In re Brown

2002 WL 32104169 (11th Cir.)

For opinion see 67 Fed.Appx. 590, 303 F.3d 1261

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit

In re: Jane McLean BROWN, Debtor.

Deborah C. Menotte, Appellant/Trustee in Bankruptcy,

Jane McLean Brown, Appellee.

Court of Appeals Docket No. 01-16211A.

January 14, 2002.

APPEAL FROM ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Appellee's Initial Brief

David Lloyd Merrill, Esquire, Cohen Conway Copeland Copeland Paiva & Merrill, P.A., 10570 S. Federal Highway, Suite 203, Port St. Lucie, Florida 34952, (561) 398-6000, Florida Bar No.: 99155, Attorneys for Appellee/Debtor Jane McLean Brown

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Appellee's position is that oral argument would significantly aid the Circuit Court of Appeals's decisional process, and would respectfully request the opportunity to present oral argument.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Cover Page ...

Certificate of Interested Parties ...

Statement Regarding Oral Argument ...

Table of Contents ...

Table of Citations ... i

Statement of Jurisdiction ... v

Statement of the Issue of Appeal ... vi

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRUST QUALIFIES AS A SPENDTHRIFT TRUST AND THEREFORE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE.

Statement of the Facts and Case ... vii

I. Record References ... vii

II. Nature of the Case ... vii

III. Course of Proceedings and Dispositions Below ... viii

IV. Statement of the Facts ... viii

V. Standard or Scope of Review for Each Contention ... ix

Summary of the Argument ... x

Argument and Citations of Authority ... 1

THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURT WERE CORRECT IN OVERRULING THE TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION TO THE CLAIMED EXEMPTION OF THE SUBJECT TRUST BECAUSE WHETHER TRUST IS SELF-SETTLED IS NOT, BY ITSELF, DETERMINATIVE OF THE FACT THAT THE TRUST IS NOT PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE.

1. The Income Received by the Debtor From the Trust is Not Property of the Bankruptcy Estate and is Otherwise Exempt From Creditors and the Bankruptcy Trustee pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 222.14. ... 1

2. The Corpus of the Trust is Not Property of the Estate. ... 1

Conclusion ... 8

Certificate of Compliance ... 9

Certificate of Service ... 10

*i TABLE OF CITATIONS AND AUTHORITIES

CASE LAW

Arizona Bank v. Morris, 435 P.2d 73 (1967), opinion modified 436 P.2d 499 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968) ... 6

Ball v. Nichols, 36 Fla. Supp. 91 (1971) ... 7

In re: Brackett, 54 B.R. 57 (Bankr. N.M. 1985) ... 6

In re: Cameron, 223 B.R. 20 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 1998) ... 2

In re: Cattalfi, 237 B.R. 853 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1999) ... 2

In re: Chase and Sanborn Corp., 904 F.2d 588 (11th Cir. 1990) ... ix

Cohen v. U.S., 191 B.R. 482 (S.D. Fla. 1995) ... ix

Cooke Trust Co. V. Lord, 41 Haw. 198 (1955) ... 6

Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 So. 243 (Fla. 1911) ... 3

Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 850 F.2d 1453 (11th Cir. 1988) ... 2

In re: Green, 115 B.R. 1001 (Bankr. W.D.Mo. 1990) ... 6

In re: JIJ, Inc., 988 F.2d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993) ... ix

In re: Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990) ... xi

In re Lawrence, 251 B.R. 630 (S.D.Fla. 2000) ... 2

In re: Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985). ... 4

In re: Mack, 269 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Minn 2001) ... 4

*ii In re: Martec Corp., 168 B.R. 427 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) ... ix

In re: McCollum, 612 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1993) ... xii

Miller v. Ohio Dept. Of Human Services, 664 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) ... 6

In re: Morgan's Estate, 72 A. 498 (Pa. 1909) ... 6

Morton v. Morton, 147 A.2d 150 (Pa. 1959) ... 6

In re: Owens, 86 B.R. 691 (M.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd. 877 F.2d 144 (11th Cir. 1989) ... ix

Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 762; 112 S.Ct. 2242, 2248 (1992) ... 5

Payiasis v. Robillard, 171 So.2d 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) ... 7

Preston v. City National Bank of Miami, 294 So.2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) ... xi

In re: Red Carpet Corp. Of Panama City Beach, 902 F.2d 883 (11th Cir. 1990) ... ix

Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846 (Fla. 1927) ... 7

Saunders v. Richard, 16 So. 679 (1895) ... 2

In re Shurley, 115 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1997) ... 2

Speed v. Speed, 430 S.E.2d 348 (Ga. 1993) ... 6

In re: Sublett, 895 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1990) ... ix

In re Spenlinhauer, 182 B.R. 361 (Bkrtcy.D.Me. 1995), affirmed, 195 B.R. 543 (D.Me. 1996) ... 2, 6

*iii In re: T & B General Contracting, Inc., 833 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1987) ... ix

Walker v. Close, 98 Fla. 1103, 125 So. 521, reh. denied 98 Fla. 1125, 126 So. 298 (Fla. 1929) ... 7

Waterbury v. Munn, 159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1947) ... xi, 3, 4

Wenzel v. Power, 100 Md. 36, 59 At. 194, 108 Am. St. Rep. 380 ... 2

In re: Wheat, 149 B.R. 1003 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992) ... 2

In re: Williams, 118 B.R. 812 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) ... 2

Matter of Witlin, 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) ... 2

STATUTES

Fla.Stat. § 222.14. ... viii, xi, 2

Fla.Stat. § 689.09 ... x

11 U.S.C. § 541(d) ... 5

11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) ... 5

26 U.S.C. § 664(d)(2) ... 2, 6

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ... v

Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(a) ... 2,6

OTHER AUTHORITY

Bogert on Trusts, § 222 (1992) ... 6

IIA, Scott, The Law of Trusts, Section 156 ... 6

*iv Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §§ 156 and 159 (1959). ... 6

9 FLA. JUR. 2d, CHARITIES § 5 (1979) ... 7

56 Fla.Jur.2d., Trusts § 1 (1985) ... x

56 Fla.Jur.2d., Trusts § 3 (1985) ... x

56 Fla.Jur.2d., Trusts § 9 (1985) ... x

56 Fla.Jur.2d., Trusts § 18 (1985) ... 7

History of Trusts, 6 Fla. St. B. Assoc. L.J. 342 ... x

*v STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This case is an appeal from a final decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291.

*vi ISSUE ON APPEAL

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRUST QUALIFIES AS A SPENDTHRIFT TRUST AND THEREFORE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE.

*vii STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

I. Record References.

Because part of the record on appeal is in the Bankruptcy Court Docket and part is in the District Court Docket, the following citations will be used to refer to the record

BR# ___ - followed by a corresponding number refers to the Document Number shown by the Bankruptcy Court Docket Sheet and, if applicable, the page number of that document.

DC# ___ - followed by a corresponding number refers to the document # shown by the District court Docket Sheet and, if applicable, the page number of that document.

RE# ___ - followed by a corresponding number refers to the exhibit and page number of the Record Excerpts that have been provided to the Court along with this brief.

The Appellant, Deborah C. Menotte, will be referred to as Appellant or Trustee. The Appellee, Jane McLean Brown, will be referred to as Appellee or Debtor.

II. Nature of the Case

The Appellee/Debtor concurs and joins with the Appellant/Trustee's dissertation of the Nature of the Case.

*viii III. Course of the Proceedings

The Appellee/Debtor concurs and joins with the Appellant/Trustee's dissertation of the Course of the Proceedings, except to note the inaccuracy of the Appellant's read of Judge Friedman's orders regarding the applicability of Fla.Stat. § 222.14 to this case. In the Court's clarification (BR#30-1, RE #I-1), the Court speaks only to the issue of the trust corpus not being exempt pursuant to that statute. The Court did not recede from its prior order (BR#27, RE#H) holding that the income stream from the trust is not property of the estate and is furthermore, pursuant to the dicta of that order, exempt pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 222.14. The Trustee has never appealed the latter issue.

IV. Statement of the Facts

The Appellee concurs and joins with the Appellant's dissertation of the Statement of the facts, except to note that characterizing of the formation of the subject Charitable Remainder Trust as "self settled" is incorrect: The Bankruptcy Court found that the Charitable Remainder Trust was formed at the behest of her family as part of an intervention related to the Debtor's chronic alcoholism and serious depletion of her inheritance by various boyfriends and other non-creditor persons (BR#27-1, RE#H-1) and furthermore found that third-party charitable remaindermen were the beneficiaries of the corpus. (BR#27-6, RE#H-6).

*ix V. Standard of Review for Each Contention

A. Bankruptcy and District Courts's Conclusions of Law.

A Circuit Court of Appeals enjoys de novo review over conclusions of law and the legal significance accorded the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact. In re: JIJ, Inc., 988 F.2d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993).

B. Bankruptcy and District Courts's Findings of Fact.

Findings of fact made by the Bankruptcy Court are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In Re: JIJ, Inc., 988 F.2d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993); Cohen v. U.S., supra; In Re: Owens, supra; In Re: Chase and Sanborn Corp., 904 F.2d 588 (11th Cir. 1990); In Re; Sublett, 895 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1990); In Re: T & B General Contracting, Inc., 833 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1987).

C. Bankruptcy and District Courts's Equitable Determinations.

Equitable determinations made by the Bankruptcy Court are subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. In Re: Red Carpet Corp. Of Panama City Beach, 902 F.2d 883 (11th Cir. 1990); In Re: Martec Corp., 168 B.R. 427 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).

*x SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Appellant continues to confuse the basis for finding a trust to be property of the estate. The issue of whether a trust is "self-settled" or not relates to the ancient statute of uses doctrine which, since the early history of English law, was closely interwoven with that of the law of trusts. 56 Fla. Jur. 2d, TRUSTS §§ 1, 3 (1985). See also, History of Trusts, 6 Fla. St. B. Assoc. L.J. 342. Specifically, the fact of a trust being self-settled merely raises a "red flag" with respect to the possibility of the legal and equitable ownership interests being or becoming vested in the same person or entity, which is impermissible in the context of a valid trust. 56 Fla.Jur. 2d, Trusts § 9 (1985). The statute of uses, codified in Fla.Stat. § 689.09, operates to vest both the legal and equitable title in a beneficiary in such a circumstance. Should that occur, any assets or income purported to be part of such a "trust" would in fact be assets or income of the debtor/beneficiary. Furthermore, if it is the "self-settled" nature of a trust that the Appellant finds offensive, they will have to look elsewhere than the Debtor to be offended for two reasons: First, the Bankruptcy Court already found that the trust was formed at the behest of her family as part of an intervention relating to her chronic alcoholism so it was not, in fact, self-settled; and second, in order to be considered "self-settled," each and every case and treatise cited by the Appellant requires that the settlor create a trust for his own benefit -- a fact that is undisputed *xi to be absent here since Ms. Brown has no power of alienation over the trust whose corpus is already vested in third-party Internal Revenue Service qualified charities. (BR #27-1, RE#H-6).

The more appropriate analysis in determining whether a trust is property of the bankruptcy estate is to determine what reservation of powers have been left in the settlor, trustee of the trust or its beneficiaries, since it is the power of alienation that reigns over whether a trust qualifies a spendthrift or support trust or not. In Re: Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1990); See also Preston v. City National Bank of Miami, 294 So.2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), (determining whether terms of a trust may be modified and what the effect of a power of termination can be on a spendthrift trust - trust held to be valid spendthrift in that case); Waterbury v. Munn, et. al., 159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1947), (determining whether a codicil providing trustee/beneficiaries more powers than originally granted created a basis for invalidating a "spendthrift trust" - trust held valid since no change in the alienability of the trust income occurred).

Finally, any discussion regarding the income to the trust is inappropriate since there has been no appeal of the issue from either the Bankruptcy Court's original Order (BR#27, RE#H) or its Order Clarifying July 26, 2000 Order. (BR #30, RE#I). In any event, the broad definition of an annuity provided by Fla.Stat., § 222.14 more *xii than amply covers the income stream herein, which is clearly a successive stream of monthly payments to be made until Ms. Brown's death that falls within the exemption statute. In Re: McCollam, 612 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1993).

*1 ARGUMENT

1. The Income Received by the Debtor From the Trust is Not Property of the Bankruptcy Estate and is Otherwise Exempt From Creditors and the Bankruptcy Trustee pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 222.14.

2. The Corpus of the Trust is Not Property of the Estate.

First and foremost, issues relating to the trust's income are not properly before this Court since income was never an issue appealed by the Trustee. Therefore, to the extent that income issues are raised by the Appellant, the Appellee will rest on its Argument as provided both its Brief before the Bankruptcy Court and Reply Brief before the District Court on this issue. Second, because the legal arguments raised by the Appellant in its first and second points substantially overlap, the Appellee will consolidate these issues within the main legal argument infra. Finally, the Debtor will rely primarily on the arguments previously made in her Brief before the Bankruptcy Court and Reply Brief before the District Court and for purposes of this reply will limit her response accordingly.

*2 The Trustee, as below, continues to erroneously believe that it is impossible for a self-settled trust to exist in Florida that is not attachable by creditors. In support of this position the Trustee once again raises a litany of cases which all include one common theme: The Debtor in each instance tried to create an instrument through which he could remain in control of his money and assets while at the same time keeping it from the reach of his creditors. See Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 850 F.2d 1453 (11th Cir. 1988); Matter of Witlin, 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Wenzel v. Power, 100 Md. 36, 59 At. 194, 108 Am. St. Rep. 380; In re Cattalfi, 237 B.R. 853 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 1999); In re Shurley, 115 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Lawrence, 251 B.R. 630 (S.D.Fla. 2000); In re Cameron, 223 B.R. 20 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla. 1998); In re Spenlinhauer, 182 B.R. 361 (Bkrtcy.D.Me. 1995) affirmed, 195 B.R. 543 (D.Me. 1996); In re: Wheat, 149 B.R. 1003 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992); In re: Williams, 118 B.R. 812 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990). None of these cases are applicable to the facts of this case as it remains uncontroverted that this Debtor holds no power of alienation over any portion of this trust, income or otherwise, and none of the above cases involved the use of a Charitable Remainder Trust which creates an equitable ownership interest in a third-party remainderman beneficiary whose rights cannot be disturbed by another beneficiary. 26 U.S.C. § 664(d)(2), Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(A). See Saunders v. Richard, 16 So. 679 (1895). In addition to the cases mentioned above, *3 the Trustee has raised Waterbury v. Munn, 159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1947) in support of its position.

The Trustee takes care to add emphasis to a line of dictum wherein the Waterbury court stated in mid-sentence that a "spendthrift trust is one that is created . . . for the maintenance of another, and at the same time securing it against his own improvidence or incapacity for self protection." Emphasis added. Waterbury at 605, citing, Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 So. 243 (Fla. 1911). The Trustee's purpose in doing so is to add support for its proposition that spendthrift trusts cannot be self-settled. However, the Waterbury court did not consider this issue. Waterbury involved whether an assignment of income from one beneficiary to another was valid. Waterbury at 604. Specifically, the spendthrift nature of a trust was called into question where a change was made to the will that provided the trustee/beneficiaries with more powers than they originally had. Id. The court ultimately determined that the spendthrift features of the original will were not destroyed due to the fact that the restrictions on the alienability of the income and profits of the trust were not changed. Waterbury at 606. Accordingly, the only issues visited by the court were those involving the powers of alienation enjoyed by the trustee/beneficiaries. In this case, the Appellee holds virtually no power of alienation. (BR#27-8, RE#H-8). Because the trustee/beneficiaries in Waterbury were held to not *4 have powers of alienation such that would rise to the level of destroying the spendthrift qualities of the trust in that case, it follows that the spendthrift trust in this case is valid under the Waterbury standard.

This Court considers whether a spendthrift trust is valid by analyzing the extent of the Debtor's powers of alienation as determined by the dominion and control exercised by a debtor or trust property. In re: Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985). This is consistent with the various bankruptcy cases which, in addition to determining whether trust property is property of the estate, will also review the powers held by the Debtor which might be administrable by the Trustee. In re: Mack, 269 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Minn 2001) (Reviewing the Debtor's powers in terms of their administrability by a trustee-in-bankruptcy, but ultimately determining the issues in that case strictly pursuant to Minnesota law). If the Debtor had the ability to distribute corpus to herself or increase the amount of income she could receive from the trust, then those powers could conceivably be exercised by the trustee to liquidate the bankruptcy estate's interest in that power. Such an exercise of power would be consistent with the holdings in the cases above in which the Debtors held substantial powers of alienation.

However, in this case the sole power enjoyed by the Debtor as trustee of the CRT is the power to designate the charitable beneficiaries of the trust -- and this *5 power is tightly regulated by the fact that any charity she selects must be an Internal Revenue Service qualified charity (BR#27-8, RE#H-8). 26 U.S.C. § 664(d)(2). Thus, to support the Trustee's position and end the analysis at the question of whether the Debtor is a trustee or settlor of a trust or not cannot be correct. To determine whether a trust qualifies as a spendthrift trust, a careful inventory of the powers afforded to its trustee must be made. In this case, the minute powers afforded to the Appellee do not rise to a level which would invoke the administration of same pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(d). Finally, the Appellant's statement that the meaning of the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" found in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) refers to state spendthrift law is misleading. The Supreme Court has held that state spendthrift law is a factor to consider when interpreting that phrase, but that the definition ". . . is not limited to, state spendthrift law." Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 762; 112 S.Ct. 2242, 2248 (1992). Therefore, because the corpus of this trust is now equitably owned by a third-party charity under Florida and federal law, there is no basis for claiming that the corpus is property of the estate administrable by the Appellant.

The second problem with the Appellant's argument is that it provides no analysis of what "self-settled" means in Florida. The Appellant espouses the view that it is a one-part test: e.g., if it was your assets and you formed the trust, it is self-settled. However, in each case and treatise cited by the Trustee, the second part of *6 the test is clearly set forth: a trust may be invalid as "self-settled" if the trust is made for the settlor's own benefit. In re: Morgan's Estate, 72 A. 498 (Pa. 1909); Speed v. Speed, 430 S.E.2d 348 (Ga. 1993); Arizona Bank v. Morris, 435 P.2d 73 (1967), opinion modified 436 P.2d 499 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968); Morton v. Morton, 147 A.2d 150 (Pa. 1959); Cooke Trust Co. V. Lord, 41 Haw. 198 (1955); Miller v. Ohio Dept. Of Human Services, 664 N.E.2d 619 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); In re: Spenlinhauer, 182 B.R. 361 (Bankr. Me. 1995), aff'd. 195 (B.R. 543 (D. Me. 1996); In re: Green, 115 B.R. 1001 (Bankr. W.D.Mo. 1990); In re: Brackett, 54 B.R. 57 (Bankr. N.M. 1985); Bogert on Trusts, § 222 (1992); IIA, Scott, The Law of Trusts, Section 156 at 155; Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §§ 156 and 159 (1959). The Trustee also makes he related argument that a spendthrift trust must be made for the benefit of another. These factors are not at odds with the Appellee in this case.

The trust in question is a Charitable Remainder Trust, which by the very definition provided in the Internal Revenue Code requires that the equitable ownership be vested in someone other than the Appellee - in this case a number of Internal Revenue Service Qualified charities. 26 U.S.C. § 664(d)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(a). Accordingly, by its very definition a Charitable Remainder Trust cannot be merely for the settlor's "own benefit." Furthermore, charitable trusts are viewed differently in Florida than are other trusts due to their charitable nature, and are *7 therefore accorded more protection from being rendered invalid since "[i]t is the policy of the courts to make every intendment in favor of charitable trusts." Ball v. Nichols, 36 Fla. Supp. 91 (1971); 9 Fla. Jur. 2d, Charities § 5 (1979). It remains uncontroverted that the subject trust is qualified as a Charitable Remainder Trust pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code. For this reason, the Appellant's argument fails on the second tier of Florida's definition of "self-settled" and the Appellant is left no basis for invalidating the spendthrift aspects of the subject Charitable Remainder Trust.

Very little has been made of the Bankruptcy Court's holding that the trust in question qualifies as a second, albeit distinct, form of spendthrift trust known as a "support trust." (BR#27-9, 10, RE#H-9, 10). In its order, the District Court declined to rule on that issue, but erroneously recited in dicta that the trust may not be a support trust by virtue of the fact that it did not see any specific language in the trust document denoting it as such. (DC#13-13, 14, RE#G-13, 14). Such specificity is unnecessary since no particular words are required to create a trust. 56 Fla.Jur.2d., Trusts § 18 (1985); see also Walker v. Close, 98 Fla. 1103, 125 So. 521, reh. denied 98 Fla. 1125, 126 So. 298 (Fla. 1929); Payiasis v. Robillard, 171 So.2d 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846 (Fla. 1927).

*8 CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing argument, including that provided in the Debtor's Brief before the Bankruptcy Court (BR# 22, RE#C), Reply Brief before the District Court (DC#10, RE#D) and the fact that the Trustee has cited only clearly distinguishable cases in supporting its positions, the Debtor urges this Court to follow the current state of the law and concur with the Bankruptcy Court by holding (1) that the CRT corpus belongs to the corpus beneficiaries and not the Debtor; (2) that the CRT corpus is not property of the estate administrable by the Trustee; (3) that what title is held by the Debtor, if any, is merely bare legal title leaving the trust not administrable by the Trustee; (4) that the income derived from the trust is not property of the estate and is otherwise exempt under Florida law; and (5) sustaining the Bankruptcy Court's dicta that equity and public policy dictate that this trust and its income are not property of the bankruptcy estate.