Greystoke (Andrew Lawrence) v Lloyd's of London
Alexander Consultants Ltd
Winterflood (Adam)

Date	04/03/98

Division	Civil

Case No	LTA 97/7574 CMS1

Page 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE LTA 97/7574/CMSI
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

(Mr. J. Wadsworth QC)

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand London WC2
Wednesday, 4th March 1998

B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE HIRST
LORD JUSTICE WARD

ANDREW LAWRENCE GREYSTOKE
Applicant

- v -

(1) LLOYD'S OF LONDON
(2) ALEXANDER CONSULTANTS LTD
(3) ADAM WINTERFLOOD - - - - - - - -

THE APPLICANT appeared in Person.

J U D G M E N T

(As approved by the Court)

LORD JUSTICE HIRST: This is an application for leave to appeal by Mr. Andrew Greystoke, who is a litigant in person, who appeals out of time (we extend his time) against an order made by Mr. Wadsworth QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court in the Queen's Bench Division, dated 12th December 1997, that the appellant be refused leave to amend his statement of claim and that his appeal against the order of Master Prebble dated 15th May 1997, made on the summonses issued by the first and third respondent, striking out the statement of claim and dismissing the action, be dismissed. We are going to grant leave to appeal.

I briefly explain the basis on which we do so. The amended statement of claim is to be found on page 73 and thereafter of the file. In it there are pleas of three statements which are alleged to be slander which are complained of in subparagraphs A, B and C on page 73 of the amended statement of claim. They were permitted as an amendment, rightly in my view, having regard to paragraph 6 of the affidavit of Mr. Gough, which actually vouches the three statements which are alleged to be slanders in paragraph 6 on page 66. That being the case, it seems to me reasonably arguable that there is nothing objectionable in the pleas of the three natural and ordinary meanings pleaded in paragraphs 8, 10 and 12 on page 74 of the amended statement of claim.

However, Mr. Greystoke then goes on to plead innuendos in paragraphs 10 and 12 which, if they stood as they are pleaded, would be objectionable, because for a true innuendo, where a secondary meaning is intended, particulars must be given of the facts and matters which support such a secondary meaning. None are given here by Mr. Greystoke. Having invited Mr. Greystoke to explain that part of his pleadings, it is clear that what he really intends is not an innuendo in the strict sense of the word, but a natural and ordinary inference from the words complained of, that they bear those meanings that are set out in the last sentences of paragraphs 10 and 12. On that footing, it is reasonably arguable that those parts of the pleadings are also unobjectionable.

Finally, there is a claim for exemplary damages in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the amended statement of claim. That of course is a very strictly confined claim, having regard to the decisions of the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 and Broome v Cassell [1972] AC 1027.

At first I was troubled by that plea, but Mr. Greystoke has explained that he is indeed seeking to claim exemplary damages. His case is that the defendants calculated that the publication of the libel would result in the loss of a lesser sum to them than if they did not have access to the funds, in excess of £108,000, to which he refers in paragraph 18. I have told him that I do not think that is clearly spelt out at the moment. No doubt he may come back later with a clearer form of words before the matter comes before the full court. In the meantime, I would not seek to shut out an appeal in relation to that aspect of the case. It follows that for these reasons I would grant leave to appeal.

LORD JUSTICE WARD: I agree.

Order: Application for leave to appeal allowed; extension of time allowed.