[DIVISIONAL COURT]

VAUXHALL ESTATES, LIMITED v. LIVERPOOL CORPORATION.

Public Health - Improvement Scheme - Acquisition of Land - Assessment of Compensation - Statutory Provisions - Construction - Provision that other Acts inconsistent therewith "shall cease to have or shall not have effect" - Operation on future Acts - Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 57), s. 7, sub-s. 1 - Housing Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 14), s. 46.

The Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, provides by s. 2 for the assessment of compensation in respect of land acquired compulsorily for public purposes according to certain rules; and by s. 7, "(1.) The provisions of the Act or order by which the land is authorised to be acquired, or of any Act incorporated therewith, shall, in relation to the matters dealt with in this Act, have effect subject to this Act, and so far as inconsistent with this Act those provisions shall cease to have or shall not have effect: ...."

The Housing Act, 1925, s. 46, provides for the assessment of compensation for land acquired compulsorily under an improvement or reconstruction scheme made under that Act in a manner differing in certain respects from that prescribed by the Act of 1919:-

Held, even on the assumption that s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1919 purports to apply to future Acts, that s. 46 of the later Act of 1925, in so far as its provisions for the assessment of compensation for land acquired thereunder are inconsistent with the provisions of the earlier Act of 1919, repeals by implication these provisions of that earlier Act.

Per Avory J.: Sect. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1919 on its true construction applies only to Acts which existed at the time when that Act was passed, and not to future Acts.

SPECIAL CASE stated by an official arbitrator under the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919. (1)

(1) The Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, provides:-

Sect. 1: "Where by or under any statute (whether passed before or after the passing of this Act) land is authorised to be acquired compulsorily by any Government Department or any local or public authority, any question of disputed compensation, .... shall be referred to and determined by the arbitration of such one of a panel of official abitrators to be appointed under this section as may be selected in accordance with rules made ..... under this section."

Sect. 2: "In assessing compensation, an official arbitrator shall act in accordance with the following rules:- ....

(2.) The value of land shall, subject as hereinafter provided be taken to be the amount which the land if

The Corporation of Liverpool (hereinafter called "the respondents") propounded a scheme, dated March 7, 1928, under the Housing Act, 1925, Part II. (1), for the improvement of the Queen Anne Street area of the city.

On November 23, 1928, the Minister of Health made an Order confirming the scheme.

The Order incorporated the Lands Clauses Act, 1845, as modified by the above-mentioned Acts of 1919 and 1925.

The Vauxhall Estates, Ld. (hereinafter called "the claimants"), were the owners of certain freehold lands and houses thereon situate within the area of the scheme. The lands were coloured pink and blue on a map sealed with the official seal of the Minister. The lands coloured pink on the map were included in the area on account of the sanitary

sold in the open market by a willing seller might be expected to realise: ...."

Sect. 7: "(1.) The provisions of the Act or order by which the land is authorised to be acquired, or of any Act incorporated therewith, shall, in relation to the matters dealt with in this Act, have effect subject to this Act, and so far as inconsistent with this Act those provisions shall cease to have or shall not have effect: ...."

[The marginal note to s. 7 is: "Effect of Act on existing enactments."]

(1.) The Housing Act, 1925, provides:-

Sect. 46: "(1.) Where land included in any improvement or reconstruction scheme made under this Part" [Part II.] "of this Act or the corresponding provisions of any Act repealed by this Act (other than land included in such a scheme only for the purpose of making the scheme efficient and not on account of the sanitary condition of the premises thereon or of those premises being dangerous or prejudicial to health) is acquired compulsorily, the compensation to be paid for the land, including any buildings thereon, shall be the value at the time the valuation is made of the land as a site cleared of buildings and available for development in accordance with the requirements of the building byelaws for the time being in force in the district:

Provided that, if in the opinion of the Minister it is necessary that provision should be made by the scheme for the re-housing of persons of the working classes on the land or part thereof when cleared, or that the land or part thereof when cleared should be laid out as an open space, the compensation payable to all persons interested in any land included in the scheme (other than as aforesaid) for their respective interests therein shall be reduced by an amount ascertained as follows: ....

(2.) Subject as aforesaid, the compensation to be paid for such land shall be assessed in accordance with the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919."

condition of the premises thereon or of their being dangerous or injurious to health, and the lands coloured blue were so included for the purpose only of making the scheme efficient.

A dispute having arisen between the parties as to the basis of assessment of the compensation to be paid by the respondents to the claimants for their land, the respondents applied for the appointment of an official arbitrator under the said Act of 1919, which was duly made.

On July 11, 1931, the question of disputed compensation was referred to the official arbitrator.

At the hearing before the arbitrator the above-mentioned facts were proved or admitted, and it was further admitted that, in the event of the claimants' contentions hereinafter mentioned proving unfounded in law, the amount by which compensation in respect of the part of the land coloured pink on the map should be reduced in accordance with the proviso to s. 46, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1925, was a sum equivalent to 5 per cent. on the amount of compensation ascertained by the arbitrator to be payable in accordance with that sub-section.

At the hearing before the arbitrator it was contended for the claimants: (a) that s. 46, sub-s. 1, of the above Act of 1925 was inconsistent with the above Act of 1919 in that it provided for the assessment of compensation on a materially different basis from s. 2 of the last-mentioned Act; (b) that, if that contention was correct in law, s. 46 of the Act of 1925 was, so far as related to the land coloured pink, of no effect, because of s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1919.

It was contended for the respondents that where land included in an improvement or reconstruction scheme made under Part II. of the Act of 1925 (other than land included only for the purpose of making the scheme efficient and not on account of the sanitary condition of the premises thereon or of those premises being dangerous or prejudicial to health) was acquired compulsorily, s. 46 of the Act of 1925 repealed, modified or overruled the above Act of 1919, save to the extent mentioned in s. 46, sub-s. 2, of the Act of 1925, and accordingly that the compensation payable to the claimants

in respect of the land coloured pink fell to be assessed in accordance with the said Act of 1919 as modified by s. 46, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1925.

If the Court should be of opinion that the compensation in respect of the land coloured pink should be assessed under s. 2, sub-s. 1, of the above-mentioned Act of 1919, and without regard to s. 46 of the Act of 1925, then the arbitrator awarded that the respondents should pay to the claimants 2370l. as compensation, 73l. towards the costs of the claimants, and the fees of the award.

If the Court should be of opinion that the compensation in respect of the land coloured pink should be assessed on the basis of s. 46 of the Act of 1925, i.e., as a site cleared of buildings and available for development in accordance with the requirements of the building by-laws of the city of Liverpool, subject to the reduction factor provided by that section, then the arbitrator awarded that the respondents should pay to the claimants 1133l. as compensation, 55l. towards the costs of the claimants, and the fees of the award.

H. A. Hill for the claimants. The compensation should be assessed according to the first of the two alternative awards of the arbitrator - namely, under s. 2, sub-s. 1, of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, and without regard to s. 46 of the Housing Act, 1925. The scheme in question was propounded by the Liverpool corporation for the improvement or reconstruction of the area to which it applied, the land in question being included on account of the alleged insanitary condition of the premises thereon. It is, therefore, a scheme which comes under the Housing Act, 1925, Part II., and not a mere private building scheme to which that Act does not apply: Bean & Sons v. Flaxton Rural Council. (1) The scheme was approved by the Minister of Health, and eventually sanctioned judicially. Before the Act of 1925 came into force, the compensation to be paid to a person whose land was compulsorily taken for the purposes of a scheme of this nature was assessed under

(1) [1929] 1 K. B. 450.

the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919. That Act, as appears from its title, amended the law as to the assessment of compensation in respect of land acquired compulsorily for public purposes, and it altered in some respects the Lands Clauses Acts, in which the whole law of compensation was previously contained. Sect. 1 provides that any question of disputed compensation shall be determined by an official arbitrator to be appointed under the Act; and s. 2 provides that in assessing compensation an official arbitrator shall act in accordance with the rules there set out, of which r. 2 provides that the value of the land shall be taken to be the amount which the land if sold in the open market might be expected to realize. The Housing Act, 1925, contains provisions of its own for the assessment of compensation to be paid to a person whose land is acquired compulsorily for the purposes of a scheme under Part II. of that Act. Sect. 46 of that Act provides, by sub-s. 1, that where the land is included in the scheme not only for the purpose of making the scheme efficient, but on account of the sanitary condition of the premises thereon or of those premises being dangerous or prejudicial to health, the compensation to be paid for the land, including any buildings thereon, shall be the value of the land as a site cleared of buildings, provided that if provision should be made by the scheme for re-housing on the land the compensation shall be reduced by an amount ascertained as therein provided; and by sub-s. 2 that, subject as aforesaid, the compensation shall be assessed in accordance with the Acquisition, &c., Act of 1919. It thus appears that where, as in the present case, land is authorized to be taken by the Act of 1925, the respective bases for the assessment of compensation to be paid for the land under the respective Acts of 1919 and 1925 are very different from each other. Under s. 2 of the Act of 1919 the owner of the land would receive compensation not only for the land itself, but also for the buildings upon it, and the compensation would not be reduced in the event of re-housing; whereas, under s. 46, sub-ss. 1 and 2, of the Act of 1925, the owner of the land would receive compensation for the land only and not for the buildings

upon it, and in the event of re-housing there would be a reduction of the compensation. As regards the assessment of compensation, therefore, the provisions of the Act of 1925 by which the land is authorized to be taken are inconsistent with those of the Act of 1919. It is not, indeed, disputed here that the later provisions are inconsistent with the earlier, and the amounts of the alternative assessments have been agreed between the parties. Though the Legislature, in enacting s. 46 of the Act of 1925, no doubt had the provisions of the earlier Acquisition Act of 1919 clearly in mind, it is nevertheless submitted that the provisions of s. 46 for the assessment of compensation in so far as they differ from those of the earlier Act of 1919 are of no effect whatever. They are prevented from having effect by s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1919, which enacts that the provision of the Act or Order by which the land is authorized to be acquired "shall, in relation to the matters dealt with in this Act, have effect subject to this Act, and so far as inconsistent with this Act those provisions shall cease to have or shall not have effect: ...." Certain further words which occurred in the proviso to that sub-section as it originally stood and which, if they were still in force, would prevent the claimants from raising this point, have been repealed by the Act of 1925. That sub-section on its true construction means that the provisions, not only of any existing Act, but also of any future Act, so far as inconsistent with that Act of 1919, shall be of no effect. If the intention had been to limit the sub-section to existing Acts, it would have been sufficient to say that other Acts "shall cease to have effect." The addition of the words "shall not have effect" clearly shows that the sub-section is to apply to future Acts also. Further, that sub-section of the Act of 1919 must be construed along with s. 1 of that Act, which provides that where by any statute, "whether passed before or after the passing of this Act," land is authorized to be acquired, any question of disputed compensation shall be referred to the permanent tribunal thereby created, and along with s. 2, which lays down permanent rules for the

assessment of the compensation; and when so construed it seems clear that it provides that other Acts, whether past or future, which are inconsistent with it, are not to have effect. The sub-section in so providing is not in conflict with the principle of the constitution that a statute cannot bind the Legislature for the future. It does not purport to bind the Legislature absolutely for the future. It does not assume to say that the Legislature may not by express enactment repeal or modify its provisions in any way that may be deemed advisable. It only provides that until these provisions be repealed or modified by express enactment they shall prevent future provisions which are inconsistent with them from having effect. It merely seeks to prevent the provisions of the Act of 1919, including the sub-section itself, from being repealed by implication by the inconsistent provisions of any subsequent Act. That being its object, the sub-section and the other provisions of the Act of 1919, until they are expressly repealed or altered, prevail over any subsequent inconsistent provisions, for the law will not allow the revocation or alteration of a statute by construction when the words may be capable of proper operation without it: see Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 7th ed., p. 136.

Neither the sub-section in question nor any other material provisions of the Act of 1919 have been expressly repealed by any subsequent Act, and they therefore prevail against any later provisions which are inconsistent with them. It follows that by virtue of s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1919 the compensation should be assessed under that Act and not under the inconsistent provisions of s. 46 of the later Act of 1925.

Montgomery K.C. for the respondents. The compensation should be assessed in accordance with the second of the two alternative awards of the arbitrator - namely, under s. 46 of the Housing Act, 1925; and not under the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919. The contention on behalf of the claimants that s. 46 of the Act of 1925 is rendered of no effect by s. 7, sub-s. 1, of that Act of 1919 cannot be supported. In order to understand the meaning and effect of that sub-section it is desirable to

consider the later history of the legislation in regard to compensation for land taken for the purpose of improvement or reconstruction. The Housing, Town Planning, &c., Act, 1919, which was passed in July of that year, provided for the compensation to be paid for land taken for the purposes of the Act. Sect. 9 (repealed) of that Act contained provisions identical with those afterwards re-enacted as s. 46 of the Act of 1925, and thus required that where land, such as that in question, has been taken not only for the purpose of making the housing scheme efficient, but on account of the condition of the premises thereon, the compensation for the land, including any buildings thereon, should be the value of the land cleared of buildings, and that in case of re-housing the compensation should be reduced as therein provided. Shortly afterwards - namely, in the following August, the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, was passed, which contained provisions differing in some respects from those of the earlier Act. Sect. 2 provided rules for the assessment of compensation, according to which the value of the land should, subject as thereinafter provided, be the amount which the land if sold in the open market might be expected to realize. It was not desired, however, to interfere with the provisions of the earlier Act or of Orders made or to be made under it, and accordingly s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the later Act provides that the provision of the Act or Order by which the land is to be acquired shall have effect subject to the later Act, and so far as inconsistent therewith those provisions "shall cease to have or shall not have effect." The Housing Act, 1925, consolidated the provisions of the earlier Housing Acts. Sect. 46, sub-s. 1, of that Act re-enacts in identical terms s. 9 of the Housing Act of 1919, and again affirms that the compensation for land such as that now in question shall be the value of the land cleared of buildings, and that in case of re-housing it shall be reduced as therein provided; and sub-s. 2 provides that "subject as aforesaid" the compensation shall be assessed in accordance with the Acquisition, &c., Act of 1919, which was now the earlier Act. Sect. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Acquisition, &c., Act of 1919,

on its true construction does not purport to apply to future Acts, such as the Housing Act, 1925. The provision in that sub-section that the provisions of other Acts or Orders "shall cease to have or shall not have effect" refers only to provisions of then existing Acts or of Orders made or to be made thereunder. It is somewhat unusual in form, but a provision in similar form occurs in certain other Acts, as for example in s. 9 of the Housing (Additional Powers) Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 99). The side note to s. 7, sub-s. 1, clearly shows that the effect of the Act of which it forms part is to be limited to existing enactments. If the sub-section on its true construction does purport to apply to future Acts, such as the Housing Act, 1925, it is to that extent inoperative as being in conflict with the principle of the Constitution of this country that no Act can prevent the Legislature from repealing or modifying it by a subsequent Act, either expressly or by necessary implication. The provisions of the Acquisition, &c., Act of 1919, in so far as they correspond to the provisions of the later Act of 1925, are entirely repealed. Where an Act is passed containing clauses which are inconsistent with and repugnant to those of an earlier Act, it repeals by implication those of the earlier Act: see per Field J. in Brown v. Great Western Ry. Co. (1) Consequently the provisions of s. 46 of the Act of 1925 for the assessment of compensation, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of s. 2, s. 7, sub-s. 1, and the other provisions of the Acquisition, &c., Act of 1919, repeal by implication these earlier provisions, including the words "shall not have effect" in that sub-section. If these earlier provisions were not repealed by the corresponding later provisions they would remain on the statute book as an inconvenient, or at least redundant, set of provisions and might thus give rise to great inconvenience. In view of these considerations the compensation payable to the claimants should be assessed under s. 46, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1925.

Hill in reply. It is clear that s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Acquisition, &c., Act of 1919, in providing as it does, purports to

(1) (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 744, 752.

affect future Acts by which land is authorized to be acquired, unless it be expressly prevented from doing so. In so providing the sub-section is not in conflict with the law of the Constitution. Several other well known statutes operate in a similar manner. Thus, the Lands Clauses Act, 1845, unless expressly excluded, is by virtue of its own provisions incorporated in many future Acts. The Acquisition, &c., Act of 1919 is incorporated in the Housing Act, 1925, not only by its own provisions, but also by the express terms of the later Act. The case of Blackpool Corporation v. Starr Estate Co., Ld. (1), is the only case hitherto decided under the Acquisition, &c., Act of 1919, but it does not appear to have much bearing upon the present case. The provisions of the Acts in question, which enable public authorities to take land by force against the will of its owner, are of a penal character, and if the meaning of any of these provisions, such as s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Acquisition, &c., Act of 1919, is doubtful, that construction of it should be preferred which is most favourable to the person who is being forcibly deprived of his property.

AVORY J. The question that arises in this special case stated by one of the official arbitrators appointed under the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, appears very clearly from the several contentions of the claimants and respondents as there stated. The claimants contended that s. 46, sub-s. 1 (2), of the Housing Act, 1925, is inconsistent with the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, in that it provides for the assessment of compensation on a materially different basis from that prescribed by s. 2 of that Act of 1919 (3); and further that if that contention was correct in law, then s. 46 of the Act of 1925 is of no effect because of the provisions contained in s. 7, sub-s. 1, of that Act of 1919. (3) In answer to these contentions of the claimants the respondents contended, as they have contended before us to-day, that where land, of the description in question, included in an improvement or

(1) [1922] 1 A. C. 27.

(2) See note (1) ante, p. 734.

(3) See note (1) ante, p. 733.

reconstruction scheme under Part II. of the Act of 1925, is acquired compulsorily, s. 46 of that Act repeals, modifies or overrules the provisions of the Acquisition, &c., Act of 1919, save to the extent mentioned in s. 46, sub-s. 2, of the Act of 1925, and accordingly that the compensation payable to the claimants falls to be assessed in accordance with the provisions of that Act of 1919, as modified by s. 46, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1925.

In order to decide between these contentions it is necessary to consider s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Acquisition, &c., Act of 1919. [His Lordship read that sub-section and continued as follows:] Mr. Hill, who has argued this case with great ability, invites us to say that s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1919 is to have effect to this extent, that s. 46 of the Act of 1925 is to be regarded as of no effect. In other words, we are asked to say that by a provision of this Act of 1919 the hands of Parliament were tied in such a way that it could not by any subsequent Act enact anything which was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act of 1919. It must be admitted that such a suggestion as that is inconsistent with the principle of the constitution of this country. Speaking for myself, I should certainly hold, until the contrary were decided, that no Act of Parliament can effectively provide that no future Act shall interfere with its provisions. I have come to the conclusion that s. 7 of the Act of 1919 on its true construction is restricted to existing Acts of Parliament. That conclusion is borne out by the marginal note to the section, "Effect of Act on existing enactments," but I had come to that conclusion before I noticed the words of the marginal note, and I should have come to the same conclusion without that note. That construction of the section avoids any conflict between the section and the principle of the Constitution, and gets rid of all the difficulty which would result from it.

Even if it be possible to read s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Acquisition Act, 1919, as applying to a future Act of Parliament, the question still remains to be considered whether the provisions of s. 46 of the Housing Act, 1925 - the Act which consolidates all the housing and town planning legislation - are not so

inconsistent with the provisions of the Act of 1919 that the two Acts cannot stand together; because, if they are inconsistent to that extent, then the earlier Act is impliedly repealed by the later in accordance with the maxim "Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant." When one is considering whether or not the provisions of s. 46 of the Act of 1925 are inconsistent with those of the Acquisition Act of 1919, it is important to bear in mind that in that same year 1919 and in the same session of Parliament in which the Acquisition Act was passed, but shortly before the passing of that Act, a previous Housing Act had been passed - namely, the Housing, Town Planning, &c., Act, 1919, in s. 9 of which are found the same provisions with regard to compensation as are re-enacted in s. 46 of the Act of 1925; and, although it is true that the Acquisition Act of 1919 provides by s. 1 that where by any statute, whether passed before or after that Act, land is authorized to be acquired, any question of disputed compensation is to be referred to one of the official arbitrators appointed thereunder, and by s. 2 that in assessing compensation an official arbitrator shall act in accordance with rules there set out, yet the mode of assessing compensation under these rules is different from that prescribed under the earlier Act. Bearing in mind that s. 46 of the Act of 1925 is a re-enactment of s. 9 of the Housing, Town Planning, &c., Act, 1919, there can, I think, be no question that the provisions of s. 46 are so inconsistent with those of the Acquisition Act of 1919 that these respective provisions cannot stand together. That conclusion is emphasized when regard is had to sub-s. 2 of s. 46 of the Act of 1925 which enacts that, "subject as aforesaid," the compensation shall be assessed in accordance with the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919. In other words, in 1925 the Legislature is saying that, subject to those new provisions, which are inconsistent with those of the Acquisition Act of 1919, the compensation is to be assessed in accordance with that Act of 1919. The words "subject as aforesaid" must mean that pro tanto there is an implied repeal of the provisions of the Acquisition Act of 1919.

In the result, therefore, dealing with the specific question which we are asked in this case, I come to the conclusion that the compensation in respect of the land in question should be assessed on the basis of s. 46 of the Housing Act, 1925 - namely, as a site cleared of buildings and available for development in accordance with the requirements of the building by-laws for the time being in force in the city of Liverpool, subject to the reduction factor as provided by that section, and that the award on that basis should stand.

HUMPHREYS J. I am of the same opinion. One is accustomed in these Courts to listen to the argument that a particular section of an Act of Parliament does not apply to the facts of a particular case. In this case the argument for the claimant is that s. 46 of the Housing Act, 1925, does not, and never can, apply to this or any other case, inasmuch as it is utterly void and of no effect - and that in spite of the fact that that section is merely re-stating the law as it had existed in and since 1919. That is certainly an astonishing proposition, and Mr. Hill has based it upon the language of s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, which provides that: "the provisions of the Act or order by which the land is authorised to be acquired .... shall .... have effect subject to this Act," and further that: "so far as inconsistent with this Act those provisions shall cease to have or shall not have effect." He says that these words mean that at no subsequent time shall it be competent for Parliament to alter the law as there laid down, except in one or other of two ways. He admits very frankly that it would be open to Parliament at any subsequent time to repeal that sub-section by express enactment, and he admits that it would be open to Parliament at any subsequent time to amend that sub-section by express enactment. He says, however, that the ordinary rule of construction, which lays down that where two inconsistent provisions are found in two Acts of Parliament, the one passed subsequently to the other, the later provision shall prevail and shall be deemed impliedly to repeal the earlier provision, cannot apply to this

sub-section because of its special terms. For my part I fail to follow that argument. If it is once admitted that Parliament, in spite of those words of the sub-section, has power by a later Act expressly to repeal or expressly to amend the provisions of the sub-section and to introduce provisions inconsistent with them, I am unable to understand why Parliament should not have power impliedly to repeal or impliedly to amend these provisions by the mere enactment of provisions completely inconsistent with them.

As regards the meaning of the provisions of s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1919, I have been impressed, if I may say so, by the very able argument of Mr. Hill, and I prefer not to express any final opinion upon the question whether the sub-section on its true construction applies only to then existing Acts of Parliament or may not apply also to future Acts. If we were at liberty to decide that question in accordance with our own views of what was the intention of Parliament, I think there can be no doubt that we would all agree that the intention of Parliament was not to tie its hands for the future, but we are only at liberty to construe the terms of an Act of Parliament by reference to the words that Parliament itself has used. The language of s. 7, sub-s. 1, is certainly very curious and very unusual, and I prefer not to express any opinion upon the question whether the sub-section taken by itself ought or ought not to be read as purporting to apply to future Acts of Parliament.

Assuming, however, for the purpose of argument, in favour of the claimants, that the sub-section does purport to apply to future Acts, then it seems to me to be clear that Parliament has exercised its power of overriding the provisions of the sub-section by enacting in s. 46 of the later Act of 1925 a set of provisions which are totally inconsistent with them.

I agree, therefore, that s. 46 of the Housing Act, 1925, applies to this case, and that the compensation to be awarded to the claimants should be assessed under that section.

MACNAGHTEN J. I also am of opinion that the compensation should be assessed under s. 46 of the Housing Act,

1925; but I say nothing at present regarding the construction of s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919.

Solicitors for claimants: W. W. Wynne & Sons, for T. J. Smith & Son, Liverpool.

Solicitors for respondents: F. Venn & Co., for Town Clerk, Liverpool.

J. R.