this case. It also demonstrates to my mind the efficacy of the rule that the
findings and conclusions of the trial court should be accepted unless they are
unsupported [*180] by evidence or are at direct variance with
established law.
It is my opinion that the decision of the majority is opposed to the established
law, and unsettles it as related to domicile. It makes the determination of
that question [***46] more concerned with the length of time one
may spend in the places claimed as residences or domiciles than with the intent
to establish a domicile or retain a status already acquired.
It is admitted that Dr. Dorrance was domiciled in Cinnaminson prior to 1925.
The burden then rested on the Commonwealth to show that this domicile had been
abandoned. While section 17 of the American Law Institute, Restatement,
“Conflict of Laws,” states, “To acquire a domicile of choice, a
person must establish a dwelling-place with the intention of making it his
home,” and “The fact of physical presence at a dwelling-place and the
intention to make it a home must concur; if they do so, even for a moment, the
change of domicile takes place,” yet the converse of this proposition is
true in relation to losing a domicile once established. To retain it the
intention must persist to make it a home, and physical presence even for a
moment concurring with that intent will be sufficient to preserve that status.
Measured by such a rule the estate of Dr. Dorrance easily sustains its case.
The Commonwealth, being required to show that his domicile at Cinnaminson had
been abandoned, and that he intended [***47] to make Radnor his
permanent home or “preeminent headquarters,” cannot assume that
because he built a fine residence at Radnor with a more expensive maintenance
cost he intended such abandonment or to acquire a domicile at Radnor. Neither
the size of the building, the number of servants nor the expenses connected
therewith are persuasive as showing abandonment of a domicile long acquired and
retained through acts which show a positive intention to hold such domicile. Nor
may the fact that much of the family’s social [*181] life centered
about the new residence be so considered. All such acts are consistent with and
not hostile to the retention of domicile in New Jersey. During the summer and
winter his residence was at Bar Harbor, Jamestown, Palm Beach, or abroad; the
Radnor residence was closed when the family went away in the summer, but
Cinnaminson was kept open the year round to receive him and his family. How
much of the balance of the time he spent at either of these places does not
definitely appear. It is certain, however, that much of that time was spent at
Radnor, but the length of time spent at any particular place does not determine
domicile. Concurrent with [***48] physical presence in a place for
any time, there must be the intent to make the place a home. Intention is a
state of mind, evidenced, it is true, by acts, but it may be shown by words as
well.
The majority opinion speaks rather censuringly of Dr. Dorrance because he
desired to retain New Jersey as his residence rather than Pennsylvania. His
efforts in that direction are styled as “a claimed sentimental
attachment,” “to give color to his assertion,” “to bolster
his assertion that he retained domicile in New Jersey.” His church
affiliation is described as being “to avoid the appearance of identifying
himself with the community in which he resided with his family.” He wished
to retain New Jersey citizenship because in that state his taxes would not be
as heavy as in this State. I cannot see any good reason why a man should be
censured when he wishes to avoid a heavy tax rate such as we have in this
State, even if it is necessary for him to live in another state. It is not
contrary to law to reside in New Jersey rather than Pennsylvania, even if the real
purpose is to avoid taxes. “If one has the legal right to do a particular
thing, the law will not inquire into his motive for [***49] doing
it”: Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Title & Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570;
Vetter’s Est., 308 Pa. 447. Moreover, even these criticisms emphasize the
deliberate intention to retain his domicile in New Jersey. He had
[*182] his domicile there, wished to retain it, and while he wished
to have a residence in Pennsylvania, surely the fact of his acquiring this residence
should not impose on him the obligation of our citizenship with the resultant
liability for our taxes.
Dr. Dorrance had other reasons for wishing to remain a resident of New Jersey.
Our laws as to the devolution of property are different from theirs, as are
also our laws with regard to the execution of trusts.
[**314] I cannot see Dr. Dorrance’s residence in Pennsylvania as
other than a “show place,” as Mr. Justice SCHAFFER has stated. It was
an additional place of abode where he and his family might entertain on a
larger scale than was possible at the New Jersey home, and where they might be
nearer the social life of Pennsylvania. If the penalty for such acts in
Pennsylvania is to be assessed with our death taxes, it seems to me that
Pennsylvania is assuming a very difficult role in the sisterhood of states.
[***50] Radnor was not the home of Dr. Dorrance, nor was it his
domicile, and whatever his wife or his children might have thought proper or
convenient in this respect, and whatever they did, should not be visited on Dr.
Dorrance; nor should that he held conclusive in preference to acts in which he
did everything in his power to retain his residence in New Jersey. See Mr.
Justice SCHAFFER’s dissenting opinion on the facts. He not only voted there, he
had his church residence there, he was assessed there for personal property
taxes, he was appointed by the governor of that state on a commission, and all
his documents on which his address was necessary named New Jersey as his
residence.
While the case might seem difficult in some of its aspects, it seems to me that
the majority opinion has lost sight of what Dr. Dorrance himself did, and has
stressed too heavily what his family did.